tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5743370102334877264.post6014209942003642746..comments2023-04-05T09:07:08.419-07:00Comments on Fides et Ratio: A Simple Defense of the Modal Third WayAnonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07034462951274070391noreply@blogger.comBlogger70125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5743370102334877264.post-59645910939410973942012-10-14T09:30:22.175-07:002012-10-14T09:30:22.175-07:00It's a conditional necessity. Given that some...It's a conditional necessity. Given that something exists right now, it follows that there was never a past time at which nothing existed. This means one of two things: either a temporally necessary entity exists (which would explain why there was never a past time at which nothing existed), or some temporally contingent entity or other has always existed. The only other alternative is to say that something temporally contingent or other has always existed <i>and</i> a temporally necessary entity exists.<br /><br />Can you think of another alternative?Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07034462951274070391noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5743370102334877264.post-57638432265374733642012-10-14T06:40:28.695-07:002012-10-14T06:40:28.695-07:00Clearly, the 'necessarily' in step 5 doesn...Clearly, the 'necessarily' in step 5 doesn't follow (you cannot derive necessity from actuality, as it stands in step 3), and it seems crucial to the argument.Nueva Argentinahttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12219856503592516619noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5743370102334877264.post-17218014712001600842012-07-12T13:00:06.938-07:002012-07-12T13:00:06.938-07:00Okay, fair enough.Okay, fair enough.Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5743370102334877264.post-66474859837678286992012-07-12T10:40:39.253-07:002012-07-12T10:40:39.253-07:00I think I've shown what the contradiction is, ...I think I've shown what the contradiction is, but I'll let my comments stand and let the readers (if there are any at this point) decide for themselves.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07034462951274070391noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5743370102334877264.post-78792354776624157402012-07-11T15:26:24.034-07:002012-07-11T15:26:24.034-07:00Doug,
Knowing what you mean by 'corruptible&...Doug, <br /><br />Knowing what you mean by 'corruptible' a little better would simplify matters for me. <br /><br />As for your claim of impossibility, in my scenario there is no other entity other than E1 and time, and E1 ceases to exist, but time does not go on. The question as to which entity becomes incorruptible was a question to see whether you replied 'E1' or 'time'. <br />If E1, that's not the case because it ceased to exist. <br />If time, that contradicts your claim that if changes do not continue, time is corrupted. <br /><br />As for your claim that f) is logically impossible because allegedly an existing present becomes changeless, positing that E1 ceases to exist entails no contradiction, and since there is no other entity and no further change, there is no contradiction. <br /><br />But I think it's time for me to start wrapping up my participation in this discussion, since it's taking a bit too long and we do not seem to be making progress.Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5743370102334877264.post-51151617137590474812012-07-11T10:46:45.874-07:002012-07-11T10:46:45.874-07:00Angra, I thought I explained pretty clearly at wha...Angra, I thought I explained pretty clearly at what point the scenario is logically impossible. It's at (f), since an existing present becomes changeless.<br /><br />You ask, "Q3) If not, then what is the entity that is or becomes incorruptible (if any)."<br /><br />We don't need to know the answer to this. If it's necessary for something X in the scenario to become incorruptible, as I argue, then our lack of knowledge with respect to what exactly X happens to be doesn't change the fact that some X exists. It's like saying, "we don't know which country will win the 2014 World Cup, but some country has to."<br /><br />As for the meaning of the terms, "corruptible" and "incorruptible," you had stated you would ask me for an argument showing that something created must be possibly destroyed, and not just for a definition. Nevertheless, the definition allows for your scenario, so I see no need to define the terms in such a constrictive manner.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07034462951274070391noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5743370102334877264.post-71125052799631768472012-07-10T16:45:24.443-07:002012-07-10T16:45:24.443-07:00Doug,
