I have spent quite a bit of time defending the Modal Third Way. However, I think the traditional argument is compelling, as well. What Maimonides, Thomas, and others have argued is the following:
1. Every existing entity is either contingent or necessary. (Definition)
2. Something has always existed. (Premise)
3. There was a past time at which nothing contingent existed. (Premise)
4. Therefore, a necessary entity exists. (From 1 - 3)
Before moving on to a defense of each of the premises, a few words of "necessity" are in order. First, the conclusion is not necessarily to a logically necessary entity. It's not as if "nothing necessary exists" is contradictory in the same vein as "John is a married bachelor." Rather, the argument seeks to establish the existence of some temporally necessary entity, e.g. something indestructible, or incorruptible, if it exists at all. Moreover, as I have said on more than one occasion, a necessary entity must also be eternal and enormously powerful (if not omnipotent). After all, the weaker a thing is, the more inclined it is toward corruptibility.
Now, what about the argument's premises? (1) is obviously true: an existing thing either possibly fails to exist (contingency) or cannot fail to exist (necessity). (2) is based on ex nihilo nihil fit (out of nothing comes nothing). If there were a past time at which nothing exists, then nothing would exist now, which is patently false.
(3) is likely the most controversial premise, but "controversial" is not synonymous with "improbable." Given infinite time, all non-zero probabilities will be actualized at some point. The Scholastics put it like this: given infinite time, all real potentialities will be actualized. After all, infinity is just inexhaustible. In fact, it could even be argued that there are infinitely-many points at which nothing contingent exists. Either way, (3) appears to be in good shape. Yet, if nothing contingent existed at a past time, and something existed at the same time - per premise (2) - it follows that a necessary entity exists.
Therefore, something necessary, eternal, and enormously powerful exists. Whether or not this entity is the Christian God, or the deity of any other religion, is a matter for further inquiry.
Of course, one could always say that the universe's past is finite, and I would agree. However, that does nothing to undermine the Third Way. In fact, it actually gives us another argument for God's existence: the Kalam Cosmological Argument (KCA).
Tuesday, March 1, 2011
A Heraclitean Cosmological Argument
The ancient Greek philosopher, Heraclitus, held views that are very consonant with what many today hold. He was a commonsense philosopher who is famous for his quote, "you cannot step into the same river twice." Rivers, like all natural things, are in a constant state of flux. However, there is an order to how each of these things change, and the ordering principle (or "Logos") is distinguished from these changing things. As A.H. Armstrong summarizes, "[The] world of change and conflict pictured by Heraclitus is not however a mere chaos. It is governed by an immanent principle of order and measure. . . . [H]is name for the ruling principle is the Logos." [1]
There are several ways of formalizing Heraclitus' thought into a cosmological argument. I wish to present two of these ways:
I. The Heraclitean Cosmological Argument (HCA) based on correspondence
1. Nature is in constant flux. (Premise)
2. There is order throughout nature. (Premise)
3. The order throughout nature is either in flux or not in flux. (Definition)
4. The order throughout nature is not in flux. (Premise)
5. Every fact of concrete reality corresponds to some existing concrete reality. (Premise, correspondence principle)
6. Hence, the fact of order in nature corresponds to some existing concrete reality. (From 2 and 5)
7. The corresponding concrete reality is itself either in flux or not in flux. (Definition)
8. It cannot be in flux. (From 4 and 5)
9. Therefore, an immutable ordering principle (Logos) exists. (From 6 - 8)
10. Therefore, the Logos is distinct from nature. (From 1 and 9)
The Logos that Heraclitus concludes to is immutable, eternal (for something can only cease to exist at some time if it changes), and enormously powerful, given that it is the cause of change throughout nature. More precisely, though, his thought is that the Logos is part of nature, but distinct from those aspects of nature that are in flux.
II. The HCA based on the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR)
With some modifications of Leibniz' argument, we can reformulate the syllogism to be Heraclitean-friendly:
1. Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause. (Premise, PSR)
2. If the order of nature has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is the Logos. (Premise)
3. The order of nature exists. (Premise)
4. Hence, the order of nature has an explanation of its existence. (From 1 and 3)
5. Therefore, the order of nature is explained by the Logos. (From 2 and 4)
What I like about this version is the awkwardness that results in rejecting the existence of the Logos. If the skeptic takes the view that the order of the universe has an external cause, then we have something supernatural. If, however, the other horn of the dilemma is preferred, then the order of the universe has necessary existence. This entails that something is immutable, eternal, and enormously powerful, anyway.
