Can the kalam argument be defended inductively?

By "induction," I'm not referring to the scientific evidence, although much can be said about that. Rather, are there inductive philosophical grounds for affirming the KCA's key second premise?

1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause. (Premise)

2. The universe began to exist. (Premise)

3. Therefore, the universe has a cause. (From 1 and 2)

I suppose that (1) can be supported through induction in addition to the ex nihilo principle. Our experience of things that begin to exist leads us to believe that they are caused. As far as (2) is concerned, one could point to the other known aspects of the universe. Are the universe's limitations the result of finite characteristics or infinite ones? The universe's finitude is almost built into the very concept of its having limitations.

With this in mind, what is the probability given the background information and our knowledge of the universe's other qualities that the universe's past is infinite? It would appear to be very low, unless of course we have compelling evidence to believe that it's infinite. But, there just aren't any arguments for the universe's having an infinite past. Skeptics spend almost all of their time trying to answer arguments for the universe's finite past.

Another Revised ACA

I'm not sure which one I prefer:

1. Every dependent entity has a sustaining cause. (Premise)

2. Either there is an independent first cause, or the regress of dependent sustaining causes is infinite. (Implied by 1)

3. The regress of dependent sustaining causes cannot be infinite. (Premise)

4. Therefore, an independent first cause exists. (From 2 and 3)

This version of the ACA does not require the PSR, but only supposes that there are, in fact, some entities that are causally dependent on others.

The Aristotelian Cosmological Argument (ACA) - Revised

I like to revise and rephrase these arguments from time to time, so please forgive me if you've read something similar here a hundred times before.

1. Every contingent entity has a sustaining cause. (Premise)

2. Either there is a necessary first cause, or the regress of contingent sustaining causes is infinite. (Implied by 1)

3. The regress of contingent sustaining causes cannot be infinite. (Premise)

4. Therefore, a necessary first cause exists. (From 2 and 3)

This "necessary first cause" is synonymous with the "ground of being," which is God to those of us with a theistic persuasion.

Happy Holidays?

Americans have always prided themselves on being a great melting pot. We have a plethora of traditions, religious beliefs, and cultural leanings that are equally "American" and thereby protected by our Constitution. I have to wonder whether the advocates of the "Happy Holidays" greeting, as well as the Holiday Tree, etc., are actually doing a disservice to political correctness. Here's what I mean.

When I was in graduate school, one of my Jewish professors wished us a Happy Easter. We didn't gasp or correct him or ask him to be more politically correct. Rather, we thanked him and wished him a Happy Passover.

The lesson I take away from moments like these is that true political correctness promotes inclusion, rather than exclusion or trivializing neutrality. I'm a Christian, and I don't celebrate the holidays of non-Christian faiths. Yet, when my Jewish friend wishes me a Merry Christmas, I have no qualms about wishing him a Happy Hanukkah. If somebody wants to put up a Christmas tree in a public forum, I say great. Just don't patronize us by calling it anything other than a Christmas tree. Moreover, I think we should also welcome the inclusion of a menorah, and any other religious symbol for that matter.

So sure, Happy Holidays! But, make sure that means inclusion.

Does the Third Way work assuming a finite universe?

The traditional Third Way was meant to show that a necessary entity exists by positing a universe eternal in the past.

1. Every existing entity is either contingent or necessary. (Definition)

2. Something exists now. (Premise)

3. If something exists now, then something or other has always existed. (Premise)

4. Hence, something or other has always existed. (From 2 and 3)

5. The past is infinite. (Assumption)

6. Given infinite time, all potentialities will have been actualized. (Premise)

7. The concurrent non-existence of all contingent entities is a potentiality. (Premise)

8. Hence, the concurrent non-existence of all contingent entities has been actualized. (From 5, 6 and 7)

9. Therefore, a necessary entity exists. (Implied by 1, 4 and 8)

Now, what if we assume the negation of (5), keeping the (1) through (4) the same?

5'. The past is finite. (Assumption)

6'. Given finite time, the concurrent non-existence of all contingent entities has been actualized. (Premise)

7'. Therefore, a necessary entity exists. (Implied by 1, 4 and 6').

The new debate would probably center around (6'). Could a contingent entity exist at t0, a sort of undifferentiated time? A modalized version of the Third Way would be immune to such an objection, since it's at least possible that nothing contingent existed at t0.

Forming an Actual Infinite By Successive Addition

Philosophers are divided on whether or not an actual infinite can exist and, secondly, on whether an actual infinite (if possible in and of itself) can be formed by successive addition. Karl Popper, for example, objects to Craig's argument that an actual infinite cannot be formed by successive addition. Popper states that the problem only arises if we assume that there is a point in the infinite past. However, there is no point in the infinite past, since infinity is not a number per se, but a set of numbers.

Even assuming that this objection is satisfactory, it does nothing to undermine the Aristotelian argument against an infinite regress of essentially ordered causes. Let's assume that the past is infinite. Keep in mind that the infinity of past events is still composed of finite periods of time. Now, for each finite period of time, a new regress of sustaining causes begins to be instantiated:

..., -5, -4, -3, -2, -1, 0

So, at -5 we have a new regress of sustaining causes; and the same is true for -4, -3, and so on.

Cn Cn Cn
C3 C3 C3
C2 C2 C2
C1 C1 C1
-5, -4, -3, . . .

Before -4 can begin its instantiation of sustaining causes, all of the sustaining causes of -5 must be instantiated. However, beginning with C1 of -5, the regress of sustaining causes cannot arrive at infinity, since we are in fact beginning with a point (more specifically, a cause). This means the Aristotelian argument is immune to Popper's criticism. After all, there is an obvious disparity between an infinite past and an infinite regress of sustaining causes. While the former does not have a first point, the latter most certainly does.

Contingency and Design Arguments

An acceptance of the PSR leads one to believe that the whole of contingent reality C has an explanation of its existence. Now, an explanation can be of one of two types: a thing's explanation is found either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause. Since C does not exist by a necessity of its own nature, it follows that C's explanation is found in an external cause. This external cause must be a necessary and eternal entity N, as well as very powerful in order to cause something as vast as C.

Let's suppose the atheist not only denies that N is God, but that there is any such entity as N. The atheist could do this, for example, by denying the PSR. The problem is that this presents the atheist with a new challenge. For, design arguments often present the uniformity of nature or the fine-tuning of the universe's initial conditions within the context of a trilemma:

1. The laws of nature are either due to necessity, chance, or design. (Premise)

One would be hard-pressed to think of a fourth alternative to premise (1). Keeping in mind the atheist's denial of the argument from contingency, especially the existence of N, we are led to premise (2):

2. The laws of nature are not due to necessity or chance. (Premise)

From these two premises, it follows that:

3. Therefore, the laws of nature are due to design. (From 1 and 2)

But surely the atheist does not want to affirm (3)! Yet, he already denies one of his alternatives, which leaves him with only one option: the affirmation that the laws of nature (and/or the universe's fine-tuning) are due exclusively to chance. Remember, there is no N at all according to this radical position, so the laws of nature cannot be the products of a combination of necessity and chance.

Obviously, if the chance hypothesis doesn't pan out (and there are good reasons to think it doesn't), one must accept that N exists and/or that the laws of nature are designed. Whichever route is taken, a large chunk of either the contingency or design arguments must be affirmed as a matter of consistency.