Given that God is defined as a perfect being:
Prove A: There is a perfect being.
Assume ~A: There is no perfect being.
~A --> B: If there is no perfect being, then no flaws can be known.
~B: Flaws are known.
Hence, ~~A: by modus tollens.
Therefore, A: There is a perfect being.
Q.E.D.
(~B) is fairly certain. We know that, "bachelors are married," is a false proposition. We also arguably know other intangibles, such as, "Rape is morally wrong," where such a proposition posits moral realism. Hence, (~A --> B) is the key premise.
C.S. Lewis' famous analogy pointed out that one wouldn't call a line crooked, unless there is already knowledge of what a straight line looks like. It seems, then, that in order to know that something has a defect, or "flaw," that something perfect must be the standard for making such a determination.
One weakness of this argument is that it appears to only demonstrate the necessity of some abstract notion of a perfect being. In what sense does God interact with the universe, and with human beings in particular? Descartes' answer was that the idea of a perfect being had to have been caused by a perfect being, since a finite being (i.e. a human intellect) is unable to produce anything perfect. I'm not completely satisfied with this answer, though. One might object that the concept of a perfect being can produced by a human intellect, even if the reality of a perfect being cannot.
We might supplement Descartes' argument with an appeal to some form of general realism. There are certain intangible truths that are true independently of whether humans recognize them as true or not. Moreover, what is it that provides unity between the universality of some truth and the particular mind that knows it? The principles of one cannot be used to explain the principles of the other. If there is something that provides such unity, then presumably this would be something like the mind of God.
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Good thoughts; thanks for bringing this to my attention and for commenting over at DT.
ReplyDeleteThe main thing that would need to be worked out in this argument is exactly what you mean by flaw. That aside, you’re argument:
(1) There is no perfect being.
(2) If there is no perfect being, then no flaws can be known.
(3) Flaws are known
(4) Therefore, there is a perfect being
As you mention, (2) would be the premise in need of support. You suggest:
"C.S. Lewis' famous analogy pointed out that one wouldn't call a line crooked, unless there is already knowledge of what a straight line looks like. It seems, then, that in order to know that something has a defect, or "flaw," that something perfect must be the standard for making such a determination."
But I don’t think Lewis is right on this score. All we need to understand the concept of a flaw or defect is statistical normality. Flaws and defects can be legitimately identified as being exceptions to the accepted norm, which requires no reference to perfection or normativity.
What you could do to counter this is define flaw in such a way that presupposes some kind of normativity (think of Alvin Plantinga's notion of proper function, for example). But I'm not sure how you do that in this case without begging the question.
Thanks for the response, Chad. I wholeheartedly agree that some form of normativity would be necessary in order to make this argument work. I suppose I would appeal mainly to the indispensability of a realism.
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