In one of his latest Reasonable Faith podcasts, "A Rabbi Looks at the Kalam Argument," William Lane Craig explains that he accepts the Aristotelian-Thomistic proof for the existence of a first cause in the order of efficient or sustaining causes. At the end of the podcast, he enunciates an argument one of his students came up with for the personhood of the first cause, which has necessary existence.
1. The necessary being N is either personal or impersonal. (Definition)
2. If N is impersonal, then it cannot cause any contingent effects. (Premise)
3. N does cause contingent effects. (Premise)
4. Therefore, N must be personal. (From 1 - 3)
Craig explains that N cannot cause contingent effects if impersonal, in confirmation of (2), because an impersonal cause would be mechanical. Such a cause could therefore only produce necessary effects, in violation of (3). It's interesting to note that this argument very much resembles Craig's argument for a personal creator in his defense of the kalam cosmological argument. The advantage here is that the connection between N and personhood is not dependent upon the universe's having had a beginning, unlike the kalam argument.
Thursday, April 18, 2013
Tuesday, April 16, 2013
Kant, Thomas Aquinas, and the Cosmological Argument
Immanuel Kant makes a distinction between two categories: phenomena and noumena. The phenomenal realm is what we perceive and, according to Kant's interpretation, is limited to the mind only. By contrast, the noumenal realm is what a thing is in and of itself. Noumena cannot be known by the mind, or the perceiver. For Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, what can be known through phenomena corresponds to the noumena. Kant denies this possibility. (It should be noted that Aristotle and Thomas did not use these terms, but their acceptance of alethic, or truth-bearing, realism entails correspondence.)
As a result, Kant rejects the traditional arguments for God's existence, at least insofar as they have any bearing on the noumenal realm. Nevertheless, traditional theistic proofs can be limited to the scope of the phenomenal realm, which is of significance. Of course, one need only make such limitations if Kant's distinction is actual, and not in the mind only. However, for the purposes of this post, Kantianism will be accepted for the sake of argument. While he already accepts a moral argument for God's existence for pragmatic reasons in his Critique of Practical Reason, I want to argue that the historical proofs of theism are still salvageable on Kant's worldview.
Let's start from the basic premise that we perceive (phenomena) that dependent things exist, even if this cannot be established to hold true in the noumenal realm:
1. Dependent things exist. (Premise)
2. Every dependent thing has a sustaining cause. (Premise)
3. Either the regress of dependent and sustaining causes is infinite, or else there exists an independently existing first cause in the order of sustaining causes. (Implied by 1 and 2)
4. There cannot be an infinite regress of dependent and sustaining causes. (Premise)
5. Therefore, there exists an independent first cause in the order of sustaining causes. (From 3 and 4)
I take (2) to be true by definition insofar as X is understood to be causally sustained by Y if and only if X cannot exist apart from Y. That's only a rough definition, but it will do for now.
The key premise, as with so many cosmological arguments, is (4). I've already argued at length that such an infinite regress cannot exist, even if the universe's past is conceivably eternal, which would imply an infinite regress of originating causes. One of the reasons I affirm (4) is because it would take infinite time for an infinite regress of causes to be instantiated. Given that there are finite periods of time even on the assumption that time is infinite, it follows that during any finite interval the regress of sustaining causes must also be finite.
Another way of thinking about it is that it is impossible to form an actual infinite by successive addition whenever one begins counting. Since at each finite interval the regress of sustaining causes begins anew, we can deduce that during this interval there can only exist finite causal regresses. At t1, the regress begins: 1, 2, 3, . . . n. At t2, the regress begins again: 1, 2, 3, . . . n. And so on. Before t2 can arrive, t1 must reach infinity, which is impossible because there will always and indefinitely be another number to be traversed before arriving at infinity.
One objection is that between any two natural numbers - say, 1 and 2 - there are infinitely-many numbers (1.5, 1.25, . . . n). The problem with using such examples is that the sum of these numbers is itself a finite number. Moreover, the interval between 1 and 2 has a definite beginning (1) and end (2). These two considerations show that the objection actually presupposes what it sets out to disprove, making the objection self-defeating.
The truth of (1) through (4), together with the argument's logical validity, necessitates the truth of (5): there exists an independent first cause in the order of sustaining causes. It doesn't make any sense to ask what causes the first cause, since the first cause exists independently, and the causal premise of (2) is limited to what exists dependently.
