Theological non-cognitivism is the claim that statements like, "God exists," "God is good," and "God loves me," are not only false, but literally meaningless. It amazes me that even a small segment of the atheist population still adopts this view. Although some significant work had been done prior, it was likely Alvin Plantinga's The Nature of Necessity that put the final dagger in theological non-cognitivism, logical positivism, and the verification principle.
I say that theological non-cognitivism (TNC) is the atheist's equivalent to the Christian's Young Earth Creationism (YEC) because there is a trend among both groups to ignore either scientifically or philosophically compelling reasons to reject them. Science clearly shows the universe has existed for roughly 15 billion years.
Moreover, the creation account in Genesis 1 has for centuries, and now millennia, been interpreted figuratively. I won't go into great detail here, but you'll see how Days 1 and 4, 2 and 5, and 3 and 6 each correspond to one another. On Day 1, God created light, whereas on Day 4 God created the sun and the moon. On Day 2, God separated the land from the sea, and on Day 5 God created sea animals and birds. Finally, on Day 3, God created land vegetation, and on Day 6 God created land animals of all sorts, including human beings. In other words, the author of Genesis was simply using a rhetorical device in order to illustrate the hierarchy of creation.
The problems with TNC are many as well. When a theist talks about a Cosmic Designer who transcends the universe, and is therefore timeless, changeless, immaterial, eternal, indestructible, and enormously powerful and intelligent, what's the objection the proponent of TNC has to offer? There can be no immaterial mind, and the very concept of an immaterial mind is incoherent, as I often hear from these TNC proponents? If that's all they have to offer, then they're simply begging the question against theism. On what grounds does the TNC-er make such an unsubstantiated claim?
Tuesday, September 23, 2014
Friday, September 12, 2014
Atheistic non-Naturalism
Thomas Nagel, author of the famous "What Is it Like to Be a Bat?" (1974), fits the description of an atheist who ardently rejects Naturalism (with a capital "N"). For Nagel, a philosopher of mind, the mind cannot be simply reduced to the brain or as a mere emergent property. In support of this, we are reminded that thoughts have a certain aboutness concerning them. Why is this so important?
Well, aboutness cannot be explained in terms of only physical processes. To think about something is to have an intentionality concerning what is thought about. However, where in the brain can aboutness or intentionality be found? Nowhere, at least according to Nagel, as well as many theistic philosophers.
If one were to explore the human brain, sure, there would be neurons firing away. However, neurons aren't about anything; they're simply physical parts of the brain. They might be used to express aboutness, but this is no different than a pianist using a piano to play some beautiful music. While Nagel does not use any modal argument in favor of mind-body dualism (or its cousin, hylomorphism), his argument does help to supplement such arguments:
1. Possibly, my mind exists apart from my body. (Premise)
2. Necessarily, whatever two objects do not possess the same attributes are not identical. (Premise, Leibniz's Law)
3. Therefore, my mind is distinct from my body. (From 1 and 2)
This isn't a theistic argument per se, although philosophers, such as J.P. Moreland, provide further arguments based on this in favor of theism. However, if this is a sound argument, then not only is Naturalism defeated, but the atheist can no longer claim that God's immaterial mind is something contradictory or incoherent.
Well, aboutness cannot be explained in terms of only physical processes. To think about something is to have an intentionality concerning what is thought about. However, where in the brain can aboutness or intentionality be found? Nowhere, at least according to Nagel, as well as many theistic philosophers.
If one were to explore the human brain, sure, there would be neurons firing away. However, neurons aren't about anything; they're simply physical parts of the brain. They might be used to express aboutness, but this is no different than a pianist using a piano to play some beautiful music. While Nagel does not use any modal argument in favor of mind-body dualism (or its cousin, hylomorphism), his argument does help to supplement such arguments:
1. Possibly, my mind exists apart from my body. (Premise)
2. Necessarily, whatever two objects do not possess the same attributes are not identical. (Premise, Leibniz's Law)
3. Therefore, my mind is distinct from my body. (From 1 and 2)
This isn't a theistic argument per se, although philosophers, such as J.P. Moreland, provide further arguments based on this in favor of theism. However, if this is a sound argument, then not only is Naturalism defeated, but the atheist can no longer claim that God's immaterial mind is something contradictory or incoherent.
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