A Universe Governed By Law

In a world where God exists and has designed the universe, we would expect the universe to be governed by certain laws: logical, mathematical, scientific, moral, and even aesthetic. Given that our universe is governed by such laws, this is inductive evidence that God exists, to say nothing of deductive arguments (e.g. the conceptualist argument).

The Atlantic, a political magazine I have recently subscribed to and have enjoyed quite a bit thus far, features an article by Judith Lewis Mernit in its June edition. The article, "Is San Francisco Next?," discusses the manner in which seismologists predict earthquakes. Now, what is the connection between these first two paragraphs I've just written?

Mernit comments, "Some established geophysicists insist that all earthquakes are random, yet everyone agrees that aftershocks are not. Instead, they follow certain empirical laws." This raises an important question: does our ignorance of what the law-like mechanism behind earthquakes are imply that there are no such laws? To treat Mernit's statement as if she is answering in the affirmative would be, I think, uncharitable. After all, much of the article subsequently goes on to explain what the mechanisms that cause earthquakes (and how we can predict them) might be.

For example, Mernit points out that "[r]ocks can be subject to two kinds of stresses" that result in earthquakes (clamping and shearing). Obviously, rocks and other physical objects are subject to laws of nature (gravity, electromagnetism, and the strong and weak atomic forces are most fundamental to the universe), and so it would be hasty for the reader to conclude that geophysicists are talking about earthquakes being entirely devoid of laws.

The conclusion we should draw from this example is that ignorance of law (an epistemological issue) does not at all imply the absence of law (a metaphysical issue). I just worry that some readers may take "random" to mean "devoid of law," which simply isn't the case. In my mind it's more hyperbole than anything else.

Williame Rowe's Evidential Version of the Problem of Suffering, Plus the Ontological Argument Once More

William Rowe, like most philosophers of religion today, rejects the notion that "God exits" is logically incompatible with pain and suffering. I will delve into the logical problem of suffering at a later time, but for now I want to focus on the implications of Rowe's argument. "God" is to be understood not only as a Creator/Designer/Sustainer of the universe, but as a maximally great being (all-powerful, all-knowing, and morally perfect). Rowe himself argues like this:

1. Pain and suffering exist. (Premise)

2. If God exists, we would most likely know what the morally sufficient reasons God has for allowing pain and suffering are. (Premise)

3. We do not know what the morally sufficient reasons are. (Premise (3)

4. Therefore, God most likely does not exist. (From 1 - 3)

Again, Rowe isn't arguing in favor of atheism. Even if he is correct above, there could still exist a very powerful personal Creator, and so forth. Rowe is only arguing against God as a maximally great being.

First, the theist could challenge any of the premises. Premise (1) should be granted because of its perspicuity. (3) is debatable. The Free Will Defense serves as a refutation that we do not know why God would allow pain and suffering. I don't want to focus on this too much at this time, though. I'm much more interested in (2).

It has become almost a mantra among some of our secular friends that evidence is needed in order to conclude that something exists. As much as I disagree with this, it may be granted for the sake of argument. For instance, suppose that you are accused of a crime and all the available evidence suggests you are in fact guilty. Yet, you know you are innocent. Surely you are not compelled to believe that you committed the crime. This is because your experience of the incident provides you with warrant to maintain your innocence. This warrant is an overwhelming defeater of the evidence against you. Now, you may not be able to persuade law enforcement that you are innocent, but that point is moot, since we are focusing on your own epistemic justification.

Now, for the one who has heard the problem of suffering as defended by Rowe, but is also aware of the argument of natural theology for God's existence, could we not have a similar case? Take the ontological argument:

1*. It is possible that a maximally great being exists. (Premise)

2*. Necessarily, a maximally great being is maximally excellent in every possible world. (Premise)

3*. Necessarily, a maximally excellent being is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect. (Premise)

4*. Hence, an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect being exists in all possible worlds. (From 1 - 3, S5)

5*. Therefore, an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect being exists. (From 4 - the actual world is a member of the set of all possible worlds)

In short, God's possible existence entails God's actual existence. This means that the possibility premise is the most controversial of the ontological argument. In fact, (2*) and (3*) are virtually uncontroversial, leaving (1*) as the only premise to be viably rejected.

Yet, we can actually reverse Rowe's argument against God and turn it into support for the ontological argument's premise (1*). Consider the following:

1'. To say that God is impossible is to say that God's existence is not possible. (Premise)

2'. If God's existence is impossible, we would most likely know what the reasons are for God to not possibly exist. (Premise)

3'. We do not know what the reasons are. (Premise)

4'. Therefore, it is most likely the case that God's existence is possible. (From 1' - 3')

If at this point the skeptic wishes to reject either (2') or (3'), then the theist is given at least as much justification for rejecting the original (2) and (3) of Rowe's argument. Do we not have enough information yet to conclude that God's existence is possible or impossible? Then why should we expect to have enough information to say that pain and suffering undermine God's existence? The skeptic should be careful to not commit a double standard.

The Aesthetic Argument

A simple version:

1. There is the music of Bach.
2. Therefore, God exists.

"You either see that one or you don't," half-jests Peter Kreeft.

A more sophisticated version of the argument will unpackage some of the intuitions many of us feel when connection music to reverence of God. The argument, which for now I will simply designate as *the* Aesthetic argument for God's existence.

Music is beautiful if it exhibits melody on top of repetition.

By analogy, nature is beautiful if it exhibits diversity among repetition.

The parity between the two cases is that there is some intelligent composer/designer who is able to translate their beautiful thought into something tangible. As great as Bach's music is, just think of how much great and more wondrous the entire cosmos is! We can, then, quite naturally infer that the designer of the cosmos is that much greater than Bach. Bach, of course, took his inspiration from this designer - the being we call "God."

