"Would you be immoral if you were an atheist?"

I'm asked this question a lot whenever discussing the moral argument for God's existence.  Usually the argument goes something like this:

1. Every law has a lawgiver. (Premise)

2. There is an objective moral law. (Premise)

3. Therefore, there is an objective moral lawgiver. (From 1 and 2)

The moral lawgiver is then associated with God.  Now, whether this argument is sound or not isn't the point.  Rather, what I'm interested in is answering the question contained in this post's title: would I suddenly become immoral, e.g. raping, murdering, etc., if I abandoned my belief in God?

The answer is obviously no.  The follow up retort is usually: "then objective morality doesn't depend on God."

This objection is fallacious for the simple reason that it confuses moral epistemology with moral ontology.  What the skeptic should say is that "objective morality doesn't depend on belief in God."  This is quite distinct from the former assertion.  The reason I would remain moral (assuming I'm considered a moral person) even if I abandoned my belief in God is because I would still be created in the image of God.  It's just that my hypothetical atheism would be inconsistent with my recognition of an objective moral law.

Readers are free to disagree with the moral argument all they want.  In fact, I encourage open debate.  However, it's important to understand what the moral argument claims and what it doesn't claim.

The Contingency Argument and the Composition Fallacy Objection

Here's my own formulation of the contingency argument:

1. Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause. (Premise)

2. If the sum total of contingent entities C has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is a necessary, eternal and very powerful entity N. (Premise)

3. C exists. (Premise)

4. Hence, C has an explanation of its existence. (From 1 and 3)

5. Therefore, the explanation of C is N. (From 2 and 4)

Let's assume the skeptic accepts premise (1), the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR).  Instead, he objects that premise (2) commits a composition fallacy: if every contingent entity is explained by another contingent entity, ad infinitum, then C has a sufficient explanation.

I think the problem with this objection is that the regress of contingent causes is itself contingent; there didn't have to be any regress, finite or infinite, of contingent causes.  If every part of a mountain can not-exist, then it's only reasonable to infer that the mountain as a whole can not-exist.  Likewise, if every contingent cause can not-exist, then C as a whole can not-exist.  If the skeptic wishes to deny this, then he is required to say that C is necessary, which is self-contradictory.

A Modal Argument for Mind-Body Dualism

I don't consider this argument a proof, largely because the first premise is so controversial.  The physicalist will argue that the mind is an essential part of the body and cannot even possibly be separated.  Still, I think intuition is on the side of the dualist and, as a result, the argument is rationally acceptable.

1. Possibly, the mind exists apart from the body. (Premise)

2. Necessarily, if a separation between two entities is possible, then the two entities are distinct. (Premise)

3. Therefore, the mind is distinct from the body. (From 1 and 2)

The Argument from Reason

1. Human cognitive faculties are generally reliable. (Premise)

2. If human cognitive faculties are caused by rational processes, then they may be generally reliable. (Premise)

3. If human cognitive faculties are caused by non-rational processes, then the cognitive faculties' general reliability is inscrutable. (Premise)

4. The reliability of human cognitive faculties is scrutable. (Premise)

5. Therefore, it is most rational to believe that human cognitive faculties are caused by rational processes. (From 1 - 4)

Now, what if human cognitive faculties are not generally reliable?

6. Human cognitive faculties are not generally reliable. (Assumption)

7. The reliability of human cognitive faculties is less than . 5. (Implied by 1)

8. (6) is a belief formed by unreliable cognitive faculties whose likelihood of truth is less than .5. (From 6 and 7)

9. Hence, it is irrational to believe that human cognitive faculties are generally unreliable. (From 6 and 8)

10. Therefore, it is most rational to believe that human cognitive faculties are generally reliable. (Implied by 9)

Of course, these "rational processes" could be explained away by aliens.  However, the theist could easily supplement the argument from reason with the argument from motion for the existence of an Unmoved Mover.  The same logic would follow, and we may sit comfortably knowing that we have a sound argument for an intelligent Unmoved Mover.

My Books

As some of you may already know, I've completed my first book, Faith and Philosophy: An Introduction to Natural Theology.  I'm currently in talks with a publisher.

I've also begun editing an anthology for a book entitled, Contemporary Perspectives in Thomism.  This anthology will cover a wide variety of contemporary philosophical issues, including ethics, theism, the mind-body problem, and moral realism versus antirealism, among others.  Originally, I was only going to write the Introduction, but I'll now be adding my own chapter: "Karl Popper, Induction and the Teleological Argument."

The book will have at least a dozen contributors, all of whom have a Master's or higher in Philosophy or a related field.

Another Modal Cosmological Argument

This one is inspired by Bl. John Duns Scotus:

1. Necessarily, everything that exists is either contingent or necessary. (Definition)

2. Possibly, every contingent thing has a cause. (Premise)

3. Necessarily, the regress of contingent causes is either finite or infinite. (Premise)

4. Possibly, the regress of contingent causes is finite. (Premise)

5. Necessarily, a necessary entity cannot have a cause. (Premise)

6. Possibly, a necessary first cause exists. (From 1, 4 and 5)

7. Therefore, a necessary first cause exists. (From 6 and S5)

I think the most difficult premise to defend is (5).  If we understand necessity as being self-explanatory, then (5) is most certainly true.  If, on the other hand, there can be more than one necessary entity, with one being dependent (but not contingent) on another, then the former wouldn't be classified as a first cause.

It's at this point that we could supplement the argument with additional reasons for the unicity of a necessary entity.  As St. Thomas Aquinas summarizes:

"[I]f there are two beings of which both are necessary beings, they must agree in the notion of the necessity of being.  Hence, they must be distinguished by something added either to one of them only, or to both.  This means that one or both of them must be composite.  Now . . . no composite being is through itself a necessary being.  It is impossible therefore that there be many beings of which each is a necessary being."  (Summa Contra Gentiles, ch. 42.)

My Proposed Dissertation Topic

As some of you may know, I'm now pursuing a PhD in Philosophy.  Before I begin my work, I have to propose a topic for my dissertation.  I've had plenty of ideas, many of which involve Thomism (no surprise there).  However, I may be surprising some, since I keep coming back to the works of William Alston and my favorite internet blogger, Victor Reppert.  The connection will become clearer as I develop an outline, assuming the committee accepts my proposal: "Theistic Implications of Alethic Realism."

The advantage of focusing on alethic realism is that it makes no metaphysical assumptions about the existence of abstract objects, propositions in particular.  Just one of the theistic implications would involve Reppert's argument from reason, where our cognitive faculties must have been the result of rational processes in order to be generally reliable.  This is similar, but not identical to, Alvin Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism (EAAN).

In any case, I have my work cut out for me. :)