"It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain a thought without accepting it." -Aristotle
Let's suppose a man is persuaded by an argument from natural theology, say, the argument from change (yay!), that there must exist a monotheistic God. Let's also say he's inclined to accept the key premise of Plantinga's modal ontological argument - namely, that it's possible for a maximally great being to exist and concludes that a maximally great being does exist. Now to make things interesting. Suppose this man is also persuaded by the logical version of the argument from suffering. Should he abandon his theism (or more specifically, God's maximal greatness) just because he has become persuaded by an argument that concludes that it is impossible for God to be maximally great?
I don't think so. In fact, I think changing one's position based on two (hypothetically) equally strong and opposing arguments may be a sign of mental instability. What the rational person will do upon such a predicament is reassess the arguments for and against God's maximal greatness. If after a time he still cannot make up his mind, then he could take one of two routes: either a) continue researching these arguments, or b) adopt agnosticism with respect to God's maximal greatness.
Of course, virtually no atheistic philosopher today defends the logical version of the argument from suffering. Stephen Law, for instance, prefers instead to defend the evidential version of the argument from suffering, which only concludes that God's being maximally great is unlikely. Still, one ought to remind one's self that the arguments from suffering, even if successful, would be a far cry from constituting a demonstration of the truth of atheism. After all, one may make the more modest claim that a monotheistic God exists who is very powerful, very intelligent, and very good (or maybe morally perfect).
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The man who is persuaded by the argument from change, the Ontological argument and the logical version of the argument from suffering should of course continue researching these arguments and others. In fact everybody should continue researching arguments in search of the truth. That's precisely why adopting a position of faith is in fact a very anti-philosophical approach.
ReplyDeleteIf the man still comes to the conclusion that the argument from suffering works, then the only thing he has to do if he wants to remain a theist is adopt the view that maximal also greatness entails selfishness on the part of God, or that it entails a certain amount of cruelty.
That wouldn't work, since if someone accepts the ontological argument, then he believes in a God who is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect. Selfishness and cruelty are incompatible with moral perfection. Maintaining one's faith is not anti-philosophical for the reasons given. At the most you could call it non-philosophical, but there's nothing about this man maintaining his faith that's irrational. He simply has yet to come up with a solution. In fact, his conviction that the argument from change and the modal ontological argument are sound may be significantly stronger than his conviction that the logical version of the argument from suffering is sound. In such a case, it may actually be irrational for him to abandon the view that God is maximally great.
ReplyDeleteFor example, a scientist who adheres to General Relativity shouldn't abandon this theory just because of some anomaly, or set of anomalies. Rather, he should continue to look into the matter, which is exactly what physicists are doing in attempting to reconcile GR with quantum mechanics.
Who says that selfishness nd cruelty are incompatible with moral perfection? if, as lots of Christians believe, God is the standard of morality then whatever God's moral character is, is the basis for morality and God is morally perfect no matter what he does as long as it is in keeping with His character.
DeleteAnd a scientist who adheres to GR as a theory should not abandon his theory right away but should be open to the possibility of abandoning his theory. That approach is called the scientific approach.
Likewise, if you regard your brand of theism as a theory, you are taking a philosophical approach. If , however, you hold to it as a position of faith, you work from a presupposed truth and try to fit everything that conflicts with it into this belief-system, which is exactly the opposite of philosophy.
You're definitely knocking down a strawman definition of "faith," which defines it in such a way as to be closed-minded, but I'm not going to be sidetracked. Selfishness and cruelty are incompatible with moral perfection. Your objection presupposes that God's moral decrees are capricious, which is not the Christian view. At least, it's not the orthodox Christian view of the likes of St. Anselm, the originator of the ontological argument.
DeleteMy objection does not presuppose that God's decrees are capricious, it is merely a logical consequence of the claim that God is the ground of morality.
DeleteIf they're not capricious, then God cannot decide to make selfishness and cruelty good anymore than he can make a square-circle.
