Craig and Moreland offer this argument against divine timelessness:
1. God is timeless. (Assumption)
2. God is omniscient. (Premise)
3. If God is omniscient, he would know what time it is now. (Premise)
4. Necessarily, knowing what time it is now constitutes a change in God. (Premise)
5. Therefore, God is not timeless. (From 2 - 4)
To their credit, Craig and Moreland acknowledge that their argument presupposes an A-theory of time. If the theist adopts a B-theory, at which all moments of time - past, present and future - exist simultaneously, the theist can affirm both God's timelessness and his omniscience. Craig and Moreland go on to argue that an A-theory of time is preferable to a B-theory. However, they don't offer any proof that an A-theory is true, and as Craig admits in Time and Eternity, there are good reasons to accept a B-theory. He even concedes that, "the static [B-theory] understanding of time is accepted almost unquestioningly by many physicists and by a good many reflective philosophers as well." (William Lane Craig, Time and Eternity: Exploring God's Relationship to Time, Crossway Books, 2001, p. 167.)
Earlier Craig admits that at least one argument in favor of divine timelessness, "does have some force and so needs to be weighed against whatever arguments can be offered on behalf of divine temporality." (ibid, p. 74.)
My constructive criticism of Craig and Moreland does not in any way detract the admiration I have for both of them. After all, as a self-proclaimed Aristotelian-Thomist, there are philosophical matters in which I disagree with them, as well.
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I like the B-theory, not least because it seems to me that it solves a lot of questions about God's foreknowledge that would otherwise be perplexing and difficult (sort of like the resolution offered by Boethius).
ReplyDeleteHowever, I've lately questioned it a little bit, around these lines: it seems that the B-theory results in contradictions or inconsistencies since, on that view, time is, roughly speaking, simultaneous. Therefore, a time T1 at which entity E exists exists alongside and simultaneous with a time T2 where entity E does not exist. This seems to imply that entity E simultaneously exists and does not exist, which looks very much like a contradiction, a la "walking through a wall and not walking through a wall at the same time".
Of course, since philosophy of time is hardly my strong suit, I don't know if I'm misunderstanding some of the principles involved.
To be honest, philosophy of time is one of my weakest areas. I still find it fascinating, but I'm much more qualified to talk about natural theology and Biblical theology. One potential way of solving the problem your example poses is to think of time as inches on a ruler. Inch 3 exists simultaneously with inch 5, even though 3 is "earlier" than 5. Something can be said to exist at 3, but not at 5, without contradiction. Make sense?
ReplyDeleteI think on a B-theory of time, saying that at time T1 E exists while at T2 E does not exist is not the correct way of talking.
ReplyDeleteDoug's analogy of the inches on a rules is more accurate. Every inch on a ruler exists, so it's not as if the one inch mark simultaneously exists and does not exist, it's rather that the one inch mark is not at the same position as the two inch mark. So ,E exists at another (temporal) position).
I must add,though, that the consequences of the B-theory of time are quite devastating for classical theism. While it is true that it may solve a lot of problems with God's foreknowledge, it also means Libertarian Free will is impossible. For on a B-theory, the future of every entity is also situated somewhere on the 'ruler', so everything is completely determined.
And, of course, on a B-theory of time, W.L. Craig's favourite Kalam Cosmological Argument is invalid. (It does not work on a A-theory either, BTW).
Regards
Walter
Walter, you and I agree on a few things here. However, classical theism is not dependent on libertarian free will. Thomas Aquinas and John Calvin, for example, were both compatibilists. Classical theism only maintains that God has certain attributes, e.g. omnipotence. It says nothing about the nature of human freedom. With that said, I'm not convinced a B-theory of time is inconsistent with libertarianism, but I'd rather not open that can of worms.
ReplyDeleteAs for the kalam argument, Craig openly admits that the argument presupposes an A-theory of time. On the other hand, one could appeal to the Leibnizian argument, whether the universe had a beginning or not.
Without Libertarian Free will, Doug, the classic Catholic reply to the Problem of Evil 'God does not want robots' is meaningless, as is Plantinga's more sophisticated Free Will Defense.
ReplyDeleteMoreover, the Catechism of the Catholic church specifically states that "Freedom is the power to act or not to act, and so to perform deliberate acts of one's own." If what I do is determined, then I do not have "the power to act or not to act."
What e.g. is the point of trying to convert someone if his fate has already been decided upon?
And I am glad you have finally come to realize that the KCA does not work on a B-theory of time. You used to deny this.
