Richard Dawkins and some of the new atheists are fond of saying that everyone is an atheist, and that atheists simply believe in one less God than we do. It occurred to me last night while thinking about this that there can be dozens of parodies of this argument. For example:
"You believe the Steelers alone will win the next Super Bowl. I simply believe that one less team will win."
The point of the parody is to show that it may be the case that some God or other must exist, just as some team or other must win the Super Bowl. Obviously, this contention may be disputed, but that's where the debate ought to shift to the arguments of natural theology.
Thursday, May 24, 2012
Friday, May 18, 2012
More on the Uniformity of Nature
It occurred to me that for the diehard skeptic, the uniformity of nature/principle of induction may not be readily accepted. Of course, I've always known this, and Hume makes it abundantly clear that he doesn't believe that the uniformity of nature is something demonstrable. Nevertheless, I've been thinking about possible arguments that would demonstrate the irrationality of denying the uniformity of nature. Here's one:
1. In order for a belief B to be rationally compelling, there must be a probability of B > .5. (Premise)
2. Necessarily, if nature is not uniform (represented by ~B), then ~B > .5. (Implied by 1)
3. Necessarily, if ~B, then the probability of ~B is inscrutable. (Premise)
4. Necessarily, if ~B is inscrutable, then it is not the case that ~B > .5. (Definition)
5. Hence, it is not the case that ~B > .5. (From 3 and 4)
6. Therefore, ~B is not rationally compelling. (From 1 and 5)
Based on this argument, it's easy to see how ~B is not rationally acceptable, either. Assuming that rational acceptability requires some level of probability, then ~B does not even meet this criterion. After all, inscrutability is the inability to ascertain a belief's probability, whereas rational acceptability necessitates that there be such an ability.
1. In order for a belief B to be rationally compelling, there must be a probability of B > .5. (Premise)
2. Necessarily, if nature is not uniform (represented by ~B), then ~B > .5. (Implied by 1)
3. Necessarily, if ~B, then the probability of ~B is inscrutable. (Premise)
4. Necessarily, if ~B is inscrutable, then it is not the case that ~B > .5. (Definition)
5. Hence, it is not the case that ~B > .5. (From 3 and 4)
6. Therefore, ~B is not rationally compelling. (From 1 and 5)
Based on this argument, it's easy to see how ~B is not rationally acceptable, either. Assuming that rational acceptability requires some level of probability, then ~B does not even meet this criterion. After all, inscrutability is the inability to ascertain a belief's probability, whereas rational acceptability necessitates that there be such an ability.
Tuesday, May 15, 2012
Uniformity of Nature and the PSR
There is a great deal of order exhibited throughout the universe. We often refer to this order as the "uniformity of nature." A simple (not to be confused with simplistic) teleological argument might go like this:
1. Regularity is the result of design. (Premise)
2. The uniformity of nature exhibits regularity. (Premise)
3. Therefore, the uniformity of nature is the result of design. (From 1 and 2)
In other words, whenever something happens over and over again, it is not the result of chance, but of design. Since the laws of nature fit this description, we are justified in concluding that a cosmic designer exists.
The typical objection to this argument is that it leaves the designer unexplained. There are two equally effective responses the theist may appeal to. First, in order for an explanation to be best, we don't have to have an explanation of the explanation. If archaeologists discovered the remains of pottery in a remote part of the world, they would rightly conclude that someone had designed the pottery. This holds true even if the archaeologists have no idea who the person was, where he came from, where he went, etc.
Secondly, theists are happy to admit that the cosmic designer has an explanation. The PSR states that everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause. The cosmic designer, far from having no explanation, is explained by a necessity of its own nature. The cosmic designer exists because it cannot possibly fail to exist.
Another way of summarizing the argument is like this:
1. Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause. (Premise, PSR)
2. If the uniformity of nature has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is in a necessary cause. (Premise)
3. The uniformity of nature exists. (Premise)
4. Hence, the uniformity of nature has an explanation of its existence. (From 1 and 3)
5. Therefore, the uniformity of nature is explained by a necessary cause. (From 2 and 4)
Here's the atheist's dilemma. If he says that the uniformity of nature has an external cause, that cause must be supernatural, timeless, changeless and immaterial, in addition to being very powerful and intelligent (per the teleological argument above). Now, this supernatural cause must also have an explanation of its existence, but this can only be found in a necessity of its own nature. After all, a timeless entity is not the kind of thing that can exist and then cease to exist, for that would require temporal becoming.
On the other hand, if the atheist wishes to say that the uniformity of nature exists by a necessity of its own nature, then we still have something very much like God. It's a God-substitute, if you will. It seems that the atheist's insistence that the cosmic designer have an explanation is a sort of backhanded compliment to the theist's defense of the PSR.
1. Regularity is the result of design. (Premise)
2. The uniformity of nature exhibits regularity. (Premise)
3. Therefore, the uniformity of nature is the result of design. (From 1 and 2)
In other words, whenever something happens over and over again, it is not the result of chance, but of design. Since the laws of nature fit this description, we are justified in concluding that a cosmic designer exists.
The typical objection to this argument is that it leaves the designer unexplained. There are two equally effective responses the theist may appeal to. First, in order for an explanation to be best, we don't have to have an explanation of the explanation. If archaeologists discovered the remains of pottery in a remote part of the world, they would rightly conclude that someone had designed the pottery. This holds true even if the archaeologists have no idea who the person was, where he came from, where he went, etc.
