Is logic dependent on God? Some have gone so far as to say that God is logic, simply as a matter of identity. Others, such as Plantinga, hold that logic, insofar as it can be expressed propositionally, constitute one of the "divine ideas," or thoughts of God. One argument against this goes something like this:
1. Logic is necessary. (Premise)
2. Whatever is necessary cannot be contingent. (Definition)
3. If logic is dependent on God, then logic is contingent. (Definition).
4. Therefore, logic is not dependent on God. (From 1 - 3)
The problem with this argument, and we find a similar problem with the Euthyphro Dilemma, is that it unambiguously equivocates the term, "contingent." In (2), "contingent" refers to contingency-as-possible-non-instantiation, whereas in (3), "contingency" refers to contingency-as-dependency. Only the former of the two definitions necessarily entails the non-necessity of logic.
To show that this is the case, suppose that A exists necessarily. Now imagine that A necessarily entails B. B is therefore necessary as well, but it is also dependent on A. Therefore, B is both necessary and dependent.
For this reason, it is probably best to use the term, "dependent," when referring to contingency-as-dependency. "Contingency" may then be reserved only for possible non-instantations. This may help alleviate the common confusion.