I prefer the argument from order, since it's premises and conclusions are so clear and impossible to reject on pain of irrationality. There is obviously order in the world and, depending on your additional presuppositions, God is either order itself, or else the entity that causes order within the cosmos. However, why should we limit our mode of inquiry to what is logically and mathematically airtight? Arguments like the aesthetic argument simply tap into a different realm of inquiry that may be known with just as much certainty, just not in the same dry manner.

It's something to think about, at least.

The Carelessness of Language

Have you ever said, "I'm tired," when you're not really tired at all? Maybe you just don't like what you're doing at the moment and instead making this feeling explicit, you water it down with, "I'm tired."

Do these slips have any reflection on a person's rational status? Are we in thinking mode, or is it just an automatic response the way "ouch!" is whenever we stub a toe? Further, are these expressions symptomatic of an underlying moral problem? One should say how he/she feels, and so anything short of this would therefore fall short of a moral imperative.

Considered another way, it may actually be a sign of moral virtue. If you have your friend's feelings in consideration, you will likely "blunt the strike," so to speak. Your desire for his emotional well-being is morally praiseworthy, but do the ends justify the means? Or, is this question entirely misplaced, since your friend's well-being is an end in and of itself?

Ethics is tricky. I think I'll stick to the Golden Rule. That famous guy said it. What was his name? Oh, yeah. Jesus!

Against Materialism

Here's an argument against mind-body materialism that I find persuasive:

1. If Materialism is true, all possible minds are physical brains. (Premise)

2. Abstract objects are necessary concepts of a mind. (Premise)

3. There are possible worlds in which there are no physical brains. (Premise)

4. Therefore, Materialism is false. (From 1 - 3)

I take (1) to be one of the standard interpretations of Materialism, but of course, there is some variance among those who call themselves Materialists. (2) entails conceptualism: both the necessary existence of abstract objects and their conceptual nature. One of the inferences to be drawn from (2) is that a necessary mind exists. After all, abstract objects cannot be grounded in just any mind, since there there are possible worlds in which you and I (contingent minds) do not exist, and yet those same abstract objects are still instantiated. Moreover, there are possible worlds in which nothing contingent exists.

Given (3), conceptualism provides us with a strong defeater for Materialism. Obviously each of the argument's premises has to be defended. This is just an outline.

The Circularity Objection Against the MCA

Like any modal argument for theism that uses S5, the modal cosmological argument (MCA) is sometimes alleged to commit the informal fallacy of begging the question. First, here's a refresher of the argument:

1. Every contingent entity possibly has an external cause. (Premise)

2. If the sum total of contingent entities C has an external cause, that cause is a necessary entity. (Premise)

3. C is a contingent entity. (Premise)

4. Hence, a necessary entity possibly causes C. (From 1 - 3)

5. Therefore, a necessary entity exists. (From 4 and S5)

Unless the skeptic is willing to question the truthfulness of S5, or else either of (2) or (3), which in any case would be highly dubious, he must focus his attention on (1). Does (1) beg the question?

It's not entirely clear. (1), on its own, does not entail (5), even in conjunction with S5. (2) and (3) have to be added, and only (2) is plausibly analytical. (3) seems almost indubitable, but that doesn't (or shouldn't) have any effect on one's acceptance/denial of (1). In other words, it is coherent to simultaneously affirm (3) and reject (1).

What makes the circularity objection even more suspect is that the negation of (1) does not result in the negation of (5). Even if it is not possible for every contingent entity to have an external cause, a necessary entity may very well exist. This is peculiar if the MCA's proponent is already assuming the truth of (5) by postulating (1).

Finally, even assuming that (1) entails (5) - which it doesn't - that doesn't undermine the argument. There are often cases in which one statement will entail another, despite their possessing two distinct levels of perspicuity. Take, for example, the proposition, "Socrates is a man." This statement is much more obvious than, "Socrates is a homo bipedal primate." Yet, the former entails the latter. What this illustrates is that some statements can supplement by their clarity even those statements they entail. Why can't this be the case with (1) and (5)?

Arguing for God as the Logos

We observe diverse things coming together in certain kinds of order. These composite entities either have an external cause of that order or they do not. That much is obvious. What is more controversial, but still seemingly obvious to those of us without a strong prejudice against even quasi-religious statements is that these composite entities really do have external causes of their order. I call this statement "quasi-religious" because of its implications.

1. Composite entities have order. (Premise)

2. If a composite entity has order, its order most likely has an external cause. (Premise)

3. The universe as a whole is a composite entity with order. (Premise)

4. Therefore, the universe's order most likely has an external cause. (From 1 - 3)

The external cause - called the "Logos" by the ancient Greeks - of the universe must itself be non-composite, or simple, if we are going to avoid the regress problem. This is already apparent, though, since if a thing such as the Logos is not extended in space, it cannot be composed of any (physical) parts. The non-temporality of the Logos is also indicative of its eternality. And, of course, the Logos must also be very powerful if it is going to cause order in something as vast as the universe.

Obviously, whenever we introduce the notion that the Logos is intelligent, we are going to come across more resistance. However, if there exists an immaterial, eternal, and very powerful entity that causes the order throughout the entire universe, shouldn't atheists concede that something exists that is at the very least God-like? I would even be thrilled to see a retraction of the term "delusion" so often attached to descriptions of theistic belief.

It's also important to keep in mind that arguments like the one above should not be taken in isolation from one another. The argument from order may be combined with, say, the fine-tuning argument as part of a cumulative argument for God's existence.