Why does the universe exist? Because God created it, answers the theist.
How did God create the universe? We have no idea. A common objection among some popularizers of atheism and on some internet discussion forums is that if we cannot know how God created the universe, then we are not justified in concluding that God did create the universe.
This claim is demonstrably false. Imagine the following fictitious discussion:
Julius Caesar: The sky looks so blue.
Brutus: How does the sky look blue?
Julius Caesar: I don't know.
Brutus: Then you can't say it looks blue.
Julius Caesar may not have had the advantage of accessing modern science, but it is plainly wrong to conclude that he wasn't justified in concluding the sky appears blue simply because he didn't know how its appearance is blue. One needn't know how something is true in order to know that it is true.
Monday, August 30, 2010
Saturday, August 28, 2010
An Inductive Argument Against an Infinite Regress of Non-temporal Causes
1. For any non-temporal causal regress, that regress is either finite or infinite. (Definition)
2. The causal regress of X is an attribute of X. (Premise)
3. If every observable attribute of X is finite, then the causal regress of X is most likely finite. (Premise)
4. Every observable attribute of X is finite. (Premise)
5. Therefore, the causal regress of X is most likely finite. (From 1 – 4)
Take, for example, my favorite illustration of a watch. The causal regress of one gear turning to cause another gear's turning is an attribute of the watch - in support of our second premise. (3) introduces induction to the argument. If attributes A, B, C, and D of X are all observed to be finite, the likelihood that E of X is also finite is increased significantly. Moreover, if all of the known attributes of X are finite, and none of them are infinite, it follows that all of X's attributes - both known and unknown - are most likely finite.
For any non-temporal causal regress, then, it follows that the regress itself is most likely finite, given the finitude of every other attribute. In arguing for a metaphysically necessary non-temporal First Cause, the inductive argument against an infinite regress may be combined with the following argument:
1*. Every existing entity is either contingent or necessary. (Premise)
In this context, an entity is contingent if it has its existence in another; and it is necessary if it is self-existent, and exists simply by virtue of the fact that it cannot not-be.
2*. If a non-temporal regress of causes is finite, then a metaphysically necessary First Cause exists. (Premise)
3*. The non-temporal regress of causes is most likely finite. (Premise)
4*. Therefore, a metaphysically necessary First Cause most likely exists. (From 2 and 3)
I tend to think that this argument is also applicable to strictly temporal causal events. So long as time is an attribute of a thing, the inductive argument may be modified to fit this change of focus.
2. The causal regress of X is an attribute of X. (Premise)
3. If every observable attribute of X is finite, then the causal regress of X is most likely finite. (Premise)
4. Every observable attribute of X is finite. (Premise)
5. Therefore, the causal regress of X is most likely finite. (From 1 – 4)
Take, for example, my favorite illustration of a watch. The causal regress of one gear turning to cause another gear's turning is an attribute of the watch - in support of our second premise. (3) introduces induction to the argument. If attributes A, B, C, and D of X are all observed to be finite, the likelihood that E of X is also finite is increased significantly. Moreover, if all of the known attributes of X are finite, and none of them are infinite, it follows that all of X's attributes - both known and unknown - are most likely finite.
For any non-temporal causal regress, then, it follows that the regress itself is most likely finite, given the finitude of every other attribute. In arguing for a metaphysically necessary non-temporal First Cause, the inductive argument against an infinite regress may be combined with the following argument:
1*. Every existing entity is either contingent or necessary. (Premise)
In this context, an entity is contingent if it has its existence in another; and it is necessary if it is self-existent, and exists simply by virtue of the fact that it cannot not-be.
2*. If a non-temporal regress of causes is finite, then a metaphysically necessary First Cause exists. (Premise)
3*. The non-temporal regress of causes is most likely finite. (Premise)
4*. Therefore, a metaphysically necessary First Cause most likely exists. (From 2 and 3)
I tend to think that this argument is also applicable to strictly temporal causal events. So long as time is an attribute of a thing, the inductive argument may be modified to fit this change of focus.
