Saturday, June 5, 2010

Mystical Perception and Epistemology

SP = sensory perception
MP = mystical perception

One of the questions people have about MP is this: how exactly does it differ from SP? It seems as if the characteristics of MP are generally the same as those of SP. For example, a heavenly vision and/or message constitutes vision and audibles, which are thought of as defining characteristics of SP.

Before we attempt to distinguish between the two, it should be asked: does this hurt the case for MP or help it? It seems to me that the arguments against MP can be used equally against SP. If, for instance, Paul hallucinates a vision of Jesus, where the vision of Jesus is not veridical, then that is an argument against a particular instance of MP. The problem with this argument is that it can also be used against any instance of SP. If I observe a flower in a garden, and my vision has an impression of a purple flower, it could also be the case that I am hallucinating a non-veridical color, or even a non-veridical garden.

This brings us back to the age old question: how do we know what is real? I think there are things we can know with certainty (e.g. the existence of the self, the existence of God, and the fact that the self is not God), but that doesn't necessarily help us determine whether most instances of SP are veridical. In fact, it might even be argued that the success of SP entails the success of MP.

Differences in perception are also appealed to in discrediting MP, but once again, the same argument can be used against SP. Although I may be seeing a purple flower, someone standing at the opposite side of the garden may see the same flower as a white flower. Yet, this doesn't necessarily mean that either one of us should abandon our beliefs about what we perceive via SP. Perhaps there is a defeater for one of our beliefs. If I discovered that there is a light shining above the garden that, when someone is standing at a certain angle, makes white flowers appear purple, then that would give me an incentive to abandon my belief.

So, the skeptic of MP could reason that while there are available defeaters for instances SP, there are not available defeaters for instances MP. In other words, one's beliefs need to be falsifiable in order to be veridical.

Of course, this line of thought is troubled by at least two factors. 1) The principle that every belief must be falsifiable is it itself not falsifiable, so it appears that this objection to MP is self-refuting. 2) The criteria for falsifiability may be applicable to MP, after all.

One way of falsifying some instance of MP is to show that it is contrary to other things we know. If, for example, S has an experience of MP in which it is stated to S that torturing children for fun is a good thing, then given what is known about proper moral behavior, S is compelled to reject this instance of MP on some grounds (psychological, demonic, etc.).

Yet, it also seems to me that there are solid confirmations of MP. Say that St. Teresa of Avila has an experience in which God tells her that He loves her. This is consistent with God being the greatest conceivable being, so barring any defeater, her experience of MP may be veridical. I also believe that the arguments of natural theology establish God's existence, so any instance of MP that is consistent with what we can know on these grounds may also be taken as veridical.

The skeptic can, on the other hand, appeal to something like the logical version of the problem of evil, which states that the existence of God is logically incompatible with the reality of evil. Of course, I don't think these arguments are at all successful, given that God may have a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil. Plantinga, I think, put the nail in the coffin of the logical problem of evil.

It seems, then, that the reasons for rejecting MP work equally well against SP. If, therefore, SP is accepted in spite of skepticism, there remains no additional reason for rejecting MP.

8 comments:


  1. It seems, then, that the reasons for rejecting MP work equally well against SP. If, therefore, SP is accepted in spite of skepticism, there remains no additional reason for rejecting MP.


    You've not even come close to establishing that the reasons for rejecting MP work equally well against SP. Let's look at what you did do:

    You observe that differences in perception are a reason people sometimes give for doubting mystical "perception" is veritical.

    You assert (correctly) that there are sometimes reasons to doubt the validity of what was experienced as a sense perception (which is, among other things, why we believe in hallucinations).

    You discuss an irrelevant case of a flower than appears purple from one angle and white from another (irrelevant because this does not involve inaccurate sense perception---only an inaccurate assumption that the flower is of the typical variety that don't appear different colors from different angles).

