Johnson and Meier on the "Real" Jesus

New Testament scholars, Luke Timothy John and John P. Meier, are among some of the most influential, and indeed thought-provoking thinkers in the current NT-studies field. What we discover upon reading their works are quite a few similarities. However, there are also some key differences between the methodologies of the two. While Johnson attempts to “do away with” the notion of a pure study of the historical Jesus, Meier believes that such attempts can be intellectually stimulating, and that they have an important place in a faith that seeks understanding.

Johnson includes in his “Epilogue,” an attempt to construct an alternative to the historical approach toward faith. He writes, “A more adequate model for reading the New Testament, then, can be called an 'experience/interpretation' model. The model take seriously the deeply human character of the writings, the experiences and convictions that generated them, and the cultural and historical symbols they appropriate.” [1] This line of thinking may help if one's approach to knowledge is an experience-based method of determining what is true, or “real.” This is not to say that historical research is entirely useless, but when it comes to faith in God and Jesus, the historical solutions that result are rather superfluous.

By contrast, we might note how Meier does attempt to answer faith-based questions with at least some historical inquiry, even if the latter is not a necessary precondition of the former. He points out that, “Five key pieces of data help impose initial, though rough, limits on our speculation about Jesus' dates. Once these general limits are set, we can attempt to be more precise.” [2] The data that Meier points out are those facts about Jesus that are almost universally accepted, e.g., the death of Jesus during the era of Pontius Pilate. It is on the basis of these core facts that one is, therefore, able to construct a portrait of Jesus that closely corresponds to what the historical Jesus was like.

It should be noted that for neither scholar is the historical method then final word on the “real” Jesus. Even if we are capable of supplementing what we know about the real Jesus, historical inquiry does just that: it supplements, rather than holds up the faith in the risen Lord. Even though I am not entirely convinced that the dichotomy between “historical” and “real” is a necessary one, I concede that it can provide some utility. For example, for a methodological naturalist, like Bart Ehrman, the notion that God raised Jesus from the dead cannot be determined by any historical inquiry. The reason why is simply because history is by its very nature a science, and science deals only with those things that are repeatable.

The above idea is, of course, subject to the criticism that some historical cannot be repeated. Take Julius Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon, for instance. It will never be the case that Julius Caesar will ever live on earth and cross the river as he had done before. Yet, this criticism does appear to be faulty. One might not that while we cannot observe Julius Caesar crossing the Rubicon again, there are certain parallels to it. Certainly, nobody would doubt that people do, in fact, cross rivers. That appears to be obvious to anyone who accepts their sensory perceptions and cognitive faculties as essentially reliable. On the the other, we cannot observe God raising people from the dead. So, the interlocutor might conclude, we cannot use historical means to determine whether God raised Jesus, or anyone at all, from the dead.

This response to the original objection, however, also appears to have some holes in it. Few people will say that we can use historical methods to know whether God exists or not. In fact, only a minority would contend that science in general could demonstrate God's existence. Yet, there are actually many philosophical arguments for God's existence. On these grounds, we might point out that while history all by itself cannot provide us with sufficient reason to believe in a resurrected Jesus, history can be involved in a conjunction with metaphysics.

In fact, this reiterates my initial concern that the separation between the historical Jesus and the real Jesus is a legitimate one. It was, after all, only since the nineteenth century that people began to separate the sciences. Instead of one science (literally taken from the Latin, scientia, or knowledge) that has multiple facets, we now think of there being multiple sciences, each distinct and independent from the other. I think this causes many epistemic problems. Take a hypothetical distinction between physics and logic. It is not the case that physics can operate independently of logic; instead, physics presupposes logic in order to come to reasonable conclusions about the various functions contained within the universe. I think of faith and reason in the same way. It seems to me that philosophy/theology need not be separated from history. The two may actually overlap and have some kind of mutual dependence on each other. Thomas Aquinas, for example, considered theology a science in its own right.