Tuesday, August 24, 2010
The Leibnizian Cosmological Argument (LCA)
Many of you are probably familiar with Richard Taylor's famous illustration in support of the PSR. He reasons that if you were walking in a forest and came across a glowing translucent ball, you would immediately ask, "why is that translucent ball here?" You would find the response that it has no explanation quite unsatisfying, if intelligible at all. Rather, you would surely conclude that it has some explanation, even if you have no idea what the explanation is. Now imagine the ball were the size of a continent: it would still need an explanation. What about the size of a planet? Same problem. What if it were the size of the entire universe? Same problem. Merely increasing the size of the ball, or anything for that matter, doesn't at all do away with its need for an explanation. It seems quite plausible then to say:
1. Every existing thing has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause. (Premise, PSR)
A thing can be explained in one of two ways. A) It is the type of thing that exists because it cannot not-exist. Something necessary exists because it is self-sufficient. B) It is the type of thing that exists because it is dependent on another. This type of entity is not-self-sufficient. Both (A) and (B) are explanations, but they are different types of explanations.
Now, in order to make the LCA an argument for God's existence, our next premise must be justified:
2. If the universe has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is God. (Premise)
Think of what the universe is for a moment: the totality of all physical space, time, matter and energy. Whatever explains the universe, then, must transcend the universe and be timeless, changeless, and immaterial, in addition to being enormously powerful. This is very close, at any rate, to being a God-concept.
Notice that it doesn't do any good to say that the universe has existed eternally. For, a translucent ball resting on the ground of a forest would still need an explanation even if it existed for all eternity. Just as we can't get around the need for an explanation by increasing the size of something, neither can we get around the need for an explanation by increasing its age.
Another objection might be that everything in the universe has an explanation, but that this isn't true of the universe itself. Every part of a mountain may be small, but this isn't necessarily true of the mountain itself. This objection may be disposed of by sticking with the same analogy. If every part of the mountain has an explanation, then the mountain itself must also have an explanation. (In fact, we know this to be true, anyway.) Likewise, it is special pleading to say that the universe itself has no explanation.
A final objection to premise (2) is that the universe exists by a necessity of its own nature. In order to successfully respond to this objection, all we need to do is show that the universe does not possess one or more attributes that something necessary would have to have. This is fairly easy to show. Take some changing entity X. X if becomes Y, then it is no longer the case that X. This implies that X doesn't exist necessarily. Now, the universe is constantly changing in that every part of the universe is at least capable of a change in location. This implies that the universe does not have necessary existence. The universe could be something other than what it is.
Our final premise:
3. The universe exists. (Premise)
Now, what follows from these three premises?
4. The universe has an explanation of its existence. (From 1 and 3)
5. Therefore, the explanation of the universe is God. (From 2 and 4)
1. Every existing thing has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause. (Premise, PSR)
A thing can be explained in one of two ways. A) It is the type of thing that exists because it cannot not-exist. Something necessary exists because it is self-sufficient. B) It is the type of thing that exists because it is dependent on another. This type of entity is not-self-sufficient. Both (A) and (B) are explanations, but they are different types of explanations.
Now, in order to make the LCA an argument for God's existence, our next premise must be justified:
2. If the universe has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is God. (Premise)
Think of what the universe is for a moment: the totality of all physical space, time, matter and energy. Whatever explains the universe, then, must transcend the universe and be timeless, changeless, and immaterial, in addition to being enormously powerful. This is very close, at any rate, to being a God-concept.
Notice that it doesn't do any good to say that the universe has existed eternally. For, a translucent ball resting on the ground of a forest would still need an explanation even if it existed for all eternity. Just as we can't get around the need for an explanation by increasing the size of something, neither can we get around the need for an explanation by increasing its age.
Another objection might be that everything in the universe has an explanation, but that this isn't true of the universe itself. Every part of a mountain may be small, but this isn't necessarily true of the mountain itself. This objection may be disposed of by sticking with the same analogy. If every part of the mountain has an explanation, then the mountain itself must also have an explanation. (In fact, we know this to be true, anyway.) Likewise, it is special pleading to say that the universe itself has no explanation.
A final objection to premise (2) is that the universe exists by a necessity of its own nature. In order to successfully respond to this objection, all we need to do is show that the universe does not possess one or more attributes that something necessary would have to have. This is fairly easy to show. Take some changing entity X. X if becomes Y, then it is no longer the case that X. This implies that X doesn't exist necessarily. Now, the universe is constantly changing in that every part of the universe is at least capable of a change in location. This implies that the universe does not have necessary existence. The universe could be something other than what it is.