This means that either (1) and/or (3) must be rejected. That's not an issue for me, though.
[1] A.H. Armstrong, An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1989 edition, p. 10.
There are several ways of formalizing Heraclitus' thought into a cosmological argument. I wish to present two of these ways:
I. The Heraclitean Cosmological Argument (HCA) based on correspondence
1. Nature is in constant flux. (Premise)
2. There is order throughout nature. (Premise)
3. The order throughout nature is either in flux or not in flux. (Definition)
4. The order throughout nature is not in flux. (Premise)
5. Every fact of concrete reality corresponds to some existing concrete reality. (Premise, correspondence principle)
6. Hence, the fact of order in nature corresponds to some existing concrete reality. (From 2 and 5)
7. The corresponding concrete reality is itself either in flux or not in flux. (Definition)
8. It cannot be in flux. (From 4 and 5)
9. Therefore, an immutable ordering principle (Logos) exists. (From 6 - 8)
10. Therefore, the Logos is distinct from nature. (From 1 and 9)
The Logos that Heraclitus concludes to is immutable, eternal (for something can only cease to exist at some time if it changes), and enormously powerful, given that it is the cause of change throughout nature. More precisely, though, his thought is that the Logos is part of nature, but distinct from those aspects of nature that are in flux.
II. The HCA based on the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR)
With some modifications of Leibniz' argument, we can reformulate the syllogism to be Heraclitean-friendly:
1. Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause. (Premise, PSR)
2. If the order of nature has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is the Logos. (Premise)
3. The order of nature exists. (Premise)
4. Hence, the order of nature has an explanation of its existence. (From 1 and 3)
5. Therefore, the order of nature is explained by the Logos. (From 2 and 4)
What I like about this version is the awkwardness that results in rejecting the existence of the Logos. If the skeptic takes the view that the order of the universe has an external cause, then we have something supernatural. If, however, the other horn of the dilemma is preferred, then the order of the universe has necessary existence. This entails that something is immutable, eternal, and enormously powerful, anyway.
This means that either (1) and/or (3) must be rejected. That's not an issue for me, though.
[1] A.H. Armstrong, An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1989 edition, p. 10.
Tuesday, February 15, 2011
Mortimer Adler's Cosmological Argument
Mortimer Adler came to the Christian faith fairly late in life, and to the Catholic faith in particular, even later. Nevertheless, even before his conversion and throughout his professional career, Adler made no apologies for defending his belief in God (or a Supreme Being of some kind) based on the existence of a contingent universe. His own argument goes roughly like this:
1. If X is an effect in need of a sustaining cause Y, then the existence of X implies the existence and action of Y. (Premise)
2. The universe is an existing effect. (Premise)
3. The universe is radically contingent. (Premise)
4. Whatever is radically contingent requires a sustaining cause. (Premise, PSR)
5. Therefore, the universe has a sustaining cause. (From 1 - 4)
(1) and (2) are indubitably true. (3) seems fairly benign upon consideration. Adler distinguishes between radical contingency and superficial contingency, the former of which entails the possibility of one or more alternative states of affairs. For example, the universe as it presently exists could logically exist differently. The laws of nature could be different; my desk could be yellow instead of black; the Steelers could have beaten the Packers in the Super Bowl; and so forth.
(4) is Adler's interpretation of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR). Instead of going into a defense of the PSR, it is worth considering a common objection. It is often alleged that these arguments commit a composition fallacy. Just because each part of a mountain is small, that doesn't mean the mountain as a whole is small. Likewise, it is thought, even though each part of the universe has a sustaining cause, that doesn't mean the universe as a whole has a sustaining cause.
The disparity in this analogy is evident whenever we try to apply causal explanations. Would it be wise to suggest that even though each part of the mountain has a causal explanation, the mountain as a whole does not? Surely the mountain itself has been formed by geological processes, etc. What this illustrates is that while there are cases in which the whole is not like its parts, there are other cases in which the whole is like its parts.
Adler then reasons that the sustaining cause of the universe must have the usual transcendent attributes of timelessness, immutability, and immateriality, in addition to enormous power.
It turns out that Adler's argument is pretty close to Leibniz's own formulation of the cosmological argument.