There are a few more points to make. First, one might be satisfied with this conclusion and seek no further implications. The atheist is right to point out that the existence of a first cause does not automatically lead to theism. If the theist wishes to make any connection between the first cause and God, additional metaphysical considerations will need to be taken into account. However, that is beyond the purview of what I want to look at in this post.
As I said, one could go no further than concluding that a first cause exists, and one wouldn't even need to go beyond the phenomenal realm. Nevertheless, I'm interested in ways to argue that the proof extends to the noumenal realm as well. This will likely be the area of philosophy I most explore next. For now, let's argue transcendentally, or from the impossibility of the contrary:
Prove A: Something independent exists in the noumenal realm.
Assume ~A: Nothing independent exists in the noumenal realm.
~A --> B: If nothing independent exists in the noumenal realm, then only dependent things exist in the noumenal realm.
~B: B is inscrutable.
Hence, ~~A: by modus tollens.
Therefore, A: by negation.
Q.E.D.
The noumenal realm does not escape the law of excluded middle. Either X is dependent or independent, and there is no third alternative. If A is denied on the grounds of inscrutability, then so is ~A. For Kant, this demonstrates the collapse of human reason, but such a conclusion cannot be affirmed without making a claim about the noumena. This also means that agnosticism about A and ~A is self-defeating, and so the only rational conclusion is that the phenomena maps onto the noumena.
If this argument is correct, and I'm only tentatively affirming it, one is compelled to reject the strong Kantian doctrine in favor of some form of metaphysical realism.
As a result, Kant rejects the traditional arguments for God's existence, at least insofar as they have any bearing on the noumenal realm. Nevertheless, traditional theistic proofs can be limited to the scope of the phenomenal realm, which is of significance. Of course, one need only make such limitations if Kant's distinction is actual, and not in the mind only. However, for the purposes of this post, Kantianism will be accepted for the sake of argument. While he already accepts a moral argument for God's existence for pragmatic reasons in his Critique of Practical Reason, I want to argue that the historical proofs of theism are still salvageable on Kant's worldview.
Let's start from the basic premise that we perceive (phenomena) that dependent things exist, even if this cannot be established to hold true in the noumenal realm:
1. Dependent things exist. (Premise)
2. Every dependent thing has a sustaining cause. (Premise)
3. Either the regress of dependent and sustaining causes is infinite, or else there exists an independently existing first cause in the order of sustaining causes. (Implied by 1 and 2)
4. There cannot be an infinite regress of dependent and sustaining causes. (Premise)
5. Therefore, there exists an independent first cause in the order of sustaining causes. (From 3 and 4)
I take (2) to be true by definition insofar as X is understood to be causally sustained by Y if and only if X cannot exist apart from Y. That's only a rough definition, but it will do for now.
The key premise, as with so many cosmological arguments, is (4). I've already argued at length that such an infinite regress cannot exist, even if the universe's past is conceivably eternal, which would imply an infinite regress of originating causes. One of the reasons I affirm (4) is because it would take infinite time for an infinite regress of causes to be instantiated. Given that there are finite periods of time even on the assumption that time is infinite, it follows that during any finite interval the regress of sustaining causes must also be finite.
Another way of thinking about it is that it is impossible to form an actual infinite by successive addition whenever one begins counting. Since at each finite interval the regress of sustaining causes begins anew, we can deduce that during this interval there can only exist finite causal regresses. At t1, the regress begins: 1, 2, 3, . . . n. At t2, the regress begins again: 1, 2, 3, . . . n. And so on. Before t2 can arrive, t1 must reach infinity, which is impossible because there will always and indefinitely be another number to be traversed before arriving at infinity.
One objection is that between any two natural numbers - say, 1 and 2 - there are infinitely-many numbers (1.5, 1.25, . . . n). The problem with using such examples is that the sum of these numbers is itself a finite number. Moreover, the interval between 1 and 2 has a definite beginning (1) and end (2). These two considerations show that the objection actually presupposes what it sets out to disprove, making the objection self-defeating.
The truth of (1) through (4), together with the argument's logical validity, necessitates the truth of (5): there exists an independent first cause in the order of sustaining causes. It doesn't make any sense to ask what causes the first cause, since the first cause exists independently, and the causal premise of (2) is limited to what exists dependently.
There are a few more points to make. First, one might be satisfied with this conclusion and seek no further implications. The atheist is right to point out that the existence of a first cause does not automatically lead to theism. If the theist wishes to make any connection between the first cause and God, additional metaphysical considerations will need to be taken into account. However, that is beyond the purview of what I want to look at in this post.
