Theism, Atheism and the Uniformity of Nature

The universe exhibits certain laws of nature, e.g. gravity, electromagnetism, and the strong and weak atomic forces.  There are three ways of explaining the uniformity of nature, where the uniformity of nature entails things that happen over and over again.

1. The uniformity of nature is either the result of chance, necessity or design. (Premise)

2. Whenever something happens over and over again, it is not the result of chance. (Premise)

3. Therefore, the uniformity of nature is either the result of necessity or design. (From 1 and 2)

Atheists obviously don't want to embrace the design alternative, but (2) appears rationally compelling.  Yet, I don't hear many atheists theorize that the uniformity of nature is the result of necessity.  My speculation on the matter is that atheists view the existence of anything necessary as too God-like.  After all, if the uniformity of nature is necessary, then we're left with Spinoza's pantheistic God, e.g. that God and Nature are identical.

I suggest that if the atheist is going to take seriously the need to explain the uniformity of nature, then he cannot possibly say it's the result of chance.  Why not simply adopt pantheism instead?  Not that I think there are good reasons to believe that the uniformity of nature is necessary, but I do think it's a vastly better explanation than chance.

If you were to win the lottery once, you might think you were lucky.  Imagine you win the lottery a thousand times in a row.  Surely you would conclude that this was not the result of chance, but you would also be reluctant to say it's the result of necessity.  You didn't have to win the lottery a thousand times in a row, which leads us to the design alternative: you win the lottery a thousand times in a row because someone chose to rig the lottery results.

Even so, necessity is a much better explanation than chance.  At least necessity can explain why things have predictable patterns of order and regularity.

I suggest the most viable option in explaining the uniformity of nature is design, and that necessity comes in at a distant second, but is still a much better explanation than chance.

If the uniformity of nature is by design, we might be asked the following rhetorical question: who designed the designer?

The question is misguided for at least two reasons.  In order for an explanation to be best, we don't have to have an explanation of the explanation.  If we did, then there would be an infinite regress of explanations, and then nothing could be explained at all.  Secondly, theists do say that the designer has an explanation of his existence.  As the designer of the universe, he would have to transcend the universe.  Since the universe is the sum total of all physical space, time, matter and energy, the designer must be timeless, changeless (for time is a measurement of change), and immaterial, in addition to being very powerful and very intelligent.

You will recall that the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) states:

PSR: Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause.

Therefore, the designer does have an explanation, and that explanation is found in the necessity of the designer's own nature.  After all, it's impossible to cause something timeless and changeless, since causing such a thing would mean that it changes from a state of non-existence to existence, which is a contradiction.  Therefore, if the objector insists that the designer must have an explanation, the theist is happy to comply, adding only that the designer's explanation is found in his own necessity.

Slight Variation of the Argument from Reason

Inspired by Reppert's argument in C.S. Lewis's Dangerous Idea on pp. 57-58:

1. No belief is rationally inferred if it can be fully explained in terms of non-rational causes. (Premise)

2. If naturalism is true, then all beliefs can be fully explained in terms of non-rational causes. (Premise)

3. Hence, if naturalism is true, then no belief is rationally inferred. (From 1 and 2)

4. Beliefs can be rationally inferred. (Premise)

5. Therefore, naturalism is false. (From 3 and 4)

I modified Reppert's "materialism" to my own rendering of "naturalism."  I also simplified (4) and (5).

The naturalist is likely to accept (1) and (4), but will almost certainly deny (2).  After all, aren't our minds rational causes?  In a word, yes.  It's true that our minds are rational causes, but that's not quite what the argument is getting at.  What the argument from reason stresses is that our minds are the result of some type of process.  That process (e.g. evolution) either includes rational causes or strictly non-rational causes.  It's the theist who says that evolution includes rational causes.  It's the atheist who is committed to the view that only non-rational causes are at work in the formation of our minds.

With that said, why think our minds generally produce true beliefs if they are the mere result of non-rationality?  If one wishes to bite the bullet and say our minds generally don't produce true beliefs, contrary to (3), then the belief that our minds are only the result of non-rationality is itself most likely not true!

This latter aspect is what Alvin Plantinga focuses on in his Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN).  The claim isn't that evolution is false, but that naturalism is inconsistent with evolution and rational minds (Plantinga's term is "cognitive faculties").  Thus, the truth of evolution implies the falsity of naturalism.