1. If X is an effect in need of a sustaining cause Y, then the existence of X implies the existence and action of Y. (Premise)
2. The universe is an existing effect. (Premise)
3. The universe is radically contingent. (Premise)
4. Whatever is radically contingent requires a sustaining cause. (Premise, PSR)
5. Therefore, the universe has a sustaining cause. (From 1 - 4)
(1) and (2) are indubitably true. (3) seems fairly benign upon consideration. Adler distinguishes between radical contingency and superficial contingency, the former of which entails the possibility of one or more alternative states of affairs. For example, the universe as it presently exists could logically exist differently. The laws of nature could be different; my desk could be yellow instead of black; the Steelers could have beaten the Packers in the Super Bowl; and so forth.
(4) is Adler's interpretation of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR). Instead of going into a defense of the PSR, it is worth considering a common objection. It is often alleged that these arguments commit a composition fallacy. Just because each part of a mountain is small, that doesn't mean the mountain as a whole is small. Likewise, it is thought, even though each part of the universe has a sustaining cause, that doesn't mean the universe as a whole has a sustaining cause.
The disparity in this analogy is evident whenever we try to apply causal explanations. Would it be wise to suggest that even though each part of the mountain has a causal explanation, the mountain as a whole does not? Surely the mountain itself has been formed by geological processes, etc. What this illustrates is that while there are cases in which the whole is not like its parts, there are other cases in which the whole is like its parts.
Adler then reasons that the sustaining cause of the universe must have the usual transcendent attributes of timelessness, immutability, and immateriality, in addition to enormous power.
It turns out that Adler's argument is pretty close to Leibniz's own formulation of the cosmological argument.
Thursday, February 3, 2011
The Indispensability Argument for the Existence of Abstract Objects
Numbers, sets, laws of logic, and so forth are all abstract objects. What makes something abstract as opposed to concrete is known with some imprecision, but it is generally agreed that one aspect that distinguishes abstract objects from concrete objects is that the former do not stand in causal relations. Now, should we admit that such objects actually exist? Here is one reason to think they do.
Our scientific knowledge of the world can be reduced in some cases to basic "laws," axioms composed of mathematical formulas. For instance, Newton's law of universal gravitation states that: F = G (m1 * m2 / r^2). The distance between the masses is "r" and the axiom requires that r be squared - hence, r^2. The mathematical function of squaring the distance is therefore an indispensable aspect of Newton's law. The same indispensability can be shown for all kinds of abstract objects. This leads us to the following argument:
1. Whatever is indispensable possesses the attribute of indispensability. (Definition)
2. Abstract objects are indispensable. (Premise)
3. Hence, abstract objects possess the attribute of indispensability. (From 1 and 2)
4. Non-existent objects cannot possess any attribute. (Premise)
5. Therefore, abstract objects exist. (From 3 and 4, plus negation)
All that's left is to defend the certainly uncontroversial premise (4). Something non-existent cannot possess any attributes, since attributes are themselves existing qualities. Therefore, at least some abstract objects, at any rate, exist.
Our scientific knowledge of the world can be reduced in some cases to basic "laws," axioms composed of mathematical formulas. For instance, Newton's law of universal gravitation states that: F = G (m1 * m2 / r^2). The distance between the masses is "r" and the axiom requires that r be squared - hence, r^2. The mathematical function of squaring the distance is therefore an indispensable aspect of Newton's law. The same indispensability can be shown for all kinds of abstract objects. This leads us to the following argument:
1. Whatever is indispensable possesses the attribute of indispensability. (Definition)
2. Abstract objects are indispensable. (Premise)
3. Hence, abstract objects possess the attribute of indispensability. (From 1 and 2)
4. Non-existent objects cannot possess any attribute. (Premise)
5. Therefore, abstract objects exist. (From 3 and 4, plus negation)
All that's left is to defend the certainly uncontroversial premise (4). Something non-existent cannot possess any attributes, since attributes are themselves existing qualities. Therefore, at least some abstract objects, at any rate, exist.
Monday, January 24, 2011
The Modal First Way
Inspired by Maydole's Modal Third Way, as well as Gale and Pruss' Modal Cosmological Argument, I think there is promise in constructing a modalized version of the argument from motion - the Modal First Way (MFW). Let's start with three modal axioms:
A1. Everything in motion is possibly moved by another.
A2. The regress of movers is possibly finite.
A3. Whatever is contingent is possibly moved by another.
Motion, or change, is the transition of a potentiality to an actuality, as in the case of an acorn becoming an oak tree. Now, for a reductio ad absurdum:
P1. Assume that a First Mover does not possibly exist.
