tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5743370102334877264.post1562325016505859247..comments2023-04-05T09:07:08.419-07:00Comments on Fides et Ratio: The Modal Third WayAnonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07034462951274070391noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5743370102334877264.post-85282766035715040322015-10-06T11:17:14.817-07:002015-10-06T11:17:14.817-07:00Interesting thoughts, as always, Syllabus. The res...Interesting thoughts, as always, Syllabus. The reservation I have is that premise (1) is true by definition. It's possible for a temporally contingent thing to fail to exist, even if it doesn't actually fail to exist.<br /><br />The rest of your well thought-out post misconstrues the Third Way with the Modal Third Way. It's important to distinguish Thomas' Third Way with Robert Maydole's Modal Third Way.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07034462951274070391noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5743370102334877264.post-28039850783658612802015-10-04T14:26:27.674-07:002015-10-04T14:26:27.674-07:00I'm not convinced (1) as it stands is true. Su...I'm not convinced (1) as it stands is true. Suppose we've got a temporally contingent entity E whose chances of not existing at a given time t(n) are P(~E)=1/(10^10) (or any other sufficiently small number). Now, if I examine a probability space S of sufficient size, say w/ 10^20 seconds, then P(~E|S) =1, sure. But if I examine one with size, say, 5^10 seconds, then P(~E|S') = 1/2. So I think a phrasing which would make it more plausible would be:<br /><br />1') <i>Given infinite time</i> every temporally contingent thing fails to exist at some time.<br /><br />Now, if you run this with a probability space of countably- or asymptotically-countably-infinite size, then of course P(~E|S) → 1, (assuming something like the principle of plenitude as regards infinite time and infinitesimal possibilities). But then this argument can terminate equally well as a rejection of past-infinite time (which is, all cards on the table, how I like to run Thomas' argument).<br /><br />Now, I agree that this is sort of a rephrasing, since I'm cashing it out in terms of probability instead of possibility. But I still think that the position holds when done in strictly modal terms. For instance, consider (2). If you restrict your consideration to <i>past</i> time, then it seems to me you've got to assume that it's possible, given a finite set of past instant, that there's an instant where all temporally contingent things fail to exist. But if we rephrase (2) as <br /><br />2a. If all things possibly fail to exist at some time, and time is past-finite, then it is possible that all things collectively fail to exist at some past time.<br /><br />then your opponent can simply say that, yes, given all infinite time, there is a time at which all temporally contingent things fail to obtain, but that the past is just a proper subset of that infinite set, and so your conclusion doesn't follow. If instead you go with<br /><br />2b. If all things possible fail to exist at some time, and time is past-infinite, then it is possible that all things collectively fail to exist at some past time.<br /><br />and then your premiss would be sound. But again, it's not clear whether the argument terminates as (6) or at the conclusion that time is not past-infinite.Syllabushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00563029287077473612noreply@blogger.com