Walter
Your claim was that *classical theism* (not Catholicism specifically) is dependent upon libertarian free will. I'm not going to address your point about Catholicism and conversion. No disrespect intended, but those points are way off-topic.
ReplyDeleteThe KCA is still relevant on a B-theory of time, but it requires the PSR, as opposed to the ex nihilo principle.
I do concede that my statements on the kalam argument have not been very clear.
ReplyDeleteThe KCA has nothing to do with the PSR, Doug. The LCA does, but that's a completely different argument, so if you accept B-theory of time, there is one prominent argument for theism less.
ReplyDeleteWhy did the universe begin to exist? That's surely a question for the PSR. Why is there something rather than nothing? The latter is the LCA.
ReplyDeleteIn other words, Craig's formulation of the KCA doesn't utilize the PSR. Pruss's version, on the other hand, does.
ReplyDeleteSure "Why did the universe begin to exist" would be aquestion for the PSR. But on a B-theory of time, the universe did not 'begin' to exist. And I do not know Pruss' version of the KCA, but if it uses 'begin to exist', it is equally invalid on a B-theory of time.
ReplyDeleteSo, does Pruss use a version of the KCA or a version of the LCA?
Walter
Now, this is not really on-topic, so I am leaving it for now.
I was wondering, though, have you ever thought about what death would mean on a B-theory? There seems to be no fundamental difference between Julius Ceasar (dead) and me (alive). Julius is just 'somewhere else' on the ruler, and fromthe POV of people living a hundred years from now, I would also be 'somewhere else'.
Isn't this a potential eternal life even for atheists?
It's not so much that the universe would "begin to exist," but rather that the universe had a first moment of time, e.g. there was no time prior to t0. Pruss mainly defends the LCA, but he's also argued in favor of the KCA.
ReplyDeleteDeath on a B-theory of time? I have to admit, that's a very interesting question. From what I can gather, B-theorists state that human beings are four-dimensional. So, while each moment of one's existence is equally real, the experience of consciousness changes. We do experience this, so it's not as if B-theorists are just pulling this view out of thin air. Eternal life would entail an eternity of conscious experience, so no, I wouldn't say that there would be an afterlife on atheism. Of course, I can't speak for all (or really any) atheists.
If you're interested in what might be the most sophisticated defense of the LCA to date, you might like to read Pruss's article in the Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology. It's available online: https://bearspace.baylor.edu/Alexander_Pruss/www/papers/LCA.html
ReplyDeleteOn a B-theory nothing has "a first moment in time". being on the first mark on the ruler does not entail a first moment in time.
ReplyDeleteThe point is, and that also relates to my question about death, that nthing on the ruker actually passes away. Julius Ceasar is on the ruler, just as you and I are, so, in what way is my consciousness not eternal? The consciousness of me as a 10-year-old is on the ruler and AFAICT it will always be there.
And as to the LCA, I have read Pruss' article, and he does have a point IF the PSR is true. But his case for the PSR just isn't convincing enough. I happen to be with Peter Van Inwagen on this matter, and Pruss fails to actually refute Van Inwagen's argument.
But, that's for another time.
Walter
Well, I disagree that he fails to refute the argument. That should come as no surprise.
ReplyDeleteBeing the first mark on a ruler means that there is no mark that precedes it. Simultaneity has nothing do with it. I'm not sure how your latest comment about Julius Caesar isn't just a restatement of what you originally argued. I explained why his existence is eternal in one sense and not in another.
Let me put it another way. Eternal life entails that S exists from some time, say t5, and every moment of time that follows t5. If Julius Caesar exists at t4, but not at t5 or tn, then Julius Caesar does not have "eternal life" in the latter sense.
ReplyDeleteOn a B-theory, being the first mark on the ruler has no special meaning. So, as WL Craig himself admits, if the B-theory is true, the KCA fails.
ReplyDeleteAnd of course eternal temporal life entails that S exists at t and every other moment of time, but since there is not really a point at which S comes into existence, and no point at which S goes out of existence, there is another way in which S is eternal
As for the PSR, that's a matter of preference, and way off-topic, so I am not going to discuss this here.
Walter
If the PSR is true, then there would be an explanation for why there is a first moment of time. The KCA is still viable, but not by using the same arguments Craig appeals to. I agree the discussion of the PSR's truth is off-topic, but so is the point about eternal life. As I already stated with respect to the latter, there is one sense in which all moments are eternal in one in which they are not.
ReplyDeleteFor the record, I'm not an adamant A-theorist or B-theorist. I'm not a philosopher of time, so like you, I'm willing to keep an open mind about which theory of time is the correct one. Some have even suggested a hybrid theory.