Only propositions are necessary, say Hume and Russell. If God exists, He does not have necessary existence or, more specifically, logically necessary existence. [1] In order for a proposition to be necessary, this view states that only analytical propositions meet the bill, e.g. A=A, either A or ~A, etc.
The above view has a powerful defeater. You will recall that in order for the MCA to work, it is postulated that the sum total of contingent entities C possibly has an external cause. This external cause must be a necessary entity N. Given that N is possible, it follows (in conjunction with S5) that N exists.
In order to reject the MCA, the skeptic has to say that N is not even possible, which entails:
1. Necessarily, every cause is contingent.
Is (1) analytically true? Obviously not. Yet on Hume's hypothesis, (1) should therefore be rejected. Given that the negation of (1) entails that N is possible and therefore actually exists, the Humean is forced to say that N both exists and does not exist. Of course, this is a violation of one of the analytical propositions that Hume does take to be necessary - namely, the law of non-contradiction.
In short, the Humean hypothesis is self-defeating and should not lead the subject to conclude that N is impossible. Moreover, if N is not impossible [2], it follows that N is possible, which is one area where the MCA has its strength.
[1] On this view, God may still have temporally necessary existence.
[2] Other objections will likewise have to be disposed of.
Tuesday, April 12, 2011
Monday, April 11, 2011
God's Possible Existence and Necessity
I still scratch my head when I hear this objection: "If God possibly exists, then He also possibly does not exist."
The first step in refuting this (sadly) oft-repeated criticism of God's necessity is to explain that the opposite of "possible" is not "possibly not," but "not possible" (impossible).
What the objector is confusing for possibility is contingency. A few modal definitions should suffice to clear the air:
necessity: existence in all possible worlds
contingency: existence in at least one, but not all possible worlds
impossibility: existence in no possible worlds
Obviously, "necessity" entails possibility, whereas the latter does not entail contingency.
The first step in refuting this (sadly) oft-repeated criticism of God's necessity is to explain that the opposite of "possible" is not "possibly not," but "not possible" (impossible).
What the objector is confusing for possibility is contingency. A few modal definitions should suffice to clear the air:
necessity: existence in all possible worlds
contingency: existence in at least one, but not all possible worlds
impossibility: existence in no possible worlds
Obviously, "necessity" entails possibility, whereas the latter does not entail contingency.
Wednesday, April 6, 2011
Rethinking the Necessary Preconditions of Inspiration and Canonicty
1 Maccabees 9:27, "There had not been such great distress in Israel since the time prophets ceased to appear among the people."
The implication drawn from the preceding text is that the book as a whole is not the work of a prophet. For some interpreters, this raises the question: does 1 Maccabees belong in the canon?
First, a distinction ought to be drawn between inspiration and canonicity. Loosely, a book is inspired if it is the infallible word of God. By contrast, a book is canonical if it is recognized as inspired. This distinction, while important, is not vital for the issue at hand, since even the inspiration of 1 Maccabees is contested.
For those who answer that 1 Maccabees is inspired and ought to be included in the canon, it is argued that prophesy, properly understood, is not a necessary condition of inspiration. A prophet is a person who holds a particular office or role, which may or may not include the writing of inspired Scripture.
Assuming that 1 Maccabees 9:27 and similar passages do undermine the book's own inspiration, it seems that too much is proved. Consider Psalm 74:9, "Now we see no signs, we have no prophets, no one who knows how long." The psalm indicates that no prophet is present. But if prophesy is a necessary precondition of inspiration, doesn't this imply that Psalm 74:9 is not an inspired text?
As far as I can tell, we have two choices. We can either reject Psalm 74:9 as inspired or, as I suggest, adopt a different set of presuppositions with respect to inspiration.
The implication drawn from the preceding text is that the book as a whole is not the work of a prophet. For some interpreters, this raises the question: does 1 Maccabees belong in the canon?
First, a distinction ought to be drawn between inspiration and canonicity. Loosely, a book is inspired if it is the infallible word of God. By contrast, a book is canonical if it is recognized as inspired. This distinction, while important, is not vital for the issue at hand, since even the inspiration of 1 Maccabees is contested.
For those who answer that 1 Maccabees is inspired and ought to be included in the canon, it is argued that prophesy, properly understood, is not a necessary condition of inspiration. A prophet is a person who holds a particular office or role, which may or may not include the writing of inspired Scripture.
Assuming that 1 Maccabees 9:27 and similar passages do undermine the book's own inspiration, it seems that too much is proved. Consider Psalm 74:9, "Now we see no signs, we have no prophets, no one who knows how long." The psalm indicates that no prophet is present. But if prophesy is a necessary precondition of inspiration, doesn't this imply that Psalm 74:9 is not an inspired text?
As far as I can tell, we have two choices. We can either reject Psalm 74:9 as inspired or, as I suggest, adopt a different set of presuppositions with respect to inspiration.
Saturday, April 2, 2011
The Hierarchy of Creation in Genesis 1
Whether one is a theistic evolutionist, a young earth creationist, or anything in between, one can still appreciate the manner in which the Genesis narrative describes God's act of creation.