P2. If a First Mover does not possibly exist, then it is either necessarily the case that a) something in motion cannot be moved by another; or b) the regress of movers is infinite. (From 1, A1 and A2)
P3. It is not necessarily the case that (2a) or (2b). (From A1 and A2)
P4. Hence, it is possible that a First Mover exists. (From 1 - 3)
P5. Whatever is possible is either contingent or necessary. (Definition)
P6. Whatever is contingent is possibly moved by another. (From A3)
P7. A First Mover cannot be moved by another. (Premise)
P8. Therefore, a First Mover necessarily exists. (From 1 - 7)
Of course, one may imagine a possible world in which nothing is in motion. However, this wouldn't undermine our conclusion that a First Mover necessarily exists. For, without motion the First Mover would just exist a se and without any effect, much like George Washington would still be the same person had he not been the first president of the United States.
Let's sum up the argument in simpler terms:
1. Pure Act possibly exists. (Premise)
2. Whatever is possible is either contingent or necessary. (Definition)
3. Whatever is contingent is possibly actualized. (Premise)
4. Hence, Pure Act is necessary. (From 1 - 3)
5. Therefore, Pure Act exists. (From 4)
Then, in closing the gap between Pure Act and God:
6. Pure Act is either omnipotent or non-omnipotent. (Definition)
7. Whatever is non-omnipotent exemplifies the potentiality to grow in power. (Premise)
8. Pure Act does not exemplify any potentiality. (Definition)
9. Therefore, Pure Act is omnipotent. (From 6 - 8)
A1. Everything in motion is possibly moved by another.
A2. The regress of movers is possibly finite.
A3. Whatever is contingent is possibly moved by another.
Motion, or change, is the transition of a potentiality to an actuality, as in the case of an acorn becoming an oak tree. Now, for a reductio ad absurdum:
P1. Assume that a First Mover does not possibly exist.
P2. If a First Mover does not possibly exist, then it is either necessarily the case that a) something in motion cannot be moved by another; or b) the regress of movers is infinite. (From 1, A1 and A2)
P3. It is not necessarily the case that (2a) or (2b). (From A1 and A2)
P4. Hence, it is possible that a First Mover exists. (From 1 - 3)
P5. Whatever is possible is either contingent or necessary. (Definition)
P6. Whatever is contingent is possibly moved by another. (From A3)
P7. A First Mover cannot be moved by another. (Premise)
P8. Therefore, a First Mover necessarily exists. (From 1 - 7)
Of course, one may imagine a possible world in which nothing is in motion. However, this wouldn't undermine our conclusion that a First Mover necessarily exists. For, without motion the First Mover would just exist a se and without any effect, much like George Washington would still be the same person had he not been the first president of the United States.
Let's sum up the argument in simpler terms:
1. Pure Act possibly exists. (Premise)
2. Whatever is possible is either contingent or necessary. (Definition)
3. Whatever is contingent is possibly actualized. (Premise)
4. Hence, Pure Act is necessary. (From 1 - 3)
5. Therefore, Pure Act exists. (From 4)
Then, in closing the gap between Pure Act and God:
6. Pure Act is either omnipotent or non-omnipotent. (Definition)
7. Whatever is non-omnipotent exemplifies the potentiality to grow in power. (Premise)
8. Pure Act does not exemplify any potentiality. (Definition)
9. Therefore, Pure Act is omnipotent. (From 6 - 8)
Friday, January 7, 2011
Mind Versus Matter
Which is more fundamental in explaining the orderly processes of nature: mind or matter? How one answers this question will inevitably determine whether one adopts a theistic or atheistic worldview. I have to wonder why some of the New Atheists continue to refer to belief in God as a delusion or mental disorder when the "mind" answer isn't obviously false or a priori less likely true than "matter." Maybe they would dispute this, but it's hard to understand how there could be a reasonable a priori reason for preferring the "matter" answer. In any case, I wish to offer a couple analogies in support of a theistic worldview.
Imagine you win the lottery. You might think that you were lucky. However, suppose now that you win the lottery twice in a row, or a hundred or a thousand times in a row, etc. At this point, the chance hypothesis would become quite unreasonable. As Aristotle so aptly explained, "when a certain result is achieved either invariably or normally, it is no incidental or merely lucky coincidence; and in the processes of nature each result is achieved if not invariably at least normally, provided nothing hinders."