I was asking about the meaning of the term...Doug, <br /><br />I was asking about the <i>meaning</i> of the term you introduced, namely 'incorruptible'. <br />It's your term, so your choice, but I would like to know whether an entity that can be caused to exist and might not exist before some time t, but which cannot be destroyed if it comes into existence, is corruptible or not. <br />It's a question about the meaning of your terms. <br /><br />Now, you say: "Since time is a measurement of change, time (change) may cease to exist, but it would leave something incorruptible as a result of the thing's changelessness. "<br /><br />But that does not tell me what is impossible (if anything) about the scenario, and what is incorruptible. So, my questions are: <br /><br />Q1) Is the following scenario logically impossible? <br />Q2) If yes, then at what point does it become so (i.e., which part is the one that makes it impossible), and why? <br />Q3) If not, then what is the entity that is or becomes incorruptible (if any). <br /><br />The scenario is the same as above: <br /><br />a) At W2, time is corruptible. <br />b) At W2, at any time prior to t0, and at t0, there are some corruptible substances, other than time. <br />c) At W2, there is no incorruptible substance. <br />d) a)&b)&c). <br />e) After t1>t0, there is only E1, and time. <br />f) At t2>t1, E1 ceases to exist, and time does not go on. Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5743370102334877264.post-56389635556110234412012-07-10T15:02:55.117-07:002012-07-10T15:02:55.117-07:00Angra, I'm not going to address your first que...Angra, I'm not going to address your first question directly, simply because my view isn't pertinent for the MTW to work. As I said previously, we can assume this is a logical possibility for the sake of argument.<br /><br />Your second question I'll address with your remaining scenarios. An existing present that happens to be changeless (oddly enough) would become incorruptible, since it cannot cease to be. Notice I'm not saying that this is actually the case, but simply that <i>if your scenario is logically possible</i>, it follows that something corruptible becomes incorruptible.<br /><br />Since time is a measurement of change, time (change) may cease to exist, but it would leave something incorruptible as a result of the thing's changelessness.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07034462951274070391noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5743370102334877264.post-92011678209116578942012-07-09T10:27:40.497-07:002012-07-09T10:27:40.497-07:00You say: "I don't think it's possible...You say: "I don't think it's possible for something to be possibly created, but not possibly destroyed."<br /><br />A couple of things: <br /><br />1) Are you saying that it is <i>logically</i> impossible that there is some entity E at world W such that E is caused to exist by F, but after E exists, neither F nor any other entity can destroy it? <br />If that's what you're saying, I would ask for some argument in support of that. <br />If, on the other hand, the 'possible' in "I don't think it's possible" is not a "possible" of logical possibility, please let me know. <br /><br />2) My my question was about the <i>meaning</i> of 'corruptible', as you defined the terms. If an entity like the one I described existed, would that qualify as 'corruptible' or 'incorruptible'? <br />Since you define the terms, it's your choice. But your definition is not clear enough to ascertain which one is the case, which is why I ask. <br /><br />You say: "What you say about w2 I don't think is possible, either. Assuming the corruptibility of time is possible, there still has to be some existing present in order to talk meaningfully about a past at which time and other corruptible entities existed." <br /> <br />Two points: <br /><br />1) I will add some more details; please let me know at which statement the scenario becomes logically impossible, in your view, and why you think that that is so: <br /><br />a) At W2, time is corruptible. <br />b) At W2, at any time prior to t0, and at t0, there are some corruptible substances, other than time. <br />c) At W2, there is no incorruptible substance. <br />d) a)&b)&c). <br />e) After t1>t0, there is only E1, and time. <br />f) At t2>t1, E1 ceases to exist, and time does not go on. <br /><br />2) You say that even assuming the corruptibility of time, there <i>still</i> has to be an existing present. But that seems to imply it is logically impossible that time ceases to exist (that seems to be Craig's position, btw).<br />But if that is the case, then given that you hold that it's logically possible to create time, then it follows that it's logically possible for something to be possibly created, but not possibly destroyed. <br />If so, then, my question would be as before: would be such something be corruptible or incorruptible, according to your terminology?Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5743370102334877264.post-50884742894757972862012-07-09T09:53:55.136-07:002012-07-09T09:53:55.136-07:00I don't think it's possible for something ...I don't think it's possible for something to be possibly created, but not possibly destroyed. But, that isn't a requirement for the argument to work. We can say that Z is created and cannot cease to exist at any future time. That has no effect on the MTW.<br /><br />What you say about w2 I don't think is possible, either. Assuming the corruptibility of time is possible, there still has to be some existing present in order to talk meaningfully about a past at which time and other corruptible entities existed.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07034462951274070391noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5743370102334877264.post-42309402770259558092012-07-08T09:54:52.272-07:002012-07-08T09:54:52.272-07:00Back to the points I'm trying to make, you say...Back to the points I'm trying to make, you say: <br /><br />“Your example of w2 actually covers some of the issues we talked about earlier. For example, if time is corruptible in w2, then whatever last changes at w2 will exist in a changeless state of affairs. (A future changeless state of affairs is possible, but a past one is not?) Thus, whatever entity this happens to be is incorruptible.” <br /><br />However, you misunderstand W2. In that world, the last change involves the destruction of all corruptible entities, and so all entities. Nothing is left. <br /><br />That said, I'm curious about your reply. <br />We can posit an alternative W3 in which some entity is indestructible, but came to exist, so it can fail to exist. Would that be corruptible or incorruptible? <br /><br />You defined the terms as follows: “X is incorruptible in w1 if X cannot fail to exist in w1. Y is corruptible in w1 if Y can fail to exist in w1.”