The Leibnizian cosmological argument (LCA) goes like this:
1. Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause. (Premise)
2. If the sum total of contingent entities C has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is a necessary, eternal and very powerful entity N. (Premise)
3. C exists. (Premise)
4. Hence, C has an explanation of its existence. (From 1 and 3)
5. Therefore, the explanation of C is N. (From 2 and 4)
Hume objects that once each member of a regress of causes is accounted for, then it is superfluous to ask for an explanation of the regress itself. Maybe there is an infinite regress of contingent entities, each causing the next. Thus, he rejects premise (2).*
Now, the traditional proponent of the LCA will point out, quite rightly I think, that the infinite regress (if one is even possible) itself is contingent. There didn't have to be any contingently existing entities, and so there did not have to be an infinite regress of contingent causes. Hume's proposed solution doesn't result in an explanation for the infinite regress.
Nevertheless, there's an additional argument at the disposal of Leibniz, and I'm surprised I never see it brought up in defenses of the LCA. What I'm talking about is the one-to-one correspondence between potentialities and an infinite regress. Thomas Aquinas sums it up quite nicely in the Third Way:
6. Something cannot come from nothing. (Premise)
7. Something presently exists. (Premise)
8. Either everything that exists is contingent, or else there exists at least one necessary entity. (Premise)
9. The past is infinite. (Assumption)
10. Given infinite time, all potentialities will have been actualized. (Premise)
11. The concurrent non-existence of all contingent entities is a potentiality. (Premise)
12. Hence, there was a time in the past at which nothing contingent existed. (From 9 - 11)
13. Therefore, at least one necessary entity exists. (Implied by 6, 8 and 12)
In short, since there was a time in the past at which nothing contingent existed, it is either the case that something necessary existed at that time (and therefore must exist at all times) or that nothing at all existed. The problem with the latter is premise (6) of the argument. If there were ever a past time at which nothing existed, then nothing would exist even now, for being cannot arise from non-being. Given that something presently exists, it follows that at least one necessary entity exists.
As a result, Hume's objection is further weakened. There are good reasons to believe the infinite regress he speaks of is itself contingent, and secondly, even if it isn't contingent, there would still have been a past time at which nothing contingent existed. Either way, there's no escaping the conclusion that N exists.
*Hume sort of rejects (1) as well, but also accepts it as an indispensable element of human thought.
Subscribe to:
Post Comments (Atom)
I see a potential problem here with premise 11.
ReplyDeleteI am not sure that it is true that every existing contingency can potentially fail to exist.
I am not sure whether fundamental particles can stop existing.
So, I think your argument may prove the existence of temporally necessary entities, but I don't think it proves logically necssary entities.
Those are good observations. N needn't be logically necessary in order for the argument to work. Ontological or temporal necessity would be just fine.
ReplyDeleteWhether the concurrent non-existence of all contingent entities is a potentiality seems rather uncontroversial to me. In fact, the only philosopher I'm aware of (I'm sure you can find some others, though) who questions this is Bede Rundle. Rundle postulates that nothing necessary exists, but it's necessarily the case that some contingent entity or other exists. As Alexander Pruss points out, though, the non-existence of one contingent thing doesn't entail the existence of another. The non-existence of all non-unicorns wouldn't entail that a unicorn exists. Moreover, there's no apparent contradiction with the notion that "nothing contingent exists" is a potentiality.
With respect to fundamental particles, you're absolutely correct. The argument, as I've presented it, leaves the question of what N is as an open question. I do think there are good reasons to believe that these particles are contingent (e.g. the origin of the universe according to contemporary science), but I stopped short of making such arguments.
I'd like to give a purely philosophical answer to the question about whether fundamental particles, such as quarks or strings, can be necessary. The way I'm going to approach this is very Thomistic, and I apologize in advance if you've heard this from me many times before.
ReplyDeleteLet's begin by distinguishing between being and essence. Being is a thing's existence or actuality; essence is a thing's nature, or what a thing is.
To exist by necessity is to have in a thing's essence the identity of being itself. Now, if there were more than one being (I'm speaking in a very technical philosophical sense), then there would be distinctions between them. However, to be distinct from being is to be non-being, and to be non-being is to not exist at all. If being itself does not exist, then the distinction between something real and something not-real is literally nothing (non-being), which is the same as saying that the two are identical. Since this is absurd, it follows that being is one and that there is only one necessary entity. Given that there is a plurality of fundamental particles, it follows that they cannot be necessary.