Lest anyone think this is an "outdated" assumption, here is what contemporary British physicist, Paul Davies, has to say, "All science is founded on the assumption that the physical world is ordered. The most powerful expression of this order is found in the laws of physics. Nobody knows where these laws come from, nor why they apparently operate universally and unfailingly, but we see them at work all around us: in the rhythm of night and day, the pattern of planetary motions, the regular ticking of a clock."
Atheistic philosopher, Michael Martin, agree: "Consider science. It presupposes the uniformity of nature: that natural laws govern the world and that there are no violations of such laws."
Now, whether there are any violations of natural laws (e.g. in the case of miracles) is another issue. The point is that nature exhibits regularity for the most part, as expressed, for example, in the laws of gravity, electromagnetism, and the strong and weak atomic forces.
Yet, how could matter be the ultimate explanation of this? Without the direction of some intelligence, the same person would not win the lottery over and over again. Another analogy is this. Which computer would you trust to be reliable: one designed by an intelligence or one put together without the direction of any intelligence whatsoever? I hope you would choose the former.
This second analogy is used in support of the so-called "argument from reason," a la Lewis and Reppert. Briefly, if our cognitive faculties were formed by non-rational processes, why should we trust that our cognitive faculties are rational, e.g. why trust that our cognitive faculties generally produce true beliefs? If the skeptic retorts that they don't, then they are engaging in a self-contradiction. For, the conclusion that our cognitive faculties do not generally produce true beliefs is itself produced by our cognitive faculties, undermining the skeptic's own position. Of course, if our cognitive faculties are generally reliable, then they are most plausibly formed by rational processes, which implies an intelligent designer of sorts.
These are very simple arguments, but they have withstood centuries of philosophical critique. The fact of the matter is that the believer is capable of showing the non-believer that God exists based on just two starting points:
1. One cannot be rational while rejecting rational inquiry.
2. One cannot be rational while undermining the necessary preconditions of rational inquiry.
Order, regularity, and reliable cognitive faculties are all necessary preconditions of rational inquiry. What is more, each of these aspects of rational inquiry are best explained by the design hypothesis.
Now, the "who made God?" question of Dawkins, etc., can be easily disposed of. Here are the design criteria of the argument from laws of nature, for example: everything that a) lacks intelligence, and b) exhibits regularity, is designed.
Obviously, God does not lack intelligence, so He is not in need of being designed. When you type words on a keyboard, your own intelligence suffices to guide that process. The reason you and I are designed is because we have not always existed, and hence we didn't always have intelligence.
In combination with the cosmological argument (e.g. the Modal Third Way), these various teleological arguments provide the believer with a rational justification for theism.
[1] Aristotle, Natural Science, Book 2, Chap. 8, translated and edited by Philip Wheelwright, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., pp. 40-41.
[2] Paul Davies, http://www.fortunecity.com/emachines...6/freeuni.html.
[3] Michael Martin, http://www.infidels.org/library/mode...rame/tang.html.
Imagine you win the lottery. You might think that you were lucky. However, suppose now that you win the lottery twice in a row, or a hundred or a thousand times in a row, etc. At this point, the chance hypothesis would become quite unreasonable. As Aristotle so aptly explained, "when a certain result is achieved either invariably or normally, it is no incidental or merely lucky coincidence; and in the processes of nature each result is achieved if not invariably at least normally, provided nothing hinders."
Lest anyone think this is an "outdated" assumption, here is what contemporary British physicist, Paul Davies, has to say, "All science is founded on the assumption that the physical world is ordered. The most powerful expression of this order is found in the laws of physics. Nobody knows where these laws come from, nor why they apparently operate universally and unfailingly, but we see them at work all around us: in the rhythm of night and day, the pattern of planetary motions, the regular ticking of a clock."
Atheistic philosopher, Michael Martin, agree: "Consider science. It presupposes the uniformity of nature: that natural laws govern the world and that there are no violations of such laws."
Now, whether there are any violations of natural laws (e.g. in the case of miracles) is another issue. The point is that nature exhibits regularity for the most part, as expressed, for example, in the laws of gravity, electromagnetism, and the strong and weak atomic forces.
Yet, how could matter be the ultimate explanation of this? Without the direction of some intelligence, the same person would not win the lottery over and over again. Another analogy is this. Which computer would you trust to be reliable: one designed by an intelligence or one put together without the direction of any intelligence whatsoever? I hope you would choose the former.
