2. Whatever is possible is necessarily possible. (Premise, S5)
3. Hence, it is possible that I exist apart from my body in the actual world. (From 1 and 2)
4. Therefore, I am distinct from my body. (Implied by 3)
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While I think the conceivability argument for property dualism (the "zombie" argument) is ultimately sound, I don't think the same considerations apply to the conceivability argument for substance dualism (the "disembodiment" argument), for reasons I discuss here. I also think that using "I" in arguments like these is problematic: "I" is an indexical with no determinant referent, so whether or not disembodiment is conceivable depends on whether or not "I" refers to my body (which cannot be known a priori, since "I" ultimately refers to whatever I happen to end up being), so the argument begs the question. I think the most effective way to move from property dualism to substance dualism is to argue from the incoherence of attributing mental properties to composite material substances, as I have done here.
ReplyDeleteYour argument for substance dualism seems akin to Victor Reppert's. Is that a fair assessment?
ReplyDeleteI'm not sure what Victor Reppert's argument is, so I can't really say :P
ReplyDeleteWouldn't this argument just be against mind/brain identity theory? I.e., functionalism could still be true even if this argument is sound.
ReplyDeleteSince we're talking about the mind, and not mental states, I think the argument would rule out functionalism. I could be wrong, though. Philosophy of mind intrigues me, but it's not my area of expertise.
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