    You then go on to make some comments about falsifiability of very dubious relevance to this topic. Not to mention inaccurate. The principle of falsifiability is the idea that, to be considered a scientific hypothesis, it must be at least possible in principle for observation to show that the hypothesis is false (or at least likely to be false) if it, in fact, is false.

    It does not claim to be applicable to itself---because it is not itself a scientific hypothesis.

    You discuss one reason a particular MP should be doubted (if it's contrary to other things we know).

    You then say this:


    Yet, it also seems to me that there are solid confirmations of MP. Say that St. Teresa of Avila has an experience in which God tells her that He loves her. This is consistent with God being the greatest conceivable being, so barring any defeater, her experience of MP may be veridical.


    But being logically consistent with the veriticality of an MP is by no means even close to "solid confirmation" of the veriticality of the MP.


    I also believe that the arguments of natural theology establish God's existence, so any instance of MP that is consistent with what we can know on these grounds may also be taken as veridical.


    Really? Didn't think that one through very carefully did you? A person can claim (and I'm sure many have) to have received a revelation from God consistent with what you call natural theology (what we can know about God through reason alone without revelation) and still be highly inconsistent with God's revelation in the Bible.

    Which brings us to one of the central objections to MP. A person in one culture has MP utterly at odds with those of a person in another culture. The content of MP seems to be largely determined by cultural background. People in remote areas who've never encountered Christian missionaries never have visions of Jesus. They have visions of the Gods and spirits their religion tells them about.

    SP is nothing like this. One can make very precise observations that accord in amazing detail with the observations of a person from a culture you've never encountered. And this across the board with only the most minimal exception.

    MP are nothing like that. They have, in fact, vastly more in common with hallucinations. But you've glossed over this and on only the most minimal discussion of of a few of the possible arguments for nonveriticality concluded that MP are, in fact, often veritical.

    I'm afraid it's not as easy as that.

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  2. Both SP and MP wrong:

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  3. Creating a new religion can be a lucrative racket---it worked for L. Ron Hubbard. Don't think I'll be signing up though. The world has enough cults as it is.

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  4. Hi David,

    Thank you for your thoughts. A number of points to consider:

    1. Regarding falsifiability: principles that do not apply to themselves should, I think, be rejected. I'm not actually citing falsification as a scientific principle, though, but as a philosophical principle found in the logical positivists. They do claim that in order for a proposition to be meaningful, it must be either analytical or based on something falsifiable.

    Falsification may be required in order to do science, but science isn't the end of all knowledge. The relevance that the falsification objection has to MP is that some claim that since MP is not repeatable or testable via scientific means, then it ought to be rejected.

    2. You state, "But being logically consistent with the veriticality of an MP is by no means even close to "solid confirmation" of the veriticality of the MP."

    Logical consistency is a necessary, but not necessarily sufficient condition of what I call "solid confirmation." Notice I said that Teresa's experience "may" be veridical. In other words, it's possible and hasn't been defeated by common objections to MP.

    3. You state, "Really? Didn't think that one through very carefully did you? A person can claim (and I'm sure many have) to have received a revelation from God consistent with what you call natural theology (what we can know about God through reason alone without revelation) and still be highly inconsistent with God's revelation in the Bible."

    Maybe, but that doesn't imply there is no way of reconciling the God of natural theology with the God of the Bible.

    3. You state, "Which brings us to one of the central objections to MP. A person in one culture has MP utterly at odds with those of a person in another culture. The content of MP seems to be largely determined by cultural background. People in remote areas who've never encountered Christian missionaries never have visions of Jesus. They have visions of the Gods and spirits their religion tells them about."

    This is an interesting point. There actually are stories (how well documented, I have no idea) of people who have never heard of Jesus having visions of him. Let's assume these don't happen, though.