Sensus Divinitatis and Design

Although I don't think this is the most sophisticated argument ever, I do find it compelling:

1. There is a fixed order of things out of our control. (Premise)

2. We are hardwired to think that a fixed order of things implies that someone or something is in control. (Premise)

3. Therefore, we are hardwired to think that someone or something other than ourselves is in control. (From 1 and 2)

This is part of the reason I believe that theism or some form of spirituality is most natural to human beings.  We grow up in a world we have very little control over, and yet, things seem to be "controlled" in a sense that is astronomically beyond our power.  Whenever people explain their faith as the result of the feeling that "something must be greater than me," I think this is exactly what the intuition is all about.

It's no wonder, then, that children are naturally inclined toward supernaturalism, as opposed to naturalism.

A Simple Defense of the Modal Third Way

My most recently revised version of the Modal Third Way (MTW) goes like this:

1. Something cannot come from nothing. (Premise)

2. If something presently exists, then there was never a past time at which nothing existed. (Implied by 1)

3. Something presently exists. (Premise)

4. Hence, there was never a past time at which nothing existed. (From 1 - 3)

5. It is either necessarily the case that some temporally contingent entity or other has always existed, or a temporally necessary entity exists. (Implied by 4)

6. Possibly, there was a past time at which nothing temporally contingent existed. (Premise)

7. Therefore, a temporally necessary entity exists. (From 5 and 6)

The temporally necessary entity N must also be eternal, since there is no time at which something temporally necessary can fail to exist.  Finally, N must be very powerful if it is capable of causing something as vast as the sum total of contingent entities C.

The only way out of this argument for the skeptic is to deny (6).  In their assertion, some contingent entity or other must have always existed, given the present existence of something, anything.  However, this view is highly implausible.  As Alexander Pruss so eloquently asked: would the non-existence of all non-unicorns imply that a unicorn exists?  Surely not.  Why, then, would the non-existence of every other temporally contingent entity imply that some additional temporally contingent entity exists?  Once again, it wouldn't.

Moreover, there are good reasons to believe that C could have possibly failed to exist as some past time.  Think of it this way.  If every part of a house can fail to exist, then the house as a whole can fail to exist, as well.  Yes, there are instances in which the whole is not like its parts.  One popular expression is that just because every part of a mountain is small, that doesn't mean the mountain as a whole is small.

The problem with the charge of a composition fallacy is that there are many instances in which the whole is like its parts.  If every part of a mountain is made of rock, then the mountain as a whole must be made of rock.  So, which category do contingent entities fall into?  In addition to the argument advanced above, there is simply no reason to think of C as necessary, especially because each of its parts is contingent.  Moreover, there is no apparent contradiction in postulating C's possible non-existence.  Nothing contingent has to exist.

If these are the best objections skeptics can come up with against the MTW, then I think we're safe to say that the MTW is a knockdown and bulletproof argument for the existence of a necessary, eternal and very powerful entity.  The funny thing is atheists shouldn't be so reluctant to accept this conclusion.  After all, many of them hold to the temporal necessity of matter and energy.  I propose that theists and atheists alike ought to accept the MTW as a rationally compelling argument.  The only remaining disagreement is over whether N has any additional properties that would further bridge the gap between N and God.  I think there are, but I'll save that for another post.

An Augustinian Transcendental Argument

1. If there are any necessary, eternal, omnipresent, immutable and immaterial objects, then this fact is most parsimonious with theism.  (Premise)

2. Laws of logic exist.  (Premise)

3. The laws of logic are necessary, eternal, omnipresent, immutable and immaterial.  (Premise)

4. Therefore, the most parsimonious hypothesis with the laws of logic is theism.  (From 1 - 3)

A rejection of (2) would result in a form of anti-realism.  Due to the indispensability of the laws of logic, I think we're safe in asserting the truth of (2).  (3) seems obviously true just based on an analysis of what the laws of logic are.  They cannot be falsified at any time or any place, and so they are necessary, eternal and omnipresent.  Moreover, the laws of logic cannot change.  It's not as if the law of non-contradiction ("something cannot both be and not be at the same time and in the same sense") can suddenly become the opposite of what it is.  For, that would actually presuppose the law of non-contradiction.  Finally, the laws of logic aren't things we can just reach out and touch.  They are immaterial, e.g. not extended in space.

The atheist's best bet is to somehow undermine (1).  It's at this point that Augustine adopts conceptualism in order to refute the atheist's final option: Platonism.