Hope that helps. :)
ReplyDeleteDoug
ReplyDeleteI think you are wrong when you say that N needn't be logically necessary for the argument to work. Logical necessity is implied in premise 1. If N is merely temporally necessary, then it does not have an explanation of its existence.
As to ontological necessity, I am not quite sure what you mean by that, but your argument about an infinite past only applies to something that, once it exists can cease to exist. A temporally necessary entity cannot cease to exist, so I'm afraid your argument still does not work to prove the existence of a non-contingent being.
You also seem to misunderstand my objection. I am not claiming that it is necessary that some contingent entity or other exists, I am asking if fundamental particles can cease to exist. If the can't, then even if the past is infinite, it can never be the case that there are no contingent entities. What is true, however, is that it could have been the case that no contingent entity existed.
BTW, I don't think that Pruss' objection works against Rundle's position. I do not think Rundle claims that the non-existence of some contingent being entails the existence of another, I think he starts fromp the impossibility of complete nothingness. If a completely empty world is logically impossible, then it follows that every possible world contains at least one being.
Rundle indeed starts from the position that it is logically impossible for there to be an empty world. However, he goes on to say that even though at least one entity exists, none of these are necessary. Hence, it's necessarily the case that something contingent or other exists, but nothing necessary exists.
ReplyDeleteAs for premise (1), I was just trying to accommodate your objection. Many contemporary Leibnizians, such as Bruce Reichenbach, defend (1) as not a logical necessity, but an ontological necessity (necessary in the actual world). God, on Reichenbach's view, and I can confirm this through a personal correspondence with him, is ontologically necessary, but not logically necessary. This means that if God exists in w1, then God cannot fail to exist in w1. Whether God exists in w2 cannot be determined by the information we have about w2.
So yes, I agree that Leibniz himself had logical necessity in mind when he posited the first premise, but we needn't be inflexible about its extent when treating the argument ourselves.
What your talking about particles, though, does sound like ontological necessity. If they cannot fail to exist in the actual world, then they constitute examples of (ontologically) necessary entities.
This is my fault for not making this clear earlier, but my advice is to interpret the LCA in this post, as well as its subsequent arguments as referring to ontological necessity only.
I still think there is something wrong with your argument, Doug.
ReplyDeleteLet's, instead of your entity C (premise 3), take a hypothetical entity E, the existence of which is a brute fact (it is unexplained), but which if it exists, cannot cease to exist. Then , your argument does not reach the conclusion in (13, since all you have is an eternal contingecy.
Also, your premise (2) seems to hang in the air somewhere. It does not relate to any of the other premises.
(13) doesn't rely upon (1) - (5). It's an independent argument that I'm only suggesting can be used to supplement the LCA. (6) through (13) does provide us with an ontologically necessary entity, as opposed to an eternal contingency. In fact, the PSR isn't even invoked in the Third Way. The N of the Third Way may or may not have an explanation of its existence, but that's inconsequential. All that matters is that there was a past time at which nothing contingent existed, that something cannot come from nothing, and that there was never a past time at which nothing existed. That inescapably leaves us with something ontologically necessary. Your example of E may or may not have an explanation, but it wouldn't be a contingent thing in terms of ontological contingency.
ReplyDeleteIn terms of the revised LCA, the PSR is restricted to the actual world and does not apply to all possible worlds. So, N has an explanation of its existence, but only insofar as it is needed to explain why anything at all exists in the actual world.
I do appreciation your critiques. Keep 'em coming!
I know that (13) does not rely upon (1)-(5), because my entity E would be impossible given (1).
ReplyDeleteNow I am not sure what you are hoping to accomplish by proving an ontologically necessary entity, but it seems trivial to me.
I mean, E may be some fundamental particle. Using your definition of ontological necessity it seems the fundamental particles we observe in the actual world are ontologically necessary. I really don't understand why you need an argument for this. Isn't this a logical consequence of the law of conservation?
Remember, I offered two arguments in support of the contingency of fundamental particles. The first was based on the consensus of contemporary science that the universe, and all the particles within it, began to exist. At the moment of the Big Bang, there were none of these fundamental particles. The law of conservation only applies to a closed system, and no such system existed until after the Big Bang. Secondly, I argued that fundamental particles participate in being, but are themselves not being itself subsisting (a philosophical argument).