    One's perception of the Ultimate (God) will differ from culture to culture. However, let's take a step back and observe that many aspects of world religions are mutually compatible. Obviously, a spirit who says, "Jesus is Lord," will be incompatible with one who says, "Jesus is not Lord," but this does not imply that many (most?) instances of MP even cross-culturally are incompatible. Maybe they are, maybe they aren't. I would wager that most mystical experiences are perfectly consistent with the propositions, "God is loving," "God sustains the world's existence," and so forth. In any case, we need to be cautious that we not overestimate the fact of religious diversity.

    Nevertheless, there are significant differences between at least some MP's. I take this to be the best objection to the validity of MP, so more attention ought to be focused on it. I'll write more on this later.

    4. You state, "You discuss an irrelevant case of a flower than appears purple from one angle and white from another (irrelevant because this does not involve inaccurate sense perception---only an inaccurate assumption that the flower is of the typical variety that don't appear different colors from different angles)."

    My point is simply that not every belief formed on the basis of SP will be accurate. Environmental factors may contribute, not to an inaccurate SP necessarily, but to a false belief formed under the conjunction of SP and one's environment. Of course, one may very well appeal to something like colorblindness as an instance of a failed SP, but that's neither here nor there.

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  5. That I'm not actually citing falsification as a scientific principle, though, but as a philosophical principle found in the logical positivists.


    You're thinking of the verification principle. The falsification principle was proposed by Karl Popper(who was, in fact, strongly critical of logical positivism and proposed the falsification principle largely as an alternative to the problems with the ideas of the logical positivists).

    By the way, Popper's ideas aren't all that widely endorsed in contemporary philosophy of science.


    Logical consistency is a necessary, but not necessarily sufficient condition of what I call "solid confirmation." Notice I said that Teresa's experience "may" be veridical. In other words, it's possible and hasn't been defeated by common objections to MP.


    Even supposing that's true, you should not have used the term "solid confirmation". Logical possibility and not having been refuted do not together constitute solid confirmation.


    Maybe, but that doesn't imply there is no way of reconciling the God of natural theology with the God of the Bible.


    Nor did I say it does. What I said is that if it's true (and it clearly is) it refutes this statement which you made:


    I also believe that the arguments of natural theology establish God's existence, so any instance of MP that is consistent with what we can know on these grounds may also be taken as veridical.


    Clearly this is not a reasonable conclusion since mutually contradictory claims can be, and are, derived from MP without contradicting natural theology.


    I would wager that most mystical experiences are perfectly consistent with the propositions, "God is loving," "God sustains the world's existence," and so forth. In any case, we need to be cautious that we not overestimate the fact of religious diversity.


    It is an obvious fact from even a casual perusal of religious visions across cultures that they VERY often involve mutually contradictory propositions (take, as only one example, religious visions that include glimpses of one's past lives among many eastern mystics compared to visions of the very different view of the afterlife in western religious traditions---one could, of course, list all too many others).


    It seems as if the characteristics of MP are generally the same as those of SP.


    It's rather obvious that they have far more characteristics in common with hallucination---in fact, the only characteristics MP have in common with SP are those SP have in common with hallucinations---which is exactly what one should expect if religious visions, in fact, ARE hallucinations. This is an even bigger problem with claims for the veriticality of MP than the fact that MP are so often mutually incompatible (an incompatibility which is, of course, also what one would expect if religious visions are merely hallucinations).

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  6. You're thinking of the verification principle. The falsification principle was proposed by Karl Popper(who was, in fact, strongly critical of logical positivism and proposed the falsification principle largely as an alternative to the problems with the ideas of the logical positivists).

    I did mean to say "verification principle." Thank you for the correction. Falsification is a cornerstone of verificationism.

    By the way, Popper's ideas aren't all that widely endorsed in contemporary philosophy of science.

    I agree. In fact, I've written a number of papers critiquing Popper's rejection of induction. Nevertheless, falsification remains a key element of science, even if it's not strictly Popperian.

    Even supposing that's true, you should not have used the term "solid confirmation". Logical possibility and not having been refuted do not together constitute solid confirmation.