God is said to have "rested" on the seventh day. As it is commonly known, the number seven represents perfection in Hebrew numerology. What is much easier to overlook is the symbolic [1] nature of the previous six days. Take days one and four, two and five, and three and six:
Day One: God creates light
Day Four: God creates the sun and moon
Day Two: God creates the separation between the sky and seas
Day Five: God creates birds and sea animals/fish
Day Three: God creates land and plants
Day Six: God creates animals, notably humankind
There is a parallel between the first three days and the last three. Each day there is a progression in the hierarchy of creation. The first three days describe the environment in which the latter three dwell. This is especially important for those of us who give Genesis 1:28 a "caretaker" interpretation. The earth has been created for humanity, not the other way around. [2] With each day what God creates is greater and greater, finally reaching its peak in humanity, having been created in God's image (Genesis 1:27). [3]
[1] For those who take a literal interpretation of the six days, I do not mean to imply "non-literal" by the use of "symbolic." Certainly something can be both literal in one sense, and symbolic in another.
[2] Of course, this doesn't give humanity a license to abuse the earth. Rather, we are to care for it in an analogous way to how God cares for us.
[3] The imago dei is a term descriptive of humankind's rationality and personhood.
God is said to have "rested" on the seventh day. As it is commonly known, the number seven represents perfection in Hebrew numerology. What is much easier to overlook is the symbolic [1] nature of the previous six days. Take days one and four, two and five, and three and six:
Day One: God creates light
Day Four: God creates the sun and moon
Day Two: God creates the separation between the sky and seas
Day Five: God creates birds and sea animals/fish
Day Three: God creates land and plants
Day Six: God creates animals, notably humankind
There is a parallel between the first three days and the last three. Each day there is a progression in the hierarchy of creation. The first three days describe the environment in which the latter three dwell. This is especially important for those of us who give Genesis 1:28 a "caretaker" interpretation. The earth has been created for humanity, not the other way around. [2] With each day what God creates is greater and greater, finally reaching its peak in humanity, having been created in God's image (Genesis 1:27). [3]
[1] For those who take a literal interpretation of the six days, I do not mean to imply "non-literal" by the use of "symbolic." Certainly something can be both literal in one sense, and symbolic in another.
[2] Of course, this doesn't give humanity a license to abuse the earth. Rather, we are to care for it in an analogous way to how God cares for us.
[3] The imago dei is a term descriptive of humankind's rationality and personhood.
Monday, March 21, 2011
Our causation as an aspect of God's final causation
"The agent tends to make the patient, not only in regard to its act of being, but also in regard to causality. . . . So, the effect does tend to be like the agent, not only in its species, but also in this characteristic of being the cause of others." [1]
Is it enough for God to create and sustain us? A deeper look into our relationship with God strongly suggests that many of the things we do are an analogy or an imperfect reflection of the divine likeness. Given that we have been created in the image of God, there is an inclination within each of us to become more and more like God. One of the ways we do tend toward the divine likeness is in our causing other things to exist.
Which is more splendid: a man who builds a house, or the God who made the man who builds the house? It is only on our knowledge of God, implicit or explicit, that we desire to cause things, which sublimely shows how much we want to be like our Creator.
[1] St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Book Three: Providence, Part 1, translated by Vernon J. Bourke, University of Notre Dame Press edition 1975, ch. 21.
Is it enough for God to create and sustain us? A deeper look into our relationship with God strongly suggests that many of the things we do are an analogy or an imperfect reflection of the divine likeness. Given that we have been created in the image of God, there is an inclination within each of us to become more and more like God. One of the ways we do tend toward the divine likeness is in our causing other things to exist.
Which is more splendid: a man who builds a house, or the God who made the man who builds the house? It is only on our knowledge of God, implicit or explicit, that we desire to cause things, which sublimely shows how much we want to be like our Creator.
[1] St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Book Three: Providence, Part 1, translated by Vernon J. Bourke, University of Notre Dame Press edition 1975, ch. 21.
Sunday, March 20, 2011
The modal cosmological argument once more
The version of the modal cosmological argument (MCA) that I defend goes like this:
1. Every contingent entity possibly has an external cause. (Premise, W-PSR)
2. If the sum total of contingent entities C has an external cause, that cause is a necessary, eternal, and enormously powerful entity. (Premise)
3. C is a contingent entity. (Premise)
4. Possibly, C has an external cause. (From 1 and 3)
5. Therefore, the external cause of C is a necessary, eternal, and enormously powerful entity. (From 2, 4, and S5)
The argument is logically sound, but are its premises more likely true than their negations? Prima facie, almost nobody questions (1). Assuming it's possible for a brick to pop into existence uncaused out of nothing, it's still reasonable to conclude that the brick could have had an external cause of its existence.
(2) is largely analytical. If there is a cause outside the sum total of C that causes C, that cause must have necessary existence. Otherwise, it too would be contained within C. Moreover, this necessary entity would have to be eternal, since there is no time at which a necessary entity can fail to exist. Finally, the entity in question must also be enormously powerful, since a cause's power is at least as great as its effect. The sheer vastness and order of C warrants this conclusion.