As I said, one could go no further than concluding that a first cause exists, and one wouldn't even need to go beyond the phenomenal realm. Nevertheless, I'm interested in ways to argue that the proof extends to the noumenal realm as well. This will likely be the area of philosophy I most explore next. For now, let's argue transcendentally, or from the impossibility of the contrary:
Prove A: Something independent exists in the noumenal realm.
Assume ~A: Nothing independent exists in the noumenal realm.
~A --> B: If nothing independent exists in the noumenal realm, then only dependent things exist in the noumenal realm.
~B: B is inscrutable.
Hence, ~~A: by modus tollens.
Therefore, A: by negation.
Q.E.D.
The noumenal realm does not escape the law of excluded middle. Either X is dependent or independent, and there is no third alternative. If A is denied on the grounds of inscrutability, then so is ~A. For Kant, this demonstrates the collapse of human reason, but such a conclusion cannot be affirmed without making a claim about the noumena. This also means that agnosticism about A and ~A is self-defeating, and so the only rational conclusion is that the phenomena maps onto the noumena.
If this argument is correct, and I'm only tentatively affirming it, one is compelled to reject the strong Kantian doctrine in favor of some form of metaphysical realism.
Tuesday, April 9, 2013
Resurrection of Jesus and the Scientific Method
In his debate with William Lane Craig on the historicity of Jesus's resurrection, Bart Ehrman argues that the resurrection cannot be considered historical because the field of history only contains events that are repeatable. We shouldn't misinterpret Ehrman as saying that in order to conclude Julius Caesar crossed the Rubicon, he must be able to do so again. Rather, what Ehrman means is that similar events must be possible.
The obvious problem with this criterion is that history, much like science, includes non-repeatable events. In physics, one might look to the Big Bang. The Big Bang occurred roughly fifteen billion years ago and is not something we can reproduce. However, the Big Bang theory is also one of science's best attested hypotheses. Craig reasons that the resurrection of Jesus is also very well-attested. Since neither are repeatable, yet both are well-attested, I argue that something must be wrong with Ehrman's criterion.
Saturday, March 16, 2013
More on the Ontological Argument of Epicurus
I don't think Epicurus's argument establishes the existence of any monotheistic God. In support of monotheism, I usually appeal to the argument from motion and the metaphysical argument found in Thomas's De Ente et Essentia. Nevertheless, I've come to be convinced that Epicurus's argument is a sound proof of angelic-like beings, or what he calls "gods" (with a lower case "g").
1. There is no conception apart from real perception. (Premise)
2. There is the conception of angelic-like entities. (Premise)
3. Therefore, there is a real perception of angelic-like entities. (From 1 and 2)
In support of (1), the only reason we are able to imagine fictional entities, such as unicorns, is because of real perceptions of horses and various animals with horns. Yet, premise (2) contends that we have the conception of angelic-like entities. What possible combination of entities could account for any fictional angelic-like entity? In fact, many claim that they have been visited by angels. Are they crazy, or is there an authentic perception? I'll let readers decide for themselves.
In any case, the argument is logically valid. The skeptic's best case against the argument is probably to undermine premise (2).
Can God change his mind?
Instead of delving into any Biblical exegesis involving passages that on the surface appear to say that God can/cannot change his mind, I want to think about some of the philosophical consequences of however one chooses to answer this question. Consider this argument:
1. It is a mark of human integrity to be able/willing to change one's mind. (Premise)
2. God cannot change his mind. (Premise)
3. Therefore, God does not exhibit the human element of integrity to change his mind. (From 1 and 2)
I fully endorse this argument. The problem is that I don't see how it does any damage to God's character. Of course God doesn't always exhibit the same virtues as humans in the same manner. Yet, that only raises an additional question: why should God have to be able/willing to change his mind in order to be maximally great? Think of it this way:
4. An omniscient mind, God, knows every propositional truth. (Definition)
5. Necessarily, if God knows every propositional truth, then God would never have to change his mind. (Premise)
6. Therefore, God never has to change his mind. (From 4 and 5)
Where, then, is the conflict between (3) and (6)? In fact, it would be a sign of weakness for God to change his mind when he already possesses all propositional knowledge!
Similar comments can be made about human nature exhibiting both actuality and potentiality. It is a sign of a human's virtue to actualize his or her potentiality. However, God qua pure actuality, has no need to actualize any potentiality, since he simply doesn't exhibit any potentiality.
