St. Anselm is usually known for his ontological argument, but he also supported various other arguments for God's existence. One of these is a version of the cosmological argument, which seeks to establish that, "there is . . . some one being which is supremely good, and supremely great, that is, the highest of all existing beings." [1]
1. Something good exists.
The axiological realist will grant this premise. However, it will not be accepted by moral nihilists. The audience of this proof, then, will be restricted to those who acknowledge that there really are, objectively-speaking, good things.
2. That which is good is either good through itself or through another.
Premise (2) will be accepted by those who adhere to even a minimal Principle of Sufficient Reason. Only if some attribute of a thing is inexplicable would (2) be false, or possibly false.
3. Different things are good by virtue of a single principle.
Anselm anticipates an objection, here. A horse is said to be good because he is both strong and swift. Yet, a robber can also be strong and swift, but surely the robber is not good. It's at this point that Anselm appeals to teleology: the horse's strength and swiftness is good due to its usefulness, whereas the robber's strength and swiftness is bad because his actions are harmful. It is the end, goal or purpose, then, that Anselm appeals to.
Further, two things are said to be just because they both participate in the single quality of justness. Likewise, then, two (or more) things are said to be good because they participate in the single quality of goodness. Now, this quality of goodness is itself a great good, Anselm says. Therefore, there is a single principle of goodness, the Supreme Being (God), which is the cause of all goodness in good things.
4. Therefore, a single principle of goodness exists.
Q.E.D.
Works Cited
[1] St. Anselm, "Monologium," Ch. 1, from Basic Writings, translated by S.N. Deane, Open Court Publishing Company, 1962, p. 86.
Monday, March 29, 2010
Tuesday, March 23, 2010
The Imago Dei
We say that man is created in the image of God. Does this mean that God is just a big man? The Maverick Philosopher has recently provided a helpful analogy:
1. Man is made in God’s image.
2. Man is a physical being with a digestive tract, etc.
Therefore
3. God is a physical being with a digestive tract, etc.
But that’s like arguing:
1. This statue is made in Lincoln’s image.
2. This statue is composed of marble.
Therefore
3. Lincoln is composed of marble.
The point is that "being made in the image of" something does not require us to share physical attributes. Rather, this is a spiritual likening, which culminates in humanity's ability to reason. Reason finds its locus in God, and the fact that we are able to know things about ourselves and the ordered world around us is evidence of the order that God has created in us and the world. We reason because God reasons.
1. Man is made in God’s image.
2. Man is a physical being with a digestive tract, etc.
Therefore
3. God is a physical being with a digestive tract, etc.
But that’s like arguing:
1. This statue is made in Lincoln’s image.
2. This statue is composed of marble.
Therefore
3. Lincoln is composed of marble.
The point is that "being made in the image of" something does not require us to share physical attributes. Rather, this is a spiritual likening, which culminates in humanity's ability to reason. Reason finds its locus in God, and the fact that we are able to know things about ourselves and the ordered world around us is evidence of the order that God has created in us and the world. We reason because God reasons.
Monday, March 8, 2010
The Modal Cosmological Argument's Possibility Premise
I have been working on a Modal Cosmological Argument (MCA) for some time now, and I'm convinced that the key premise - the possibility premise - is rationally acceptable. However, given recent attempts at proving that a maximally great being is possible (see my previous post), demonstrating the possibility of a necessary being ought to be even easier, assuming that such a proof is correct. Before I provide the possibility proof, here's another look at the MCA:
1. Contingent beings exist.
2. It is possible that the collection of all contingent beings (CCB) has an external cause.
3. If an external cause exists, that cause is a necessary being.
4. Hence, a necessary being possibly exists.
5. Whatever is possibly necessary is necessary.
6. Therefore, a necessary being exists.
Let's reformulate the three axioms listed earlier:
A1. If a property is a great-making property, its negation is not a great-making property.
A2. If a property A is a great-making property and the property B is a necessary condition for A, then B is a great-making property.
A3. Being a necessary being is a great-making property.
Following these axioms is the proof that a necessary being possibly exists:
P1. If it's not possible that a necessary being exists, then every being has the property of being contingent.
P2. If every being has the property of being contingent, then being contingent is a necessary condition.
P3. If being contingent is a necessary condition, then being contingent is a great-making property. (From A2)
P4. Being contingent is not a great-making property. (From A1 and A3)
P5. Therefore, it is possible that a necessary being exists.