This second analogy is used in support of the so-called "argument from reason," a la Lewis and Reppert. Briefly, if our cognitive faculties were formed by non-rational processes, why should we trust that our cognitive faculties are rational, e.g. why trust that our cognitive faculties generally produce true beliefs? If the skeptic retorts that they don't, then they are engaging in a self-contradiction. For, the conclusion that our cognitive faculties do not generally produce true beliefs is itself produced by our cognitive faculties, undermining the skeptic's own position. Of course, if our cognitive faculties are generally reliable, then they are most plausibly formed by rational processes, which implies an intelligent designer of sorts.
These are very simple arguments, but they have withstood centuries of philosophical critique. The fact of the matter is that the believer is capable of showing the non-believer that God exists based on just two starting points:
1. One cannot be rational while rejecting rational inquiry.
2. One cannot be rational while undermining the necessary preconditions of rational inquiry.
Order, regularity, and reliable cognitive faculties are all necessary preconditions of rational inquiry. What is more, each of these aspects of rational inquiry are best explained by the design hypothesis.
Now, the "who made God?" question of Dawkins, etc., can be easily disposed of. Here are the design criteria of the argument from laws of nature, for example: everything that a) lacks intelligence, and b) exhibits regularity, is designed.
Obviously, God does not lack intelligence, so He is not in need of being designed. When you type words on a keyboard, your own intelligence suffices to guide that process. The reason you and I are designed is because we have not always existed, and hence we didn't always have intelligence.
In combination with the cosmological argument (e.g. the Modal Third Way), these various teleological arguments provide the believer with a rational justification for theism.
[1] Aristotle, Natural Science, Book 2, Chap. 8, translated and edited by Philip Wheelwright, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., pp. 40-41.
[2] Paul Davies, http://www.fortunecity.com/emachines...6/freeuni.html.
[3] Michael Martin, http://www.infidels.org/library/mode...rame/tang.html.
Tuesday, January 4, 2011
Apophatic Theology and the Meaningfulness of Religious Language
I was recently asked by a skeptic to explain the meaning of "necessary" in the proposition, "God has necessary existence." He held to a non-cognitivist position on the matter, claiming that it is meaningless to assert that anything has necessary existence. This is a very important distinction: he was not merely claiming that nothing has necessary existence, but that the very notion of necessary existence is literally without meaning.
What I pointed out is likely already apparent to most - namely, that if it is meaningful to speak of contingent existence, then it is equally meaningful to speak of necessary (non-contingent) existence. Nobody in their right mind would doubt that there are things that exist, but can also fail to exist. [1] Trees, planets, human beings, etc., are all contingent beings. If "contingent" is meaningful, then so is its negation, just as not-blue is the meaningful negation of blue.
This reminds me of how essential a sound grasp of apophatic (negative) theology is for the believer. We know the nature of God by knowing what He is not, as opposed to observing God in the same way we observe contingent things. God is said to be necessary because He is non-contingent, timeless because He is non-temporal, immutable because He is not subject to change, and so forth.
On the other hand, this is what makes the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation so scandalous to the non-Christian. How could the immutable God take on a mutable human nature? We could delve into the dual-nature of Christ, but for now I wish only to stress the need for the believer to answer the non-cognitivist's contention that religious language is meaningless. It's easy to answer, but unfortunately non-cognitivism has taken on what I consider to be a last resort in order to resist belief in God.
[1] It's funny to note that a denial of this would require that everything has necessary existence, which is what the non-cognitivist denies is even meaningful to begin with.
What I pointed out is likely already apparent to most - namely, that if it is meaningful to speak of contingent existence, then it is equally meaningful to speak of necessary (non-contingent) existence. Nobody in their right mind would doubt that there are things that exist, but can also fail to exist. [1] Trees, planets, human beings, etc., are all contingent beings. If "contingent" is meaningful, then so is its negation, just as not-blue is the meaningful negation of blue.
This reminds me of how essential a sound grasp of apophatic (negative) theology is for the believer. We know the nature of God by knowing what He is not, as opposed to observing God in the same way we observe contingent things. God is said to be necessary because He is non-contingent, timeless because He is non-temporal, immutable because He is not subject to change, and so forth.
On the other hand, this is what makes the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation so scandalous to the non-Christian. How could the immutable God take on a mutable human nature? We could delve into the dual-nature of Christ, but for now I wish only to stress the need for the believer to answer the non-cognitivist's contention that religious language is meaningless. It's easy to answer, but unfortunately non-cognitivism has taken on what I consider to be a last resort in order to resist belief in God.
[1] It's funny to note that a denial of this would require that everything has necessary existence, which is what the non-cognitivist denies is even meaningful to begin with.
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