ReplyDeleteWhile particles may not be destroyed in our universe, I still think it is reasonable to say that they can come into existence and cease to exist. For example, when a proton and an anti-proton annihilate, they form photons. These photons are obviously not identical to the particles for several reasons, such as the fact that protons and anti-protons have electric charges. I don’t think one can coherently say that after annihilation, the proton and anti-protons “still exist.” They no longer exist; the universe is short one proton and one anti-proton and is up by some number of photons. Similarly, take the Higgs Boson that researchers attempted to synthesize at CERN. The guys at CERN attempted to accelerate protons and lead ions and smashed them together, and got a glimpse as to what they believe is the Higgs Boson. If confirmed, it would be empirical proof that the particle can begin to exist.
ReplyDeleteWhether particles begin to exist or not is not relevant, what is relevant is whether they can cease to exist or not. If they can't, there is at least one possible world in which, given an infinite past, the concurrent non-existence of all contingent entities is not a potentiality, and there is no way of knowing whether our actual world is such a world or not.
ReplyDeleteAnother anon's observation that protons and anti-protons annihilate forming photons is a good illustration of what I mean.
We cannot rule out a possible world in which every contingent particle upon annihilation for whatever reason gives rise to some other particle and consequently, we cannot even rule out an infinite regress of contingent causes.
Let us also be clear that I am using fundamental particles as an example. If your(6) is true, then the Big Bang cannot have come from nothing either, so the "something" from wi-hich the Big Bang came could have been a contingent entity which never really "ceased" but gave rise to another contingent entity: our current universe.
What your argument needs is proof that it is possible for contingent entities to completely cease to exist, and by that I mean you must show that it is possible for continegnt entities to become literally nothing.
As for 'being itself', don't forget we aren't talking about logically necssary entities here, so even if your Thomistic argument succeeds, it is bot relevant here.
I think there's a fundamental misunderstanding of what ontological necessity is. Particles may be indestructible after (t1) the Big Bang, and that's only assuming the universe is a closed system. However, at the moment of the Big Bang, call it t0, there were no particles. Ontological necessity requires that a thing cannot not-exist in some possible world w1. If the actual world has an ontological necessary entity, as I've been arguing is the case, then particles are ruled out as ontologically necessary. After all, they did not exist at t0. In short, indestructibility is not synonymous with ontological necessity.
ReplyDeleteThe fact that we're talking about ontological necessity still makes the Thomistic argument relevant. A logically necessary thing is also ontologically necessary.
Also, the idea that I need to "prove" that something is merely possible is an attempt to shift the burden of proof. Finally, you're now referring to particles as "contingent," when earlier you were saying they're necessary. Do you mean to say that particles are ontologically necessary, but logically contingent?
By the way, guys, there are numerous "anonymous" posters here, each one obviously distinct from one another. It would be helpful if you would at least include your first name, so I know who to address. Thanks.
ReplyDeleteHi, this is unrelated, but do you know of any good online Intros to Modal Logic? <-- Future blog post idea?
ReplyDeleteIf not an online Intro, are there any good books for an Intro?
Hi Zia,
ReplyDeleteYou might take a look at Introductory Modal Logic, by Kenneth Konyndyk. It's a nice and concise introductory text. Just be prepared to do some critical thinking, because modal logic, even at an introductory level, can be quite taxing. Definitely a good starting point, though.
Here's a reputable online source (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy): http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-modal/
ReplyDeleteDoug
ReplyDeleteWhether paricles are ontologically necessary or not is not relevant. What is relevant in my critique is whether it is possible for contingent entities to completely cease to exist, IOW whether it is possible for contingent entities to become literally nothing.
Now I am perfectly happy agreeing to disagree here if you don't wish to reply to my objections, but I must say I am a little bit annoyed by your accusation that I am trying to shift the burden. I am trying to give an honest critique of your argument, more particularly your premise (11). If contingent entities are indestructible, then your (11) seems to be false.
regards
Walter
Welcome back, Walter. The whole point of the argument is to show that at least one ontologically necessary entity exists. If particles do not fit this description, then they're not ontologically necessary, and that's all there is to it.
ReplyDeleteThe reason you are shifting the burden of proof is that is bare possibilities are cheap. It's possible for a unicorn to exist, right? It's highly unlikely, but I'm sure you wouldn't object to its possible existence. Why assume that the universe is a closed system where particles cannot be destroyed by something outside of our universe? Are you saying I really need to prove this is even possible?