1. Contingent beings exist.
2. It is possible that the collection of all contingent beings (CCB) has an external cause.
3. If an external cause exists, that cause is a necessary being.
4. Hence, a necessary being possibly exists.
5. Whatever is possibly necessary is necessary.
6. Therefore, a necessary being exists.
Let's reformulate the three axioms listed earlier:
A1. If a property is a great-making property, its negation is not a great-making property.
A2. If a property A is a great-making property and the property B is a necessary condition for A, then B is a great-making property.
A3. Being a necessary being is a great-making property.
Following these axioms is the proof that a necessary being possibly exists:
P1. If it's not possible that a necessary being exists, then every being has the property of being contingent.
P2. If every being has the property of being contingent, then being contingent is a necessary condition.
P3. If being contingent is a necessary condition, then being contingent is a great-making property. (From A2)
P4. Being contingent is not a great-making property. (From A1 and A3)
P5. Therefore, it is possible that a necessary being exists.
Sunday, March 7, 2010
Proof of the Possibility Premise of the Modal Ontological Argument?
Plantinga has followed in the steps of Leibniz, who stated that if God possibly exists, then God actually exists. This is because God is defined as a being who possesses all great-making properties. So, God either necessarily exists or is impossible. The Modal Ontological Argument goes like this:
1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists.
2. A being is maximally great only if it is maximally excellent in all possible worlds.
3. A being is maximally excellent only if it is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good.
4. Hence, a maximally excellent being exists in all possible worlds.
5. Therefore, a maximally excellent being exists.
The four great-making properties listed are: omnipotence, omniscience, perfect goodness, and necessary existence. The first three are covered by what Plantinga calls "maximal excellence." Only if a maximally excellent being exists necessarily is it maximally excellent.
Now, Kant objected that existence is not a predicate. However, the proponent of the MOA can grant this and go merrily on his way. For, existence is not assumed to be a great-making property anyway. Rather, it is necessary existence, as opposed to contingent existence, that is deemed a great-making property. Kant's objection, therefore, while interesting, is irrelevant.
Yet, if a maximally great being (God) is possible, then it must exist. For, if God were to exist only in some possible worlds, then He would be contingent and not necessary, which means He is not maximally great. That, of course, is contradictory.
The opponent of the MOA can only conclude that God (defined not just as "First Cause" or "Creator," but as a maximally great being) is impossible. In fact, if one starts a counter-argument like this:
1*. It is possible that a maximally great being does not exist
it follows that a maximally great being does not exist.
The only two options, then, are that a maximally great being necessarily exists, or else impossibly exists. A maximally great being cannot exist contingently, for then it would not be maximally great.
Is there any compelling reason to believe (1) or (1*)? Robert Maydole's recent formulation of the ontological argument - what he calls the "Modal Perfection Argument" - attempts to establish the possibility premise. With some word-substitution, I believe we can transform Plantinga's rationally acceptable argument into a compelling proof.
Three axioms:
A1. If a property is a great-making property, it's negation is not a great-making property.
A2. If a property A is a great-making property and the property B is a necessary condition for A, then B is a great-making property.
A3. Being a maximally great being is a great-making property.
Now, the proof that a maximally great being is possible:
P1. If it's not possible that a maximally great being exists, then every being has the property of not being maximally great.
P2. If every being has the property of not being maximally great, then not being maximally great is a necessary condition.
P3. If not being maximally great is a necessary condition, then not being maximally great is a great-making property. (From A2)
P4. Not being maximally great is not a great-making property. (From A1 and A3)
P5. Therefore, it is possible that a maximally great being exists.
1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists.
2. A being is maximally great only if it is maximally excellent in all possible worlds.
3. A being is maximally excellent only if it is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good.
4. Hence, a maximally excellent being exists in all possible worlds.
5. Therefore, a maximally excellent being exists.
The four great-making properties listed are: omnipotence, omniscience, perfect goodness, and necessary existence. The first three are covered by what Plantinga calls "maximal excellence." Only if a maximally excellent being exists necessarily is it maximally excellent.
Now, Kant objected that existence is not a predicate. However, the proponent of the MOA can grant this and go merrily on his way. For, existence is not assumed to be a great-making property anyway. Rather, it is necessary existence, as opposed to contingent existence, that is deemed a great-making property. Kant's objection, therefore, while interesting, is irrelevant.
Yet, if a maximally great being (God) is possible, then it must exist. For, if God were to exist only in some possible worlds, then He would be contingent and not necessary, which means He is not maximally great. That, of course, is contradictory.