A Revision of the Clarkean Cosmological Argument

The CCA can be defended in more than one way.  With some modest Leibnizian principles, it's fairly easy to show why the fallacy of composition charge against the CCA simply does not hold up.

1. Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause. (Premise, PSR)

2. A series of contingent causes exists. (Premise)

3. Hence, the series of contingent causes has an explanation of its existence. (From 1 and 2)

4. The series of contingent causes does not exist by a necessity of its own nature. (Premise)

5. Hence, the series of contingent causes has an external case. (From 1, 2 and 4)

6. Therefore, the series of contingent causes is explained by a necessary cause. (From 1, 2, 4 and 5)

The reason this argument does not commit a composition fallacy is because, in this instance, the whole really is like its parts.  Every contingent thing possibly fails to exist, and so the only plausible inference to make is that the series of contingent things could likewise possibly fail to exist.  Nothing contingent has to exist.  Therefore, the fact that anything at all contingent exists requires that its explanation be found in an external cause, which could only be a necessary cause.

A Bad Pro-Abortion Argument

Disclaimer: This post contains some sexually explicit language.

Some statements are so obviously flawed that many of us just shrug our shoulders and dismiss them, hoping everyone else will see the same logical fallacy.  However, a lot of these statements become snappy one-liners that are presented as a trump card against otherwise well-reasoned positions.  The pro-abortion statement I have in mind is the terse, "if abortion is murder, then blowjobs are cannibalism."

I feel the need to nip this one in the bud so it doesn't become a popular catchphrase for those of the pro-choice persuasion.  First, as a practicing Catholic, I believe all forms of birth control are immoral.  I fully expect my view will be looked upon as extremist.  Fortunately, we can put this aside entirely.  The (obvious) reason blowjobs do not constitute cannibalism is because human life does not begin until conception, which is the fertilization of the sperm and egg.  Since there is no human life prior to this fertilization, then blowjobs cannot possibly constitute murder/cannibalism.  Are they immoral for other reasons?  I'd say so, but that's another discussion entirely.

A Clarkean Cosmological Argument

The CCA, as we might call it, is inspired by the philosopher, Samuel Clarke, and is a blend of Leibnizian and Thomistic cosmological arguments:

1. Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause. (Premise, PSR)

2. Something presently exists. (Premise)

3. If something presently exists, then there was never a past time at which nothing existed. (Premise)

4. Hence, there was never a past time at which nothing existed. (From 2 and 3)

5. For every past time, something contingent has existed. (Assumption)

6. Hence, the series of contingent entities has an explanation of its existence. (From 1 and 5)

7. Nothing contingent can explain its own existence. (Premise)

8. Therefore, the series of contingent entities is explained by a necessary entity. (From 1, 6 and 7)

Of course, if the assumption of (5) is rejected, then we're brought to the existence of a necessary entity anyway, due to the truth of (4).  One might reject (6) on the grounds that the series of contingent entities isn't a thing, so-to-speak.  However, that objection is impertinent.  For, nothing contingent at all has to exist.  Why, then, does anything contingent exist, much less a whole series of contingent entities?  Its explanation can only be found in a necessary entity.

Grounding Necessary Metaphysical Truths

The claim that only analytical truths are necessary is itself not an analytical proposition.  This self-contradiction is just part of the reason verificationism has been almost universally rejected.  There are necessary synthetic propositions.  For example:

*Something cannot come from nothing.

*It is morally wrong to torture children for fun.

*"Hey Jude" is more beautiful than "Pants on the Ground."

The first synthetic proposition is metaphysical.  The second and third are ethical and aesthetic, respectively.  Now, suppose one accepts a version of PSR wherein all synthetic truths have an explanation.  The explanation will either be contingent or necessary.

1. "Something cannot come from nothing" is a necessary synthetic truth. (Premise)

2. Every synthetic truth has an explanation. (Premise, PSR)

3. Hence, "something cannot come from nothing" has an explanation. (From 1 and 2)

4. Every explanation is either contingent or necessary. (Definition)

5. Nothing contingent can explain a necessary truth. (Premise)

6. Therefore, "something cannot come from nothing" is explained by something necessary. (From 3 - 5)

One could justify (5) by pointing out that there are possible worlds at which nothing contingent exists, but "something cannot come from nothing" still has an explanation.  Since only existing things can serve as actual explanations, it follows that only something necessary can explain a necessary truth.