Our final premise:
3. The universe exists. (Premise)
Now, what follows from these three premises?
4. The universe has an explanation of its existence. (From 1 and 3)
5. Therefore, the explanation of the universe is God. (From 2 and 4)
Monday, August 23, 2010
A Scotist-Anselmian Modal Argument
Codgitator has written a helpful essay on the connection between the arguments of Duns Scotus (not to be confused with Doug Benscoter) and Anselm.
Friday, August 20, 2010
The Jesus of History and the Jesus of Faith
"The historical Jesus 'uncovered' (but actually reconstucted) in the Jesus Seminar . . . could scarcely be the object of Christian church proclamation. If Jesus was a wise Cynic preacher and teacher and nothing more, why should there be a religion based on him, given the prominence of other ancient teachers (Aristotle, Plato, Seneca, etc.)? If Jesus was chiefly a deluded apocalyptic preacher who wrongly thought the end of the world would come soon, why continue to proclaim him as the savior of the world? If Jesus' resurrection from the dead is simply a way of expressing the conviction that he is with God, why is he to be worshiped, given the many other saintly people who are surely with God? Those who advance such views of Jesus often claim they are trying to reshape Christian belief and proclamation. More bluntly, however, their views of Jesus would make traditional Christian belief illusory and traditional proclamation irresponsible."
-Raymond E. Brown, An Introduction to the New Testament, Doubleday, 1997, pp. 828-829.
Brown's criticism of contemporary revisions of Jesus is direct and to the point. If the Jesus of history is not the same as the Jesus of faith, then why bother to preach the Gospel? Only if the Jesus of history really is the Jesus of faith - at least, if the historical Jesus claimed to be the Son of God - do we have any reason to dedicate our lives to him as we do. Anything less than the Jesus of faith would make him no greater than the other revered philosophers of antiquity. This is why it is so important that we not pick and choose from which teachings of Jesus we happen to fancy.
-Raymond E. Brown, An Introduction to the New Testament, Doubleday, 1997, pp. 828-829.
Brown's criticism of contemporary revisions of Jesus is direct and to the point. If the Jesus of history is not the same as the Jesus of faith, then why bother to preach the Gospel? Only if the Jesus of history really is the Jesus of faith - at least, if the historical Jesus claimed to be the Son of God - do we have any reason to dedicate our lives to him as we do. Anything less than the Jesus of faith would make him no greater than the other revered philosophers of antiquity. This is why it is so important that we not pick and choose from which teachings of Jesus we happen to fancy.
Thursday, August 19, 2010
Some really sobering words from a Church Father...
"God has promised forgiveness to your repentance, but He has not promised tomorrow to your procrastination." -St. Augustine
Wednesday, August 18, 2010
Moral Nihilism and the Modality of Moral Obligations
Suppose someone denies that there are objective moral obligations, e.g. moral obligations that persons everywhere are bound by. Imagine also that our skeptical friend is hesitant to accept the idea that something concrete could be logically necessary, but is willing to concede that propositions may be logically necessary. An example of a logically necessary proposition (one true in all possible worlds) would be this: "there are no square circles." Finally, suppose that objectivity entails logical necessity.
1. There are no objective moral obligations in the actual world. (Premise)
2. There are objective moral obligations in W. (Premise)
3. If there are objective moral obligations in W, then there are objective moral obligations in all possible worlds. (S5)
4. Therefore, there are objective moral obligations in all possible worlds. (From 2 and 3)
The actual world is a member of the set of all possible worlds. (1) is thereby false given the truth of (2) and (3), since (4) follows from (2) and (3). What this argument demonstrates is that the moral nihilist cannot merely say there are no objective moral obligations, but that objective moral obligations are literally impossible.
1. There are no objective moral obligations in the actual world. (Premise)
2. There are objective moral obligations in W. (Premise)
3. If there are objective moral obligations in W, then there are objective moral obligations in all possible worlds. (S5)
4. Therefore, there are objective moral obligations in all possible worlds. (From 2 and 3)
The actual world is a member of the set of all possible worlds. (1) is thereby false given the truth of (2) and (3), since (4) follows from (2) and (3). What this argument demonstrates is that the moral nihilist cannot merely say there are no objective moral obligations, but that objective moral obligations are literally impossible.
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