I don't wish to derail the topic of this paper. However, it seems apparent to me that the difference between Johnson and Meier comes down to these fundamental issues. Even if history is not the ultimate basis for one's faith, history can be used to supplement and confirm the rationality of one's faith. Even assuming, then, that Johnson has a valid point about the necessity of experience to determine who the real Jesus was/is (and Meier would agree that it does), that does not necessarily preclude the use of history as a means to provide one with knowledge about the Lord Jesus.

Overall, I consider the historical methods and conclusions of both Johnson and Meier to be both highly effective, as well as true. And, even though I am more on the side of Meier, the experience/interpretation based way of thinking of Jesus is certainly a legitimate one.


Works Cited

[1] Luke Timothy Johnson, The Real Jesus, HarperCollins Publishers, 1996, p. 174.

[2] John P. Meier, A Marginal Jew, Doubleday Publishing Group, 1991, p. 373.

Another Attempt at the Argument from Gradation (re: the "Fourth Way")

Let us define God as the Supreme Truth.

Prove A: Supreme Truth exists.
Assume ~A: Supreme Truth does not exist.
~A --> B: If Supreme Truth does not exist, then degrees of truth cannot be known.
~B: Degrees of truth are known.
Hence, ~~A: by modus tollens.
Therefore, A: Supreme Truth exists.

I think (~B) is fairly obvious. We know, for example, that "John Lennon was a musician" is less true (that is, it expresses less truth) than "John Lennon was a musician and founding member of the Beatles." This lends greater weight to our key premise - (~A --> B), since something is only known to be more or less true if we have some ultimate standard of truth - the Supreme Truth.

One possible objection might be that we could have a very high standard of truth, but not a Supreme Truth. I think this objection fails, however, since this "very high standard of truth" is itself known to be imperfect to some extent. By what standard do we know that? Without a Supreme Truth, then, one is left with a logically fallacious infinite regress.

I also often hear Dawkins' counter-argument to this, which is a sort of reductio ad absurdum. He says that if this argument were true, then we could also posit degrees of smelliness and conclude that there must be some Great Stinker. Since this is obviously not true, then allegedly the Fourth Way is also unsound. Once again, I don't find this objection compelling. First of all, truth is intangible; we don't reach out and touch truth. Yet, smelliness is something tangible (i.e. it can be physically sensed). Moreover, the Fourth Way is dealing specifically with great-making properties, of which truth is included, and smelliness is not. On both counts, therefore, I believe the objection misconstrues the original argument, and is therefore an unsuccessful refutation.

William Lane Craig, Philosophical Arguments Against an Infinitely Old Universe, and Induction

The prominent, and highly articulate Christian philosopher, William Lane Craig, has numerous resources for defending the Christian faith. You can find many of them at his website: http://www.reasonablefaith.org

Craig's famous kalam cosmological argument (KCA) for God's existence has been perhaps the most highly discussed argument for God's existence in the past thirty years. The argument can be summarized as follows:

1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.

I won't spend time on every detail of the argument. However, Craig defends (1) by metaphysical considerations. "Ex nihilo, nihil fit" - out of nothing, comes nothing. Another way of putting this is that being cannot arise from non-being. In fact, if literally nothing existed, then not even the potential would exist for something to come into being. Hence, if the universe came into being at some point in the finite past, then something must have brought it about.

Craig offers four lines of argumentation in favor of the second premise, what he considers the crucial premise of the argument. Two of the arguments are philosophical, and two are scientific. I will spend my time solely on the second of his philosophical arguments.

1a. An actually infinite series of things cannot be formed by successive addition.
2a. An infinitely old universe is a formation by successive addition.
3a. Therefore, an infinitely old universe cannot exist.

Wes Morriston, Graham Oppy, and others have made objections to this argument. What I would like to do is simply form an cogent inductive argument that would reach the same conclusion as Craig's.

1b. Of the things we observe that have an end, they also have a beginning.
2b. The universe's latest moment of time (the present) is the end of a collection of temporal moments.
3b. Therefore, it is probably the case that the universe had a beginning.