<br /><br />Let's suppose that Z does not exist in w1 at t1, but it comes into existence at t2, and after it comes into existence, it can't fail to exist in the future, since there is nothing in t1 with the causal powers to destroy Z. Would Z count as 'corruptible' or 'incorruptible'? <br /><br />You ask: “I concede I'm having some difficulty following the coherence here. It's probably my fault, though. If I understand you correctly, you're saying in this case that there will always be some corruptible entity or other? “<br /><br />No, what I'm saying is the following. <br /><br />Before a time t0, at any previous time, there is always some corruptible entity or another. Then, time goes on, and there are corruptible entities, until finally, all of them cease to exist, and so does time. <br /><br />The scenario is not contradictory. It would mean that at W2, 4) is true but 5) is not true.Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5743370102334877264.post-42749268758186071892012-07-08T09:42:49.812-07:002012-07-08T09:42:49.812-07:00Doug,
A past changeless state would be possible...Doug, <br /><br /><br />A past changeless state would be possible in the sense that something does not change as time goes by, except for the passage of time. But that's not what we're talking about. <br />What I'm saying is not possible is an allegedly changeless state that is somehow timeless, but then <i>changes</i> into a next state, which is temporal. That would be ontologically indistinguishable from a temporal first state. But in any case, I'm happy to let my reply to Craig's KCA (which deals precisely with this matter, and which I posted <a href="http://angramainyusblog.blogspot.com/2012/02/post-below-post-is-brief-reply-tothe.html" rel="nofollow">here</a> speak for itself, as it is not required to make my point here. <br /><br />So, getting back to the matter at hand, in the next post I will consider your objections.Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5743370102334877264.post-77312607289047320262012-07-08T07:40:56.515-07:002012-07-08T07:40:56.515-07:00Angra, I think you're still conflating changel...Angra, I think you're still conflating changelessness with immutability. If we hypothesize that there is never a t1, then something may still exist at t0. Your objection is pretty similar to Quentin Smith's, so I'm happy to let the literature speak for itself. In any case, if you're convinced that a past changeless state of affairs is impossible, then that only illustrates the truth of (5). After all, there was still never a past time at which nothing existed.<br /><br />Your example of w2 actually covers some of the issues we talked about earlier. For example, if time is corruptible in w2, then whatever last changes at w2 will exist in a changeless state of affairs. (A future changeless state of affairs is possible, but a past one is not?) Thus, whatever entity this happens to be is incorruptible.<br /><br />You add, "However, let's take some time t in W2, at which there are corruptible entities. For every time time u < t there is at least one corruptible entity. Yet, it's not necessary that at W2, some corruptible entity exists, since they all cease to exist, and time is corrupted too."<br /><br />I concede I'm having some difficulty following the coherence here. It's probably my fault, though. If I understand you correctly, you're saying in this case that there will always be some corruptible entity or other? If so, then it has to be necessary, or else we have the problem above - namely, that time's possible non-existence would entail the changeless existence of some entity or other.<br /><br />By the way, I have no problem with you talking about w2 as opposed to the actual world. I know you're talking about validity.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07034462951274070391noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5743370102334877264.post-52728268622518695402012-07-07T10:50:09.952-07:002012-07-07T10:50:09.952-07:00Just to clarify a point: when I say the argument i...Just to clarify a point: when I say the argument is invalid, I'm assuming merely for the sake of the argument that it's not incoherent to say that there is an 'undifferentiated' state that is somehow either a past state at which time does not exist, or a future state at which time does not exist, so there is a state at which time fails to exist, and time is corruptible. <br /><br />If that is not coherent, then premise 6. on its own entails that there exists an incorruptible entity, namely time. <br /><br />One way or another, the argument does not work.Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5743370102334877264.post-38105359098263054622012-07-07T10:14:42.846-07:002012-07-07T10:14:42.846-07:00Thanks for the clarification on the modifications....Thanks for the clarification on the modifications. <br /><br />Following your instruction, and considering that the 'necessarily the case' is 'in the actual world' (as you clarified before) the re-written argument is as follows: <br /><br />1. Something cannot come from nothing. (Premise)<br /><br />2. If something presently exists, then there was never a past time at which nothing existed. (Implied by 1)<br /><br />3. Something presently exists. (Premise)<br /><br />4. Hence, there was never a past time at which nothing existed. (From 1 - 3)<br /><br />5. It is necessarily the case in the actual world that some corruptible entity or other has always existed. , or an incorruptible entity exists. (Implied by 4)<br /><br />6. Possibly, there was a past time at which nothing corruptible existed. (Premise)<br /><br />7. Therefore, an incorruptibly entity exists. (From 5 and 6)<br /><br /><br />My first objection would be that the argument is invalid, as the following example shows: <br /><br /><br />S9: <br /><br />All of the substances in a world W2 not counting time such that they can be destroyed, and eventually they will. So, all those substances are corruptible. <br /><br />As for time itself, at some point it will end (where there are no other substances), which means that time is corruptible too (by your own example that time would in that case be corruptible). <br /><br />So, time goes on from a beginning (where there are corruptible entities) to an end, when all corruptible entities cease to exist. <br /><br />So, there is no incorruptible entity in W2. <br /><br />However, let's take some time t in W2, at which there are corruptible entities. For every time time u < t there is at least one corruptible entity. Yet, it's not necessary that at W2, some corruptible entity exists, since they all cease to exist, and time is corrupted too. <br /><br />So, let's consider 4. and 5, substituting 'W2' for the actual world. <br /><br />4'. Hence, there was never a past time at which nothing existed. (From 1 - 3)<br /><br />5'. It is necessarily the case in W2 that some corruptible entity or other has always existed. , or an incorruptible entity exists. (Implied by 4). <br />Then, 5' is <i>not</i> implied by 4', since in W2 4' is true (taking the past from t), 5' is false, and W2 does not appear to be contradictory. <br /><br />So, the argument is invalid. <br /><br />I do not claim, of course, that the actual world is like that. The point is merely about the validity of the argument, not about how the world actually is. <br /><br />If the use of W2 instead of the actual world is a problem for you (though there is no reason for that; my point is about validity), we may as well say the following: It might be the case that the actual world is like W2, and then 5. does not follow from 4.Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5743370102334877264.post-22462445761561802622012-07-07T10:01:36.785-07:002012-07-07T10:01:36.785-07:00Doug,
Using the word 'changeless' in its...Doug, <br /><br />Using the word 'changeless' in its usual sense, a changeless object O would be an object that does not change <i>as time goes by</i>, or that does not change at all. <br />If you have an object O at some initial state S0, and then that object changes and is different at some next state S1, and there is no temporal interval within S0, and no other state between S0 and S1, then it's not the case that O is changeless. <br /><br />The claim would be false. That's what I've argued elsewhere extensively. <br /><br />Also, I would not call t1 is a temporal <i>event</i>, but a temporal state. I'm using 'event' to mean 'any change', following Craig's terminology in 'The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology'. <br />But the point is that there is no ontological difference between the two first states; that's why the God proposed by Craig in the KCA is impossible. <br /><br />That said, I've already argued extensively for that on my blog, so I'll leave it there. <br /><br />Regarding the argument, I will consider it in the next post.Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5743370102334877264.post-95473479100244682012-07-07T07:38:09.577-07:002012-07-07T07:38:09.577-07:00Think of it this way. We have t0, which is a chan...Think of it this way. We have t0, which is a changeless state. Now suppose that t1 does not occur. It's still conceivable that something exists at t0. Just make sure you're not conflating "changeless" with "immutable."<br /><br />As I'll reiterate, if you remove t0 and are left with t1, which is a temporal event, then that temporal event must have changed from something. This is a contradiction, so any initial state cannot be temporal.<br /><br />I misunderstood what you most recently meant by "causal possibility." Right now, I think that's an appropriate term.<br /><br />As for rewriting the argument, just replace "temporally contingent" with "corruptible," and "temporally necessary" with "incorruptible."Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07034462951274070391noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5743370102334877264.post-82431073140329199092012-07-06T10:37:24.952-07:002012-07-06T10:37:24.952-07:00With respect to an allegedly changeless initial st...With respect to an allegedly changeless initial state, you say: "Now, you say that a changeless state would have to change into a temporal state. Why is this a problem? At t0, there is an undifferentiated state of affairs at which no time/change precedes it. At t1, we have a first moment of time, which is preceded only by t0. It's only called a "precession" because of t1's change (or "coming to be") from a state of changelessness. "<br /><br />The point is that there is nothing changeless about t0. I mean, the word 'changeless' is used, but the initial state <i>changes</i> into the second. It's ontologically indistinguishable from a scenario in which we remove t0, and t1 is the first temporal state, which changes into the second, then the third, etc. <br />In other words, there is no sense of 'changeless' in which the state at t0 is so. <br />Similarly, calling the state at t0 'undifferentiated' is a mysterious word, but the state just changes as a first temporal state would. <br /><br />You say: "By the way, I'm not saying you're intentionally committing yourself to Kant's antinomy. It's just that a first state of affairs that happens to be a change would have to change from something (premise 1). Otherwise, it's not really a change at all."