Notice what the skeptic cannot argue. He cannot start by reversing the W-PSR:
1*. Every contingent entity possibly does not have an external cause.
The existence of a necessary, eternal, and enormously powerful entity is consistent with its not having caused what exists contingently. What the skeptic would have to do is begin by saying that a necessary entity possibly does not exist. However, this possibility premise entails the much stronger conclusion that C cannot possibly have an external cause. This brings the original W-PSR back into question. So, the skeptic will have to pick their poison.
At any rate, I could argue that a necessary entity's possible non-existence is contradictory (and I think it is), but for now, it's important to realize that not all contradictions are as immediately obvious as the next. "The Prime Minister is a prime number" is necessarily false, but it's nowhere near as obvious as, "X is ~X."
1. Every contingent entity possibly has an external cause. (Premise, W-PSR)
2. If the sum total of contingent entities C has an external cause, that cause is a necessary, eternal, and enormously powerful entity. (Premise)
3. C is a contingent entity. (Premise)
4. Possibly, C has an external cause. (From 1 and 3)
5. Therefore, the external cause of C is a necessary, eternal, and enormously powerful entity. (From 2, 4, and S5)
The argument is logically sound, but are its premises more likely true than their negations? Prima facie, almost nobody questions (1). Assuming it's possible for a brick to pop into existence uncaused out of nothing, it's still reasonable to conclude that the brick could have had an external cause of its existence.
(2) is largely analytical. If there is a cause outside the sum total of C that causes C, that cause must have necessary existence. Otherwise, it too would be contained within C. Moreover, this necessary entity would have to be eternal, since there is no time at which a necessary entity can fail to exist. Finally, the entity in question must also be enormously powerful, since a cause's power is at least as great as its effect. The sheer vastness and order of C warrants this conclusion.
Notice what the skeptic cannot argue. He cannot start by reversing the W-PSR:
1*. Every contingent entity possibly does not have an external cause.
The existence of a necessary, eternal, and enormously powerful entity is consistent with its not having caused what exists contingently. What the skeptic would have to do is begin by saying that a necessary entity possibly does not exist. However, this possibility premise entails the much stronger conclusion that C cannot possibly have an external cause. This brings the original W-PSR back into question. So, the skeptic will have to pick their poison.
At any rate, I could argue that a necessary entity's possible non-existence is contradictory (and I think it is), but for now, it's important to realize that not all contradictions are as immediately obvious as the next. "The Prime Minister is a prime number" is necessarily false, but it's nowhere near as obvious as, "X is ~X."
Friday, March 18, 2011
A Modal Ontological Argument in the tradition of Rene Descartes
With all of the recent modalizations of St. Anselm's ontological argument, I was surprised to see how few attempts have been made to do the same with Descartes' arguments from First Meditations.
In short, Descartes reasons that he has the concept of God in his mind. He then asks, what is the cause of this conception? For example, we have the concept of an apple because we know such things exist. We have the concept of a unicorn, not because they exist, but because we composite different parts (a horse's body, the horn of any number of animals, and the wings of a majestic bird). For Descartes, then, the ability to have a clear and distinct conceptualization of a thing points to that thing's having existence in reality.
Here's how a modal version of the argument might look:
1. If a concept of C is held by person S, then C possibly corresponds to an objective reality. (Premise)
2. The concept of a maximally great being is a concept of S. (Premise)
3. Hence, the concept of a maximally great being possibly corresponds to an objective reality. (From 1 and 2)
4. A maximally great being possibly exists. (3, simplification)
5. A being is maximally great if and only if it is maximally excellent in every possible world. (Premise)
6. A being is maximally excellent if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect. (Premise)
7. Hence, an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect being exists in all possible worlds. (From 5, 6, and S5)
8. Therefore, an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect being exists. (From 7)
9. Therefore, God exists. (From 8)
In short, Descartes reasons that he has the concept of God in his mind. He then asks, what is the cause of this conception? For example, we have the concept of an apple because we know such things exist. We have the concept of a unicorn, not because they exist, but because we composite different parts (a horse's body, the horn of any number of animals, and the wings of a majestic bird). For Descartes, then, the ability to have a clear and distinct conceptualization of a thing points to that thing's having existence in reality.
Here's how a modal version of the argument might look:
1. If a concept of C is held by person S, then C possibly corresponds to an objective reality. (Premise)
2. The concept of a maximally great being is a concept of S. (Premise)
3. Hence, the concept of a maximally great being possibly corresponds to an objective reality. (From 1 and 2)
4. A maximally great being possibly exists. (3, simplification)
5. A being is maximally great if and only if it is maximally excellent in every possible world. (Premise)
6. A being is maximally excellent if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect. (Premise)
7. Hence, an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect being exists in all possible worlds. (From 5, 6, and S5)
8. Therefore, an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect being exists. (From 7)
9. Therefore, God exists. (From 8)
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