In support of (1b), we might simply provide some illustrations. If I say to a friend, "I finished my term paper," and he responds, "Great! When did you start on it?," I wouldn't reasonably be able to say that I never started it! "I finished it, but I never started it," would be an unacceptable answer to his question. We could give innumerable examples of this. "I just finished counting the number of seashells on the beach," would likewise require that I began to count the number of seashells.

Why, then, would we make an exception for the universe? All of the inductive evidence points to its having a beginning, and this need not include the various scientific data. We can simply use the various illustrations that we experience in which things that end also have beginnings.

(2b) should be fairly obvious. The present moment of time is the last in the series of moments of time that preceded it. So, to make an exception for the universe without some highly compelling reason to do so would result in special pleading. Hence, we have yet another argument for the universe's beginning that may supplement the currently existing arguments. Although not a valid deductive argument, it is in my estimation a cogent inductive argument to the best explanation.

Given the truth of both original premises - (1) and (2), it logically and inescapably follows that the universe has a cause.

A Modal Cosmological Argument Based on the W-PSR

The W-PSR is a weaker version of the principle of sufficient reason. Essentially, the W-PSR merely claims that: for any contingent fact X, it is possible that X has an explanation. Alexander Pruss and Richard Gale have provided a lengthy defense of a modal cosmological argument for God's existence based on the W-PSR. A simple way of formalizing the argument might be:

1. The union of all contingent facts X is itself contingently true.
2. There is at least one possible world where a necessary being explains X.
3. If something is necessary in one possible world, it necessarily exists in all possible worlds.
4. Therefore, a necessary being exists.

(1) is fairly benign. The union of all contingent facts (X) would not be composed of any necessary facts, so it is reasonable to conclude that X is likewise contingent.

(2) points out that if X is going to have an explanation, then it is possible that this explanation be a necessary being. Apart from any defeaters, I can't think of any reason to doubt this premise.

(3) follows from the S5 axiom of modal logic, which states that if something is possibly necessary, then it is necessary. And, given the possible existence of some necessary being that explains the union of all contingent facts, we can rightfully infer that some necessary being exists.

The Modal Third Way

Robert Maydole has recently presented a modal cosmological argument, known as the "Modal Third Way," which modifies Thomas Aquinas' Third Way in the Summa Theologiae. Maydole's paper can be found here: http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Reli/ReliMayd.htm

This will be my own take on the argument, with some premises simplified.

Where x = a thing; C = temporally contingent; t = time; P = past time; y = explicandum; and Eyx = x explains y.


1. (x) (Cx □ → ◊ (t) ~xt).
2. (x) ◊ (□t) ~xt □ → ◊ (□t) (x) ~Pxt.
3. ~(x) (◊x □ → ◊(y) (x ^ Eyx)).
4. ~[(□x) ◊ (□y) Eyx □ → ~(□t) (x) ~Pxt].
5. ~Pxt → ~C(x).
6. :. ~C(x).

In English:

1. Every temporally contingent thing possibly fails to exist at some time.
2. If all things possibly fail to exist at some time, then it is possible that all things collectively fail to exist at some past time.
3. It is necessarily the case that possible truths are explicable.
4. It is necessarily the case that something is explicable if and only if there was not a time when nothing existed.
5. If there could never have been a time when nothing existed, then something temporally necessary exists.
6. Therefore, something temporally necessary exists.

Parmenides and the Absolute Oneness of Reality

In about 485 B.C., the Greek philosopher, Parmenides, presented an argument that he purported was proof that everything is the same. "All is one," was his conclusion. I must admit that no matter how counter-intuitive such claims may seem, I often get tripped up by the logic of these kinds of arguments, until I really think through them. Parmenides basically argues as follows:

1. If there were two or more beings, they would have to differ.
2. A being differs either by being or non-being.
3. Being is that which makes them identical.
4. Hence, differences cannot be by being.
5. Non-being is nothing.
6. Hence, to differ by non-being is to not differ at all.
7. Therefore, there is only one being.