The opponent of the MOA can only conclude that God (defined not just as "First Cause" or "Creator," but as a maximally great being) is impossible. In fact, if one starts a counter-argument like this:
1*. It is possible that a maximally great being does not exist
it follows that a maximally great being does not exist.
The only two options, then, are that a maximally great being necessarily exists, or else impossibly exists. A maximally great being cannot exist contingently, for then it would not be maximally great.
Is there any compelling reason to believe (1) or (1*)? Robert Maydole's recent formulation of the ontological argument - what he calls the "Modal Perfection Argument" - attempts to establish the possibility premise. With some word-substitution, I believe we can transform Plantinga's rationally acceptable argument into a compelling proof.
Three axioms:
A1. If a property is a great-making property, it's negation is not a great-making property.
A2. If a property A is a great-making property and the property B is a necessary condition for A, then B is a great-making property.
A3. Being a maximally great being is a great-making property.
Now, the proof that a maximally great being is possible:
P1. If it's not possible that a maximally great being exists, then every being has the property of not being maximally great.
P2. If every being has the property of not being maximally great, then not being maximally great is a necessary condition.
P3. If not being maximally great is a necessary condition, then not being maximally great is a great-making property. (From A2)
P4. Not being maximally great is not a great-making property. (From A1 and A3)
P5. Therefore, it is possible that a maximally great being exists.
Wednesday, March 3, 2010
The Fifth Way
In the Summa Theologiae , St. Thomas Aquinas offers one of the most traditional design arguments in support of God's existence. He writes (with italics):
The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.
In sum, Thomas is arguing as follows:
1. Whatever a) lacks intelligence, b) and acts always, or for the most part, for a certain end, is designed to do so by some intelligence.
2. The laws of nature a) lack intelligence and, b) act always, or for the most part, for a certain end.
3. Therefore, the laws of nature are designed by some intelligence.
The beauty of Thomas' argument is that it runs circles around evolutionary theory. Granted, evolution does take place, but what significance does this fact have for the Fifth Way? Nothing as far as I can see. God may very well choose to use evolution as His means of creating life.
(1) seems quite reasonable. Thomas himself gives the example of an arrow (which lacks intelligence) hitting its mark (end) by the archer (intelligence).
I doubt anyone who takes a realistic view of science and nature will have any reservations about (2). Surely, nature isn't intelligent. If it were, that would be conducive to pantheism. Yet, nature also provides us with many rich regularities, from gravity and electromagnetism, from the strong and weak atomic forces to the sun rising and setting every day, and from the sheer mathematical and logical order of general experience to my breathing. Nature is indeed quite uniform, and don't we have quite the Designer to thank for that!
Now, who designed the Designer? You will notice that this rhetorical question misconstrues the Fifth Way. It's not that whatever acts for an end has a designer, but whatever lacks intelligence and acts for an end has a designer. Those are the two sign-posts of design, and the universe's Designer does not meet the description of lacking intelligence.
The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.
In sum, Thomas is arguing as follows:
1. Whatever a) lacks intelligence, b) and acts always, or for the most part, for a certain end, is designed to do so by some intelligence.
2. The laws of nature a) lack intelligence and, b) act always, or for the most part, for a certain end.
3. Therefore, the laws of nature are designed by some intelligence.
The beauty of Thomas' argument is that it runs circles around evolutionary theory. Granted, evolution does take place, but what significance does this fact have for the Fifth Way? Nothing as far as I can see. God may very well choose to use evolution as His means of creating life.
(1) seems quite reasonable. Thomas himself gives the example of an arrow (which lacks intelligence) hitting its mark (end) by the archer (intelligence).
I doubt anyone who takes a realistic view of science and nature will have any reservations about (2). Surely, nature isn't intelligent. If it were, that would be conducive to pantheism. Yet, nature also provides us with many rich regularities, from gravity and electromagnetism, from the strong and weak atomic forces to the sun rising and setting every day, and from the sheer mathematical and logical order of general experience to my breathing. Nature is indeed quite uniform, and don't we have quite the Designer to thank for that!
Now, who designed the Designer? You will notice that this rhetorical question misconstrues the Fifth Way. It's not that whatever acts for an end has a designer, but whatever lacks intelligence and acts for an end has a designer. Those are the two sign-posts of design, and the universe's Designer does not meet the description of lacking intelligence.
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