As mentioned previously, I run into very little opposition to the following argument:
1. The universe is either caused or uncaused. (Definition)
2. Complex things are most likely caused. (Premise)
3. The universe is complex. (Premise)
4. Therefore, the universe is most likely caused. (From 1 - 3)
In our experience, we all know why (2) is considered true. The only reservations are usually from radical Humeans. The earth, for example, is a complex thing, and we know that the earth was formed by (caused by) various cosmological and geological processes.
(3) is probably an understatement. The universe is astronomically complex (complexity being understood as the interrelationship between diverse objects), so given (1) - (3), it follows logically that the universe is most likely caused.
Interestingly, a number of atheistic philosophers agree with the conclusion that the universe is caused. Quentin Smith is one such atheistic philosopher, and he has argued that the universe is self-caused.
By way of introduction, we have two more disjunctions to consider. First:
5. The universe is either self-caused or externally caused. (Premise)
6. Nothing can be self-caused. (Premise)
7. Therefore, the universe is externally caused. (From 5 and 6)
Again, Smith would agree with both (4) and (5), but he disagrees with (6). He postulates that the universe, while being finite in the past, does not begin at a singularity. Rather, he says that t0 is an impossible state of affairs. His argument hinges on this and on the possibility that between any two moments immediately after the Big Bang, after t0 and before/at t1, there are infinitely-many points. So, t1 is caused by t1/2 and t1/2 is caused by t1/4. This process continues infinitely, such that every moment of time is explained by a previous one without t0 having been an actualized state of affairs.
This is much like treating 0 to 1 as an open interval, with 0 not being a point in the interval. This is problematic for at least two reasons. For one, Smith is assuming that the infinity of points between t0 and t1 are concrete and not merely abstract. Secondly, as Robin Collins points out in his response to Smith, if there were infinitely-many points between t0 and t1, this would result in all kinds of paradoxes.
Take the interval between t1/2 and t1. There are infinitely-many points between t1/2 and t1; but surely according to Smith's own argument, t1/2 is a point in the interval that has been actualized, e.g. t1/2 to t1 is not simply another open interval. Hence, an actual infinite is formed by successive addition, which is impossible, given that another member of the set can always be added before arriving at infinity.
Smith's argument for a self-caused universe, therefore, does not appear to be sound. Yet, are there arguments against the possibility of a self-caused universe, or against anything being self-caused? If there are, then we may consider the final disjunction:
8. The external cause of the universe is either personal or impersonal. (Premise)
The universe's external cause must already be timeless, changeless, immaterial, and enormously powerful. If a case can be made that the external cause of the universe is personal, then we have the icing on the cake of an argument for the existence of God. The focus for philosophers of religion, then, should be not only on the first disjunction (which we have already seen is almost certainly true), but on the second and third disjunctions.
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"If a case can be made that the external cause of the universe is personal, then we have the icing on the cake of an argument for the existence of God."
ReplyDeleteDone (it could be fleshed out better) and done
Ilion, I agree with your sentiments regarding reason and God. It does seem strange (if not completely absurd) that rational agents such as you and I are the product of non-rational forces, which is the perspective of the naturalist. Put more specifically, if there is no God or intelligence directing the evolutionary process, then that process is strictly non-rational. Why, then, should we trust that our own cognitive faculties will produce true beliefs when they have been produced by nothing more than non-rational processes?
ReplyDeleteI'm also inclined to think that the fine-tuning argument would compliment the inductive cosmological argument quite well.
What's "the universe" refer to? i wonder if you can treat it as a "thing".
ReplyDeleteHi Mickey,
ReplyDeleteI will get to your comment on Spinoza's ontological argument in a moment, but I wanted to reply to your question here first.
The universe may be likened to a thing at least insofar as all of its parts are interconnected and are "governed" by the laws of nature, and so forth. It's like if we asked, "is a watch a thing?" The watch is composed of different parts, but surely the watch itself is also a thing.
"... Put more specifically, if there is no God or intelligence directing the evolutionary process, then that process is strictly non-rational. Why, then, should we trust that our own cognitive faculties will produce true beliefs when they have been produced by nothing more than non-rational processes?"
ReplyDeleteThe "felled-by-its-own-sword" case against atheism/materialism/naturalism is actually far stronger than you've expressed it here. And, it's not merely an inductive argument, but deductive.
It's not merely, inductively, that were atheism the truth about the nature of reality, we could not "trust that our own cognitive faculties will produce true beliefs." Rather, it's, deductively, that we cannot even hold beliefs in the first place ... for, we cannot reason at all if naturalism is the truth about reality.
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When we reason, we choose to move from 'Thought A' to 'Thought B' after apprehending both the content of the thoughts/concepts themselves and the logical relationship between them. When we reason, we choose to affirm -- or to deny -- that there is or is not a logical relationship between the content of the thoughts/concepts. Having affirmed or denied a logical relationship between the thoughts, we hold a belief.
However, were atheism/materialism/naturalism indeed the truth about the nature of reality, then our affirmation (or denial) of a logical relationship between the content of the thoughts/concepts is not a choice, in the first place, and it is not a choice is not based upon our comprehending of the concepts and the logical relationship (or lack thereof) between them. Rather, we affirm/deny as a material/physical effect of a material/physical cause -- for, were atheism/materialism/naturalism indeed the truth about the nature of reality, then *all things* must reduce wholly to material/physical cause-and-effect.
When we consider further, we see that (if atheism is the truth about the nature of reality) all our thoughts, as we call them, are themselves also wholly material/physical effects of material/physical causes. So, if atheism is the truth about the nature of reality, then not only can we not reason from thought to thought, but we cannot even think thoughs, and we cannot understand.