1. It is a mark of human integrity to be able/willing to change one's mind. (Premise)
2. God cannot change his mind. (Premise)
3. Therefore, God does not exhibit the human element of integrity to change his mind. (From 1 and 2)
I fully endorse this argument. The problem is that I don't see how it does any damage to God's character. Of course God doesn't always exhibit the same virtues as humans in the same manner. Yet, that only raises an additional question: why should God have to be able/willing to change his mind in order to be maximally great? Think of it this way:
4. An omniscient mind, God, knows every propositional truth. (Definition)
5. Necessarily, if God knows every propositional truth, then God would never have to change his mind. (Premise)
6. Therefore, God never has to change his mind. (From 4 and 5)
Where, then, is the conflict between (3) and (6)? In fact, it would be a sign of weakness for God to change his mind when he already possesses all propositional knowledge!
Similar comments can be made about human nature exhibiting both actuality and potentiality. It is a sign of a human's virtue to actualize his or her potentiality. However, God qua pure actuality, has no need to actualize any potentiality, since he simply doesn't exhibit any potentiality.
Monday, March 11, 2013
Dogmatism and Tolerance
Have you ever noticed that those who complain about dogmatism, intolerance and closed-mindedness are often the ones who most exemplify these characteristics? I've been accused of each of these, no matter how polite I am during the course of a debate.
For example, I've been accused of being intolerant for publicly expressing my belief in moral objectivity. The funny thing is, the accuser cannot decry my intolerance without himself/herself presupposing moral objectivity. If what's right for me isn't necessarily what's right for another, then the accuser has lost all grounds for his objection. Why not be intolerant? After all, if morality is relative, then why bother complaining about what's best for me? The moral relativist's position is therefore self-defeating.
Is my claim that homosexual behavior is unhealthy merely my own subjective opinion, and not one that I should publicly express? Taken to its logical conclusion, I guess I also shouldn't publicly express that the consumption of rat poison is unhealthy. The fact is that nobody is a moral relativist or nihilist in practice. The only consistent position with one's belief and one's practice is moral objectivism.
For example, I've been accused of being intolerant for publicly expressing my belief in moral objectivity. The funny thing is, the accuser cannot decry my intolerance without himself/herself presupposing moral objectivity. If what's right for me isn't necessarily what's right for another, then the accuser has lost all grounds for his objection. Why not be intolerant? After all, if morality is relative, then why bother complaining about what's best for me? The moral relativist's position is therefore self-defeating.
Is my claim that homosexual behavior is unhealthy merely my own subjective opinion, and not one that I should publicly express? Taken to its logical conclusion, I guess I also shouldn't publicly express that the consumption of rat poison is unhealthy. The fact is that nobody is a moral relativist or nihilist in practice. The only consistent position with one's belief and one's practice is moral objectivism.
Friday, March 8, 2013
Epicurus and the Ontological Argument
It's quite strange to mention Epicurus in the same sentence as the ontological argument. Epicurus, after all, was among one of the most skeptical philosophers in ancient Greece. He denied the reality of divine providence insofar as it related to human affairs and he is famous for postulating one version of the argument from suffering.
Nevertheless, we surprisingly find Epicurus affirming the existence of the gods, who he maintained were composed of the most subtle atoms and were undergoing constant change, much like a waterfall is constantly filled with new water. Long before St. Anselm, Epicurus actually defended an ontological argument similar to that of Descartes's.
Epicurus's epistemology was exclusively based on sense-perception. Our concept of a unicorn exists only because we have perceptions of real entities, such as horses and various animals with horns. A unicorn is therefore a combination of the two and imbued with magical properties. Accordingly, Epicurus maintains, like Descartes, that our conception of the divine must be based in reality. No conception can exist apart from perception.
Whether this is a good argument is beside the point. It's just fascinating to find traces of the ontological argument over a thousand years before Anselm penned his Proslogion.
Nevertheless, we surprisingly find Epicurus affirming the existence of the gods, who he maintained were composed of the most subtle atoms and were undergoing constant change, much like a waterfall is constantly filled with new water. Long before St. Anselm, Epicurus actually defended an ontological argument similar to that of Descartes's.
Epicurus's epistemology was exclusively based on sense-perception. Our concept of a unicorn exists only because we have perceptions of real entities, such as horses and various animals with horns. A unicorn is therefore a combination of the two and imbued with magical properties. Accordingly, Epicurus maintains, like Descartes, that our conception of the divine must be based in reality. No conception can exist apart from perception.
Whether this is a good argument is beside the point. It's just fascinating to find traces of the ontological argument over a thousand years before Anselm penned his Proslogion.
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