Likewise, the whole notion that particles are indestructible is, at best, off-topic. The LCA and Third Way address what is ontologically necessary, and not just what is indestructible at the moment of its existence. I'm sorry you're annoyed, but my intention is not to get under your, or anyone else's, skin. I'm not calling into question your honestly. I'm merely pointing out that the burden of proof is not on me to prove that something is possible.
By the way, I'm not sure what objections of yours you think I'd rather not address. I've answered the distinction between what is logically necessary and ontologically necessary. I've distinguished between ontological necessity and indestructibility. Something ontologically necessary is indestructible, but not everything indestructible is ontologically necessary, especially if that thing began to exist.
ReplyDeleteWhat objection(s) do you think I'm avoiding? I'm asking this in all sincerity, since I've tried to keep this thread on-topic as much as possible. Comments that I deem on-topic I try my best to reply to. Those that are off-topic I usually don't ignore, but will point out that they are off-topic.
Doug
ReplyDeleteThe only question I would like you to answer is whether indestructible entities refute your premise (11). Of course, you do not have to answer this question. It's your blog after all.
But if you really value my critique, I think it would be a good idea to try and anwser it. After all, you are making the claim that "the concurrent non-existence of all contingent entities is a potentiality." If you think it is shifting the burden if I ask you to back up this claim, then I am fine with that, but it seems to me that a "bare possibility" of the contrary is enough to counter "a bare assertion."
Regards
Walter
A bare possibility (or even high plausibility) that particles are indestructible once they exist doesn't counter the bare possibility that they can cease to exist. That they would even possibly cease to exist means they're not indestructible in any absolute sense.
ReplyDeleteI think I've answered your question about (11) several times now. No, indestructible (contingent) entities do not refute (11). As long as it's even possible for nothing contingent to exist at some past time, then the premise remains entirely intact.
Let me put this in a more straightforward manner. If there was never a past time at which (absolutely) indestructible particles did not exist, then N exists. If, on the other hand, if there were a past time at which (absolutely) indestructible entities did not exist, then N exists. Either way, we have something that fulfills N, because something cannot come from nothing. Remember, we're talking about ontological necessity. At whichever past time we're talking about, *something* existed, and that something can only be N for the reason just given.
ReplyDeleteA bare possibility that contingent entities (particles were merely an example) are indestructible means that there is a possible world in which they cannot cease to exist, so in that world, (11) is false. And since we cannot know whether the actual world is such a world or not, (11) may or may not apply to the actual world.
ReplyDeleteNo, if you think my contingent entities are the same as your N, that may be true, but there is nothing preventing more than one "N's" existing, since they are not logically necessary.It seems to me that some of those "N's" can in fact "not exist" without altering the essential properties of the world in question.
My point is not, nor has it ever been, to prove that no N can exist, I just happen to think that you are actually arguing for some rather trivial entities here, and there is still a very long way to go from your N to the "necessary, eternal and very powerful entity N of premise (2)."
Walter, right? :)
ReplyDeleteThat there is a possible world in which fundamental particles are absolutely indestructible does not undermine (11). I just gave the reason in my last reply. If these particles are eternal in the past, then they are ontologically necessary. If there was a time in the past at which they did not exist, and then became incorruptible, then they must have arisen from some other N.
I don't think our disagreement is too significant. If you want to say that N is composed of fundamental particles, then fine. Let's assume my arguments against their necessity turn out to be wrong. N (the sum total of necessary fundamental particles) would still be necessary, eternal and very powerful. One individual particle may not be very powerful, but as a whole they'd be quite powerful. I'm assuming a form of mereological realism at this point.
I am not talking about fudamental particles, Doug. I am merely taking them as examples. I am talking about eternal yet contingent entities whatever they may be.
ReplyDeleteIf what you mean by "ontological necesity" is merely a synonym for eternal existence, then you are right: our disagreement on this matter is not that significant. Your argument is actually very good as an argument for naturalism and against theism.
I already knew that the combined energy of all particles in the universe is indeed very high, so yes, the universe is "a very powerful entity", but I am afraid that was not what you were trying to argue for.
Regards
Walter
Then we're really not on the same page, here Walter. Earlier you referred to fundamental particles (granted, just as examples) as being ontologically necessary. You've watered that down significantly, so I'm unclear about what your position is.