<br /><br />A state of affairs is not a change. A state of affairs changes into another state of affairs. I take no stance on whether there is an initial state of affairs that changes into something else. I do not see how that would be 'changeless' or 'undifferentiated', unless by that you just mean that there was no <i>previous</i> change, but that would be an unusual usage, and in particular that would mean that a first temporal state (i.e., a t=0) is also 'changeless' or 'undifferentiated', even though it's temporal. <br /><br />I will leave it at that for the sake of brevity, but I argued these issues in much greater detail in the post I linked to before (i.e., the brief reply to the KCA), and even in greater detail in the longer reply. <br /><br />I prefer to leave it at that for now, and address other aspects of the argument first. <br /><br />On the issue of intuitions, you say: "Your last couple of paragraphs is concerned with your mild skepticism of intuition. That's fine. From my perspective, our intuition and observations in conjunction with one another ought to be trusted apart from some defeater. I don't think modern physics undermines any of these things. "<br />I agree if I read it correctly, and I would say that that's because the observations are actually use of our intuitions in a familiar setting. In other words, by making observations, we're bringing some aspects of the phenomena we want to study down to Earth, so to speak. <br /><br />The observations in question (the act of actually observing stuff in the lab, or even through a telescope) are events that happen at low speed, on Earth, etc., even if they're the consequence of weird things, so we're still using our intuitions in cases in which they're trustworthy. That's the way to study weird stuff.Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5743370102334877264.post-87424609476478071762012-07-06T10:36:57.232-07:002012-07-06T10:36:57.232-07:00Regarding "corruptible" vs. "incorr...Regarding "corruptible" vs. "incorruptible" I was asking what kind of possibility you meant by "cannot" in the definition. I know it's not strict logical possibility or metaphysical possibility, since 'corruptible' is defined in terms of specific worlds, so I thought maybe causal possibility. <br /><br />But if it's not, I'm having trouble understanding the concept. <br />Also, with regard to the MTW, I still do not know how you write the modified argument (i.e., the premises using 'corruptible' and 'incorruptible', instead of 'temporally contingent', etc.). <br />So, I can't make an assessment for now. If you let me know what the modified argument is, I will try to assess it, but as I mentioned, I have some difficulty with the 'corruptible' concept, since I'm not sure what kind of possibility you're talking about. <br /><br />On that note, you ask whether I now agree with premise 5. <br />However, in the original argument, 5. was not a premise, but was said to follow from 4. In the new argument (i.e., using 'corruptible', etc.), I do not know what the premises are, so I would have to ask you what the argument is before I can make any assessments.Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5743370102334877264.post-36917562422048651262012-07-06T07:35:07.825-07:002012-07-06T07:35:07.825-07:00I understand, and thank you for the clarification....I understand, and thank you for the clarification.<br /><br />I don't think we have to think of corruptible versus incorruptible as terms that necessarily entail causality. After all, premise (1) of the OP entailed a very weak causal principle at the most.<br /><br />Now, you say that a changeless state would have to change into a temporal state. Why is this a problem? At t0, there is an undifferentiated state of affairs at which no time/change precedes it. At t1, we have a first moment of time, which is preceded only by t0. It's only called a "precession" because of t1's change (or "coming to be") from a state of changelessness.<br /><br />By the way, I'm not saying you're intentionally committing yourself to Kant's antinomy. It's just that a first state of affairs that happens to be a change would have to change <i>from something</i> (premise 1). Otherwise, it's not really a change at all. <br /><br />Physics does provide us with some "weird" information, but let's not blow it out of proportion. As chaotic as some popular scientific journals make the quantum level out to be, the quantum vacuum and its fluctuations have a rich field of energy and subject to various laws of physics. It's not as it chaos reigns supreme on the quantum level. I realize you're not saying that it does, but I wanted to get some clarification about this.<br /><br />Your last couple of paragraphs is concerned with your mild skepticism of intuition. That's fine. From my perspective, our intuition <i>and observations</i> in conjunction with one another ought to be trusted apart from some defeater. I don't think modern physics undermines any of these things.