The following is an experimental argument. I have no way of proving that (1) is true or even probable, but it seems reasonable at any rate.
1. All things being equal, intuition is a generally reliable guide to truth. (Premise)
2. My intuition is that I have libertarian free will. (Premise)
3. Therefore, all things being equal, my intuition that I have libertarian free will is most likely true. (From 1 and 2)
Libertarian free will entails that even though I chose X, I could have chosen ~X under the exact same conditions. Again, this isn't really intended to be a proof, so please take this argument with a grain of salt. It seems to me that I could have chosen to refrain from a second helping of macaroni and cheese under the exact same conditions in which I chose to eat that second helping.
Part of the issue hinges on this question: are all things equal? That's a key portion of premise (1). If there is overwhelming evidence to reject my intuition that I have libertarian free will, then "All things being equal . . ." is a moot point.
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Merry Christmas, Doug
ReplyDeleteA few observations.
Firstly, I don't think all things are equal, but more importantly, I don't think your intuition really tells you that you have libertarian fre will. Sure, you could have refrained from a second portion of macaroni if you had felt like doing so.
But if you had felt that way, that would be a different condition.
What your intuition really tells you is that you couold have acted differently under similar conditions but not that you could have acted differently under the exact same conditions. The latter is much too specific. Intuition is not reliable enough to be confidnet about information that is that specific.
Merry Christmas to you, as well, Walter. I think your objection already presupposes a form of determinism, or at least compatibilism. What if I feel like having that second helping, and I choose to refrain? That would be the same condition as if I felt like having the second helping, and indulged myself.
DeleteNevertheless, I think we can agree that "All things being equal" is key to this argument.
Doug
DeleteMy objection does not presuppose determinism or compatibilism. It just states that our intuition is probably not reliable eenough to make a distinction between what we could have done under similar conditions and what we could have done under the exact same conditions, because it is virtually impossible to imagine the exact same conditions. And since this distinction is crucial for LFW, intuition is not reliable enough to argue for LFW.
The point is that your intuition doesn't tell you in detail why you would choose to refrain, so we can't be certain that your choosing to refrain is not caused by conditions that your intuition is unaware of.
IOW our intuition cannot distinguish between libertarian choices and deterministic outcomes.
"1. All things being equal, intuition is a generally reliable guide to truth. (Premise)"
ReplyDeleteRegardless of the truth of the premise (*), it is a fact that *every* act of rational reasoning in which we engage has at its foundation one or more intuitions, that were not, and cannot be, established rationally. Reason can't even stand up without intuition.
(*) and I'd certainly not assert it without a number of caveats.
Yes, I more or less agree with this assessment.
DeleteWVdA: "IOW our intuition cannot distinguish between libertarian choices and deterministic outcomes."
ReplyDeleteYou're getting close to comprehending that *denial* of LFW logically and inescapably entails denial of a host of things we intuitively believe to be true about ourselves. Nonexhaustively, this includes --
* that we can know true from false;
* that we can (choose to) reject what we know (or fear) to be true and embrace its logical denial;
* that we can reason from premise to logically valid conclusion, totally irrespective of any material/physical effects or factors;
* that we can correctly identify when someone, including our own selves, has reasoned invalidly;
* that we can correctly identify when someone, including our own selves, has reasoned validly but from unsound premises;
* and the kicker: that we ourselves even exist. For, to deny LFW is to deny the very possibility of knowing *anything*. So, to deny LFW is also to deny that one knows that oneself exists.
Ilion
DeleteI said that intuition cannot distinguish between libertarian choices and deterministic outcomes. I have not denied LFW (at least not here) and I have not claimed that intuition cannot be useful.
So all the things you are describing are non-sequiturs.