ReplyDeleteOntological necessity is not a synonym of eternal existence. Something may have had eternal existence until some point, and would therefore be ontologically contingent.
Now as far as this being an argument for naturalism, we clearly differ here. Even if fundamental particles are ontologically necessary, there are still independent arguments for God's existence (teleological, ontological, conceptualist, moral, historical, etc.).
As for speculating about what I was trying to argue for, this is entirely my fault and I should have made it clear from the very beginning. There are two major contentions of cosmological arguments: a) that some necessary entity exists; and b) that this necessary entity is God.
I've only been arguing for the first major contention, but I did add eternality and great power as additional characteristics. The arguments I've presented in this post were not at all intended to demonstrate the truth of classical theism.
Moreover, you've added the term, "indestructible" in your replies. Hence, you cannot just be talking about eternal, yet contingent entities.
ReplyDeleteDoug
ReplyDeleteAFAIK, there is nothing in the definition of logically contingent entities that says they cannot be indestructible, so they are possibly indestructible.
I could add what I think is a good argument for the indestructibility of ALL (contingent) entities, but I do not wish to keep this discussion going on forever.
As for what you are trying to argue for. Most theists describe God as a logically necssary entity, so you simply cannot go from N (ontologically necessary yet logically contingent entity) to God (logically necessary and therefore also ontologically necssary.)
So, as yet, you haven't "argued for the first major contention" and you haven't even set a step in the right direction IMO because your argument entails the possibility that N is a natural entity (or are natural entities, because they can be multiple. And if N is possibly a natural entity, you have in fact conceded that there is a possible world in which God does not exist and hence, God is not logically necssary.
Now, to be honest, Doug, the term "ontologically necessary" seems like quite a stretch from the usual meaning of necessary. I can't help feeling that "cannot not exist in some possible world" is an oxymoron. "Cannot not exist" means that there is no possible world in which it does not exist, so adding "in some possible worlds" seems to significantly water down the definition of necessity.
But, as I said, I have no problem with this kind of necessity because I think it is an impressive name for something fairly trivial.
If we can call nature trivial, that is.
Logically contingent entities can be indestructible. There's no disagreement there. The point is that they're either ontologically necessary or ontologically contingent (prior to their creation), each of which is consistent with the MTW.
ReplyDeleteMany theists, including myself, view God as logically necessary. We also view God as omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect. That doesn't mean we have to argue for such a being in every single argument we offer. Moreover, there are plenty of theists, such as Richard Swinburne and Bruce Reichenbach, who hold that God is ontologically necessary, but not logically necessary.
Indestructibility of all contingent entities? Like mountains, trees, and animals?
Now, it's simply not the case that N must be a natural entity. In fact, even if N were a natural entity, by your own admission, there can be multiple necessary entities. Why can God not be another? It just doesn't follow that if N is possibly necessary, that God is not logically necessary.
With respect to the term, "ontologically necessary," it's certainly not as strong of a term as "logical necessity," but it's a major part of philosophical literature. My own correspondence with Reichenbach only reinforced that. It's definitely not an oxymoron (where two apparently contradictory terms appear in conjunction with another). Ontological necessity is consistent with, but does not entail, logical necessity. There's nothing oxymoronic about that.
I am not disputing that logical necssity is a part of philosophical literature, what I am disputing is that it has any sort of significance in the debate about the existence of God.
ReplyDeleteAnd I do think the term is actually an oxymoron because, as you corrcetly observe in your other post, whatever is possble is necessarily possible. So if something can possibly not exist (is logically contingent) then there cannot be a possible world in which it is not possible for said being to not exist. So "possibility" cannot be confined to one or merely some possible worlds, and hence, the term "ontologically necssary" is an oxymoron. Using this term in philosophical debates seems to lead to unnecessary confusion anyway.
And it is indeed not the case that N must be a natural entity, but it is possible, and IF N is a natural entity, then God cannot be necessary ( not even ontologically) because the world in which N is a natural entity can be completely defined without God, so whatever "God" may exist there can only be a Swinburne-style logically and ontologcally contingent entity, who is subject to even the basic "who desgned the designer"-objection.
By indestructibility of all contingent entities I mean that it may be impossible for any contingent entity to literally become nothing. I think it is extremely implausible that there is even a single real contingent entity that is destructible in that sense, regardless of closed or open systems.
And, Doug, it's that kind of destructibility that your argument requires.