Upon examination, it is often difficult for one to tell which premise is incorrect. And, if the premises are true, so is the conclusion. However, if one is careful to read (3) and trace its implications, then it becomes apparent that Parmenides is begging the question. For, he assumes that all being is identical in order to conclude that nothing can differ by being.

The solution to the problem is likely what Thomas Aquinas suggested - namely, that there are different types of being. This "complexity of being" allows the objector to rightfully reject Parmenides' argument. This makes all the more sense once we consider the previous arguments for God's existence that have been considered. God is Pure Act (or, Pure Being), whereas finite, changing beings are composed of both actuality and potentiality. The varying degrees of potentiality per attribute are what constitute complex being.

For more on this, see: Norman Geisler, Thomas Aquinas: An Evangelical Appraisal, Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2003, pp. 91-101.

Yet Another Cosmological Argument...

I don't know why, but I have always been drawn to cosmological arguments. Even when I was not a committed Christian, I still believed in God based on these kinds of arguments. As a result, I'm always looking for ways to improve how we enunciate the argument. My last post covered Thomas' basic metaphysical proof of God's existence. The one I'll brielfy cover in this entry is perhaps the oldest of the cosmological arguments - the "argument from motion." There are two ways that come to mind that we might formalize the proof. They are as follows:

1. Everything in motion is moved by another.
2. The series of movers either proceeds to infinity, or has a first mover.
3. The series cannot proceed to infinity.
4. Therefore, there exists a first mover.

1a. Everything in motion is moved by another.
2a. The universe is in motion.
3a. Therefore, the universe is moved by another.

I won't go into great detail with this argument, since I have done so in past entries. Here is a succinct defense of each premise. (1) is supported inductively by our observations. Whenever something changes (re: "is in motion"), it passes from a state of potentiality to actuality by something that actualizes it. For example, a pot of water will contain boiling water if and only if it is heated. Once again, quantum fluctuations are not an exception to the rule, given that the fluctuations arise out of the energy already contained within the quantum vacuum.

(2) provides us with our two legitimate options. (3) claims that the series of movers moving something right now, or at any finite period of time, cannot be infinite. The reason for this is that it would require an infinite series of movers to move within a finite period of time. Yet, it would take infinite time for an infinite series to move anything at all. Hence, the series of movers must be finite, and must be ontologically preceded by a first mover. Therefore, the conclusion is justified in stating that a first mover exists.

Now, we know that everything that changes is composed of both actuality and potentiality. Yet, the first mover cannot itself be moved; otherwise, it wouldn't be first, which is a contradiction. As a result, the first mover cannot be composed of any potentiality, since only changing things are composed of potentiality. Therefore, the first mover is pure actuality. From this, all of the other God-attributes are inferred.

Let's move on now to the second form of the proof.

(1a) is identical to (1), so we'll focus our time on (2a). The common objection to the second premise is that it commits the fallacy of composition. I've already touched on this before, but I'll reiterate that there are two types of compositions: incidental compositions and essential compositions. The former are fallacious, whereas the latter are sound. It seems unambigious to me that (2) falls into the category of an essential composition, since everything within the universe is connected in some sense. For instance, every part of the universe is changing, but is still intelligible.

Now, how do we infer that the mover of the universe is like the first mover above? The solution is fairly simple. Everything that changes is composed of potentiality; and, only bodies contain composition. Whatever moves the universe must be transcendent with respect to the universe, so it is simple, rather than composite. On these grounds, the mover of the universe must be purely actual, and therefore, immutable.

Moreover, why should one accept the idea that everything within the universe is moved by another, but that this is not true of the universe as a whole? This appears to me, given the weakness of the objection that this is a composition fallacy, that this objection commits the fallacy of special pleading. Why should we make such a grandiose exception for the universe as a whole? Without any plausible alternatives, I don't see any way out of the conclusion that there is a first mover.

It is also important to keep in mind that this argument is consistent with an infinitely-old universe. Aristotle defended it, after all.