    I wasn't limiting solid confirmation to just these two criteria. I listed natural theology, as well, but I would also throw in the historical evidence for the resurrection of Jesus as additional data for a cumulative argument. I just don't want to steer the discussion away from MP.

    Nor did I say it does. What I said is that if it's true (and it clearly is) it refutes this statement which you made:


    I also believe that the arguments of natural theology establish God's existence, so any instance of MP that is consistent with what we can know on these grounds may also be taken as veridical.


    Clearly this is not a reasonable conclusion since mutually contradictory claims can be, and are, derived from MP without contradicting natural theology.


    Those claims can be made, but of course, we have to consider various defeaters. If someone claims via natural theology and MP that X, and another via natural theology and MP that ~X, then obvious X and ~X cannot both be true. However, we can't just throw out MP on the basis that X and ~X are inconsistent. SP could just as easily be rejected, but that brings us to what I consider to be the best objection to MP - namely, that entirely different cultures have incompatible instances of MP.

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  7. It is an obvious fact from even a casual perusal of religious visions across cultures that they VERY often involve mutually contradictory propositions (take, as only one example, religious visions that include glimpses of one's past lives among many eastern mystics compared to visions of the very different view of the afterlife in western religious traditions---one could, of course, list all too many others).

    More background knowledge would be needed in order for us to make any truth-claim about this example. For instance, does the person having a vision of his/her past lives also have conflicting visions? Does he/she also believe in a traditional form of Judaism/Christianity/Islam? What is the manner in which this vision comes about?

    In other words, I would want to examine each claim of MP on a case-by-case basis.

    It's rather obvious that they have far more characteristics in common with hallucination---in fact, the only characteristics MP have in common with SP are those SP have in common with hallucinations---which is exactly what one should expect if religious visions, in fact, ARE hallucinations. This is an even bigger problem with claims for the veriticality of MP than the fact that MP are so often mutually incompatible (an incompatibility which is, of course, also what one would expect if religious visions are merely hallucinations).

    We also hallucinate things that can be sensed with SP, but that doesn't invalidate SP.

    I'm curious as to what you would say of a person who has no history of mental illness or drug use that also has an experience of MP. If it's necessarily the case that MP is hallucinatory, what is the explanation of that hallucination? I suppose one could posit temporary insanity, or some other biological or environmental factor (e.g. sleep deprivation), but these explanations appear ad hoc for those who apparently have inexplicable experiences of MP.

    By the way, I would never build my case for Christianity entirely on MP. In fact, most of the arguments I have spent my time on have cosmological arguments and evidence for the historical Jesus. I just find MP to be fascinating, and I would still find it fascinating even if I rejected their validity. I'm guessing you have an interest in it, too, else you wouldn't be posting? Thanks again for your thoughts. Keep 'em coming! :)

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  8. I'm curious as to what you would say of a person who has no history of mental illness or drug use that also has an experience of MP. If it's necessarily the case that MP is hallucinatory, what is the explanation of that hallucination?


    It's a misconception that hallucinations only occur as a result of mental illness or drug use. There are a wide variety of other causes. And, interestingly enough, religions often have traditions, rituals and other practices that take advantage of many of those causes. Meditation and repetitive chanting, fasting and other ascetic practices, just to name a few, are well-known ways to induce altered states of consciousness and, sometimes, hallucinations.

    And hallucinations sometimes have no obvious external cause. This is actually far more common than is sometimes supposed.

    The more one knows about hallucinations the less credible the arguments from MP used by apologists seem. If I was cynical I'd think religious apologists were deliberately avoiding taking the obvious step of researching hallucinations before trying to build an argument for the validity of MP as evidence for religious claims.



    I just find MP to be fascinating, and I would still find it fascinating even if I rejected their validity.


    On that, at least, we agree.


    By the way, I would never build my case for Christianity entirely on MP.


    I wouldn't assume you do. I could tell that was unlikely just from reading the "About Me" paragraph in the sidebar.

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