Now, unless you have something entrirely new to add, I would like to bow out here. As I said before, we can't go on forever.
Thank you for the interesting discussion.
Merry Christmas to you.
Walter
What I stated was that ontological necessity is part of the literature. Now, whatever is logically possible is necessarily possible. We just need to get these terms straight, because I think you're misreading me (not intentionally, of course). It's this confusion that's leading you to say that "ontological necessity" is an oxymoron.
ReplyDeleteAgain, how does N's being the laws of nature, for example, preclude God from being another N? Saying that God is not necessary to explain the universe is not identical to saying that God does not exist.
So by "indestructibility," you're saying what I originally thought. Trees, mountains and animals are destructible, but the fundamental particles (just as an example) out of which they are composed are indestructible. That hardly undermines premise (11) and I've already explained why. I presented a dilemma that you have yet to answer. Here it is again:
A. Indestructible entities have always existed.
B. Indestructible entities did not exist at some past time.
If (A) is true, then these entities compose N. If (B) is true, then these entities simply become indestructible, but they arise from another N. Again I ask, what's wrong with this argument?
Merry Christmas to you, as well.
Ok, since you ask, I'll answer.
ReplyDeleteWhat is wrong, IMO is that A. does not mean that these entities compose N , A. merely means that there are indestructible entities that have always existed. Those entities are not ontologically necessary because they are not logically necessary and, despite your claim to the contrary, I believe ontologically necessary entities cannot be logically contingent.
I'll give you a semi-formal argument for why that is so.
Let’s define our terms first
If logically possibly X then necessarily possibly X (S5 axiom)
X is ontologically necessary if there is a world (W1) in which ~X is not possible
X is logically necessary if there is no world in which ~X
Now the argument, in the form of a reductio ad absurdum
1 X is ON
2 ~X is not possible in W1 (from 1 and the definition of ON)
3 X is ON but not LN (supposition)
4 There is a possible world W2 in which ~X (from 3)
5 ~X is possible in W2
6 If ~X is possible in W2 then ~X is necessarily possible. (S5)
7 (from 6) If ~X is possible in W2 then ~X is possible in W1
8 ~X is possible in W1 (from 5 and 7)
9 X cannot be ON but not LN (8 contradicts 2)
Conclusion : Ontological necssesity entails logical necessity
ON: X cannot not exist in W1
Therefore something not LN cannot be ON.
Now for why N being natural (not 'the laws of nature') precludes God, that actually very simple.
If God is not necessary to explain the universe, then the universe in itslef constitutes a possible woeld, because it is explained by its being necessary. So, there is a possible world with the universe and without God. Therefore God is not logically necessary. So, the only God left to you is a logically contingent God.
Let's begin with your definitions:
ReplyDelete"If logically possibly X then necessarily possibly X (S5 axiom)
X is ontologically necessary if there is a world (W1) in which ~X is not possible
X is logically necessary if there is no world in which ~X"
The second definition is incorrect. X's being ontologically necessary does not imply that there is a possible world at which X does not exist. Ontologically necessary entities may or may not be logically necessary. It's just left as an open question. Moreover, you've conflated logical possibility in your conjunction with S5 in order to draw the conclusion that ~X is possible in w1. The rules of modal logic as they apply to logical possibilities is in a completely different realm.
"What is wrong, IMO is that A. does not mean that these entities compose N , A. merely means that there are indestructible entities that have always existed."
So, there's no time, past, present or future at which these entities are destructible? Sounds like ontological necessity to me. Why even argue that ontological necessity entails logical necessity, then? If you believe fundamental particles are indestructible, as described by scenario (A), that's the very definition of ontological necessity. Are you saying these would also have to be logically necessary?
"Those entities are not ontologically necessary because they are not logically necessary and, despite your claim to the contrary, I believe ontologically necessary entities cannot be logically contingent."
This is a mistake, Walter. Not only is one of your definitions incorrect, but ontological necessity and logical necessity are demonstratively non-contradictory if they're distinct. A contradiction would be that "X is ontologically necessary in w1 if X can both not-exist and cannot not-exist in w1."
The argument doesn't even get off the ground because of the flaw in your definition.
That God is not necessary to explain the universe does not mean that God is not necessary. That's a very elementary non sequitur, Walter. Without condescending to you, my advice is that you should take some more time to think these arguments through.