<br /><br />Either way, will you now agree with premise (5)?Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07034462951274070391noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5743370102334877264.post-75054811771865423882012-07-05T19:30:36.266-07:002012-07-05T19:30:36.266-07:00On the definition of 'corruptible', I have...On the definition of 'corruptible', I have a question: is that 'cannot' a claim about causal possibility? <br /><br />Also, I'm not sure how you would write the MTW using 'corruptible'. <br /><br />You say: "I disagree that the term "past" state of affairs necessarily entails or implies a time, since time is change, and it's conceivable for there to have been a changeless state of affairs once we "rewind" all temporal events. If you deny this, then I don't see how you're not committing yourself to Kant's antinomy. For, if this state of affairs is a time, and therefore a change, it must have changed from a previous change." <br /><br />I do not see how to conceive of that. If there is some initial state, that state <i>changes</i> into another state, so I do not see in which sense that first state could be said to be 'changeless', since it would change into some other state, and can't be said to remain changeless <i>as time goes by</i>. <br /><br />In any case, I'm not committing myself to the claim that for every state, there is a previous one. There might be, for all I know, a first state. I just do not know how that first state would be 'changeless', since it would change into something else. But it would still be first, so there is no such commitment on my part. <br /><br />That said, modern physics is so weird that I would hold judgment on whether time, space, etc., is corruptible or not.<br /><br />Generally speaking, my position is as follows: <br /><br />While we're usually justified in trusting our intuitions, in some cases there are good reasons to think that some of those intuitions fail. <br /><br />In particular, our pretheoretical intuitions about time and space turn out to be pretty good approximations when it comes to making predictions in daily life, but they fail if we try to apply them to time and space at scales that are far beyond that context, such as the universe as a whole (or even the galaxy, etc.), or the subatomic realm; modern physics is really weird. <br /><br />Given that, I do not think we're justified in using our intuitions to decide matters such as, say, whether time can or does have a beginning, whether space can have a cause, can be destroyed, etc. (using 'can' in a causal sense, in the actual world, which is what seems to matter in the argument), or whether all events will eventually cease (though I doubt it). <br /><br />So, I do not take a stance on whether there are incorruptible entities, in particular on the issue on whether time is so.Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5743370102334877264.post-22336164247782762672012-07-05T19:04:33.249-07:002012-07-05T19:04:33.249-07:00X is incorruptible in w1 if X cannot fail to exist...X is incorruptible in w1 if X cannot fail to exist in w1. Y is corruptible in w1 if Y can fail to exist in w1.<br /><br />I disagree that the term "past" state of affairs necessarily entails or implies a time, since time is change, and it's conceivable for there to have been a changeless state of affairs once we "rewind" all temporal events. If you deny this, then I don't see how you're not committing yourself to Kant's antinomy. For, if this state of affairs is a time, and therefore a change, it must have changed from a previous change.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07034462951274070391noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5743370102334877264.post-85751332496448568042012-07-05T18:47:15.973-07:002012-07-05T18:47:15.973-07:00I'm not sure how the argument would be in that...I'm not sure how the argument would be in that case (i.e., definitions, premises, etc.). <br />If you could write the modified argument (at least, the premises that are modified), and provide a definition of the term you choose (whether 'incorruptible' or some other term), then I could try to assess the argument.Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5743370102334877264.post-91882973253181325392012-07-05T18:42:38.281-07:002012-07-05T18:42:38.281-07:00I realize there has been some imprecision in how w...I realize there has been some imprecision in how we're defining our terms, but it was implicit earlier that time was considered to be temporally contingent if it ceases to beget any future change. Maybe "ontologically contingent" would work, or maybe we could talk about things being "incorruptible" versus "corruptible." Time would be a corruptible thing if it ceases to beget change, even if it's temporally necessary in a trivial sense.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07034462951274070391noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5743370102334877264.post-68722354923791157522012-07-05T18:40:24.722-07:002012-07-05T18:40:24.722-07:00If it's a past states of affairs, that seems t...If it's a <i>past</i> states of affairs, that seems to also imply time as far as I can tell. <br /><br />Also, the MTW (premise 2., 4., premise 6) all talk about a past time, and the concept of 'temporal necessity' is also defined in terms of time. <br /><br />If you have a modified argument in mind, with different premises, definitions, etc., I would have to ask what the argument is before I can assess it.Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.com