Secondly, theists are happy to admit that the cosmic designer has an explanation. The PSR states that everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause. The cosmic designer, far from having no explanation, is explained by a necessity of its own nature. The cosmic designer exists because it cannot possibly fail to exist.
Another way of summarizing the argument is like this:
1. Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause. (Premise, PSR)
2. If the uniformity of nature has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is in a necessary cause. (Premise)
3. The uniformity of nature exists. (Premise)
4. Hence, the uniformity of nature has an explanation of its existence. (From 1 and 3)
5. Therefore, the uniformity of nature is explained by a necessary cause. (From 2 and 4)
Here's the atheist's dilemma. If he says that the uniformity of nature has an external cause, that cause must be supernatural, timeless, changeless and immaterial, in addition to being very powerful and intelligent (per the teleological argument above). Now, this supernatural cause must also have an explanation of its existence, but this can only be found in a necessity of its own nature. After all, a timeless entity is not the kind of thing that can exist and then cease to exist, for that would require temporal becoming.
On the other hand, if the atheist wishes to say that the uniformity of nature exists by a necessity of its own nature, then we still have something very much like God. It's a God-substitute, if you will. It seems that the atheist's insistence that the cosmic designer have an explanation is a sort of backhanded compliment to the theist's defense of the PSR.
One for You, Two for Me
We're all familiar with the "one for you, two for me" expression. It occurred to me that a paradox akin to the Tristram Shandy paradox is within our reach. Imagine we share an infinite bag of cookies and I'm the one who is in charge of the distribution. I give you one, then keep two, give you another one, then keep three, and so on out to infinity. As time advances, my share of cookies will grow continuously larger than your own. Now, this wouldn't be very fair of me, but it also provides the background of the paradox.
Suppose instead that we have been sharing the bag of cookies from eternity past. For every minute that has already passed, you have received a cookie. Given that the past is infinite in this hypothetical scenario, it follows that you have infinitely-many cookies corresponding to infinitely-many minutes. Therefore, there is a one-to-one correspondence between your share of cookies and mine. Yet, hasn't the number of cookies I'm keeping for myself been growing exponentially larger than the cookies I'm giving to you?
This is just another fun way of stating what we already know: that in set-theory, a part may be equal to its whole. Infinite sets may be consistent within an abstract mathematical realm, but I see no reason to accept that they're part of nature/physical reality.
Suppose instead that we have been sharing the bag of cookies from eternity past. For every minute that has already passed, you have received a cookie. Given that the past is infinite in this hypothetical scenario, it follows that you have infinitely-many cookies corresponding to infinitely-many minutes. Therefore, there is a one-to-one correspondence between your share of cookies and mine. Yet, hasn't the number of cookies I'm keeping for myself been growing exponentially larger than the cookies I'm giving to you?
This is just another fun way of stating what we already know: that in set-theory, a part may be equal to its whole. Infinite sets may be consistent within an abstract mathematical realm, but I see no reason to accept that they're part of nature/physical reality.
Saturday, May 12, 2012
Was Same-Sex Marriage Ever a Christian Rite?
This article answers in the affirmative. Jimmy Akin's excellent response can be found here.
Friday, May 11, 2012
Bristol Palin and the Social Media Backlash
Sarah Palin's daughter, Bristol, has criticized President Obama for his support of same-sex marriage. Not surprisingly, Ms. Palin's comments have resulted in a firestorm of insults. This article includes just some of the barbs.
What I find most interesting is that the mockery of Bristol Palin in no way serves as a response to her argument against same-sex marriage (which is that the best environment for children includes a mother and a father). Yes, Bristol is a single mother. So what? Does this in any way undermine the argument she makes? People can attack her personally all they want, but the debate about same-sex marriage ought to focus on the arguments, rather than on the persons who defend them.
Some might chuckle at a personal insult directed toward Bristol Palin, but that kind of verbal sparring is nothing more than textbook ad hominem.
What I find most interesting is that the mockery of Bristol Palin in no way serves as a response to her argument against same-sex marriage (which is that the best environment for children includes a mother and a father). Yes, Bristol is a single mother. So what? Does this in any way undermine the argument she makes? People can attack her personally all they want, but the debate about same-sex marriage ought to focus on the arguments, rather than on the persons who defend them.
Some might chuckle at a personal insult directed toward Bristol Palin, but that kind of verbal sparring is nothing more than textbook ad hominem.
Wednesday, May 9, 2012
North Carolina, Same-sex Marriage and the Accusation of Hate
North Carolina has become the last southern state to add a constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage. Included in the measure is an additional ban on same-sex civil unions and domestic partnerships. Regardless of where you stand on the issue, a troubling trend has continued: the accusation of hate.
Think of it this way. Most of us agree that drugs, such as heroin, should remain illegal. Does this mean opponents to heroin-legalization hate drug addicts? Or, is it rather the case that they have a legitimate point about the health-deteriorating effects of the drug? I'm much more inclined to think the latter.
Note: I'm not comparing homosexuals to drug addicts. My point is simply that the accusation of hate is based upon some flawed logic.
Think of it this way. Most of us agree that drugs, such as heroin, should remain illegal. Does this mean opponents to heroin-legalization hate drug addicts? Or, is it rather the case that they have a legitimate point about the health-deteriorating effects of the drug? I'm much more inclined to think the latter.
Note: I'm not comparing homosexuals to drug addicts. My point is simply that the accusation of hate is based upon some flawed logic.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)