In fact, the more I think about it, the less I find the objection persuasive at all. Let's say that N is ontologically necessary in w1, but as you say, is logically contingent. In conjunction with S5, you're quite right that N is logically contingent in w1. But, so what? N didn't have to exist in w1, but since it does exist in w1, it cannot not-exist in w1. This is the exact same thing as your point about eternally indestructible entities. Sure, they didn't have to exist (logically), but since they do, they cannot cease to exist.
ReplyDeleteWhat do you mean by my "second" definition?
ReplyDeleteMy definition of ON is "X is ontologically necessary if there is a world (W1) in which ~X is not possible" and your definition is "Ontological necessity requires that a thing cannot not-exist in some possible world w1" That's a direct quote from you, Doug. So, from your definition, we get, a thing (X) is ON if ~X is not possible in w1, which is exactly my definition.
So where do you get that "X's being ontologically necessary does not imply that there is a possible world at which X does not exist?" That's exactly the opposite of what I am saying.
Moreover, I do not conflate logical possiblity. That ~X is possible in W1 follows from the fact that X is, according to S5, necessarily possible, that means "possible in all possible worlds", including in W1.
So, as my argument demonstrates, "X is ontologically necessary in w1 if X can both not-exist and cannot not-exist in w1." So that seems like a contradiction to me.
That God is not necessary to explain the universe means that the universe in itself constitues a possible world. If the universe can be explained without God then a world without God is logically possible (since it does not contain a contradiction) Hence there is a world in which God does not exist.
My advice is that you at least read my argument thorougly before you respond. Because you are unwillingly) attacking strawmen, Doug.
Direct quote from me? Where? All I said is that X is ontologically necessary in w1 if and only if X cannot not-exist in w1. That's it. There's nothing there about its possibly not existing in some other possible world.
ReplyDelete"Moreover, I do not conflate logical possiblity. That ~X is possible in W1 follows from the fact that X is, according to S5, necessarily possible, that means "possible in all possible worlds", including in W1.
"So, as my argument demonstrates, "X is ontologically necessary in w1 if X can both not-exist and cannot not-exist in w1." So that seems like a contradiction to me."
I've responded to these in my post immediately prior to yours. I added a second one for clarification.
"That God is not necessary to explain the universe means that the universe in itself constitues a possible world. If the universe can be explained without God then a world without God is logically possible (since it does not contain a contradiction) Hence there is a world in which God does not exist."
This is exactly what I'm referring to, Walter, when I say you're not thinking these arguments through. The propositions "God exists necessarily" and "God did not necessarily create the universe" are logically consistent. If you can show where any contradiction lies, then I invite you to do so.
"My advice is that you at least read my argument thorougly before you respond. Because you are unwillingly) attacking strawmen, Doug."
Trust me, I've read them thoroughly, multiple times in fact. The reason I've done so is to make sure I'm not committing any strawmen. So please, show me the contradiction in "God exists necessarily" and "God did not necessarily create the universe." Also, please show me how the scenario in (A) does not constitute ontological necessity.
Would it help if I revised the Third Way to resemble something more palatable to you?
ReplyDelete6*. Something cannot come from nothing. (Premise)
7*. Something presently exists. (Premise)
8*. Either everything that exists is destructible, or else there exists at least one indestructible entity. (Premise)
9*. The past is infinite. (Assumption)
10*. Given infinite time, all potentialities will have been actualized. (Premise)
11*. The concurrent non-existence of all destructible entities is a potentiality. (Premise)
12*. Hence, there was a time in the past at which nothing destructible existed. (From 9* - 11*)
13*. Therefore, at least one indestructible entity exists. (Implied by 6*, 8* and 12*)
Doug: 'Direct quote from me? Where? All I said is that X is ontologically necessary in w1 if and only if X cannot not-exist in w1.'
ReplyDeleteAnd I said "Ontological necessity requires that a thing cannot not-exist in some possible world w1" That's a direct quote from you, Doug. I copy-pasted this quote (ctrl-c; ctrl-v)from your relpy. So, please do not deny the light of the sun.
Are you still convinced that you actually read my arguments, Doug? Because the "direct quote, where?" sounds like you haven't read what I aaid and your incorrect interpretation of my definition (which is actually yours) seems to point in the same direction. Now, never mind, let's proceed.
Doug 'That's it. There's nothing there about its possibly not existing in some other possible world.' Where do I say anything about possible not existing in some other possible world? I am referring to w1. The possibe non-existence in some other world comes from the distinction between logical and ontological necessity. If there is such a distinction, then ~X must be possible in some other world.
Doug 'The propositions "God exists necessarily" and "God did not necessarily create the universe" are logically consistent.'
That's not the proposition I am talking about. I am talking about the proposition "The universe is explained by natural entities" and "God is necessary" Those two are not logically consistent because it means that there is a possible world in that is explained by natural entities and that is not explained by natural entities. That's a contradiction.
Doug "But, so what? N didn't have to exist in w1, but since it does exist in w1, it cannot not-exist in w1."
ReplyDeleteSo, your definition of ontological necessity is that something THAT EXISTS in w1 cannot not exist in w1.
In comment 13 your said "Ontological necessity requires that a thing cannot not-exist in some possible world w1."
I interpreted that as "it is impossible for X not to exist in w1", which is the equivalent of logical necessity. Now I realize you meant something different.
So "ontological necessity", is just another way of saying "(past) eternal and indestructible"? Then I have no problems with your argument, but "at least one indestrucible entity exists" is IMO very trivial. I do not see why you need an argument for that. And it still does not counter an infinite regress of logically contingent causes.
Walter, I like you and I will respond to your latest post. However, I'm going to ask you to take a break from the blog for at least a couple (two) days. After I post my reply, I'll abide by the same just for the sake of fairness. The reason I'm asking you to do this is because I'm not convinced you really are taking enough time to critically think through what you argue in your posts.
ReplyDelete"'Ontological necessity requires that a thing cannot not-exist in some possible world w1.' That's a direct quote from you, Doug. I copy-pasted this quote (ctrl-c; ctrl-v)from your relpy. So, please do not deny the light of the sun."
That's a direct quote, but I said nothing at all about N's possibly not existing in some other possible world. That was your definition that you tried to infer from mine. I do apologize, though, for not making it clear that you were only directly quoting one of my statements. Nevertheless, your definition cannot be inferred from mine.
"Are you still convinced that you actually read my arguments, Doug? Because the "direct quote, where?" sounds like you haven't read what I aaid and your incorrect interpretation of my definition (which is actually yours) seems to point in the same direction. Now, never mind, let's proceed."
Well, let's not move on too fast. Your direct quote of me was taken from the same context as your inference based on my definition. If you're not basing your definition of ontological necessity on my own statement, then where did it come from?
"Where do I say anything about possible not existing in some other possible world? I am referring to w1."
Right, and w1 is the possible world where N exists. The whole point of your argument was that the possibility of ~N in w2 (in conjunction with S5) shows that ~N is possible in w1. My point has been that this is based on a misinterpretation of the different usages of "necessary" and "contingent." Because of this confusion, I decided to accommodate you with a revision of the Third Way, which you didn't mention. Or, maybe you didn't see it. Either way, the revision is there for you to examine.
"That's not the proposition I am talking about. I am talking about the proposition "The universe is explained by natural entities" and "God is necessary" Those two are not logically consistent because it means that there is a possible world in that is explained by natural entities and that is not explained by natural entities. That's a contradiction."
Why does God have to explain anything in order to have necessary existence? I've argued in the past that the modal cosmological argument (MCA) is consistent with God's not creating the universe, so why should this be any different? Your latest paragraph was really just a restatement of what you had already said. Again, I'm asking you to take some time off of the blog.
Walter, I was attempting to approve your latest comment because it seemed we were gaining some common ground. Unfortunately, when I went to select "publish," the comment disappeared. My apologies.
ReplyDeleteIf I can sum up your reply, you were explaining why you interpreted my definition the way you did. Then, you accepted the revised Third Way, but maintain that it only demonstrates a trivial truth. While I disagree that it's trivial, part of my purpose in managing this blog is to find common ground between theists, atheists, and everyone in between.
You accept that at least one indestructible entity exists. That's the kind of common ground I'm looking for. Not every atheist will accept even that.
Doug
ReplyDeleteNo problem. I'll stay away for as long as you like. Just wanted to say that my latest comment did come through. I see you have actually published your reviewed version, so maybe I'll comment on it there, some time later, of course.
BTW atheism is not a church in which somebody is required to accept some dogma. So, you will find atheists accepting or rejecting all sorts of things, not unlike theists I might add.
Regards
Walter
By the way, Walter, I'll be out of town until next Sunday. If you happen to post between now and then, don't be alarmed if it's not published until next week.
ReplyDelete