DeleteIt's not that God 'decides' to make those things good, the point is that if selfsihness and cruelty are necessary properties of God, then it follows that those properties are good. So, in order to refute my objection, you would have to argue for why God cannot have those properties. Satying they are not perfections does not suffice unless you can define moral perfections in an absolutely objective way, which BTW would destroy the moral argument for God.
DeleteYou're merely affirming the consequent. "If X is a property of God, then X is good." This is a true statement. However, the fact that the consequent follows from the conditional does not make the conditional true or possible.
ReplyDeleteThat's not what I am arguing.
DeleteHere are your words: "if selfsihness [sic] and cruelty are necessary properties of God, then it follows that those properties are good."
DeleteThat's matches exactly what I said above: "If X is a property of God, then X is good."
If that's not what you're arguing, then you'll need to clarify without resorting to the usual, "you just don't understand my argument" tactic.
Sure, if selfishness and cruelty are necessary properties of God, if follows that those properties are good. That is a true statement. Now of course it does not follow from this that S and C are necessary properties of God, but that's not what I am arguing.
DeleteI am merely asking you to clarify why those properties cannot be necessary properties of God and to do so without circular reasoning. Unless you have a way to define moral perfection without referencing God, you have no basis for the claim that S and C cannot be moral perfections.
Now you're conflating moral epistemology with moral ontology. How do we know that selfishness and cruelty are not moral perfections? That all depends on which moral framework one adopts. It's easy to show that these are moral aberrations on virtue ethics, deontology, etc., without referencing God. That's moral epistemology. From this it doesn't follow that God is not the locus and standard of morality (moral ontology). Likewise, one can explain all about molecules without reference to atoms, but in fact atoms are needed for molecules to exist.
Delete"It all depends on which moral framework one adopts."
DeleteThat's all I wanted to know.
What does that even mean?
DeleteIt means that your answer confirms what I have always thought about your position on this matter.
DeleteWhich is what? I ask that you not be evasive. You quote one line from my response, and I suspect you've taken it out of context.
DeleteYou have made the absolute claim that "Selfishness and cruelty are incompatible with moral perfection" and you can only back up this claim by referring to relative moral frameworks.
DeleteWhat you need to do is prove (or at least give a strong argument) that S and C are incompatible with moral perfection on every possible moral framework. IOW you willk have to show that moral frameworks compatible with S and C are logically impossible.
And please do not use the tactics "moral epistemology versus moral ontology" on me.
It's bad enough that WL Craig resides to this in order to avoid having to discuss the heart of the matter. You know well enough that this issue is a matter of both ontology and epistemology.
Walter, there's a *huge* difference between moral epistemology and moral ontology. It's not a mere tactic, but philosophical fact. I'm sorry you can't or won't see the difference. I don't have to give any reasons to back up my claim about moral objectivity, since the OP has nothing to do with moral objectivity versus moral relativism. And, as I suspected, you've taken my one line completely out of context. The point is that a deontologist can show that selfishness and cruelty are wrong by using a certain method, whereas a virtue ethicist comes to the same conclusion using a different method. There's nothing about moral relativism there.
DeleteI know the difference between moral epistemology and moral ontology but in order to back up your claim that S and C cannot be compatible with moral perfection you will have to prove that it can be known what moral perfection (does not) entail(s). That's an epistemological claim.
DeleteAnd I am sure that you are aware that proponents of the argument from morality regard the morality of deontologists and virtue ethicists as relative and subjective because those methods all start from subjective assumptions. Deontology e.g. presupposes that we have certain duties but the various brands of deontology differ as to what exactly those duties are. Some varieties of Divine Command Theory, e.g., claim that cruelty is not wrong if it is commanded by God.
So, your claim has everything to do with moral objectivity because without objective morality you cannot make the claim that S and C (or whatever) is or isn't compatible with moral perfection.
That's my point and I am sorry that you can't or won't see it.
Walter, this is *not a post about the moral argument.* And, I've already refuted your objection by pointing out you're committing the fallacy of affirming the consequent.
ReplyDeleteWhat can be known about morality is a matter of ontology. The manner in which we come to know it is a matter of epistemology. You're being deliberately obtuse.
It's really simple. You have made a claim and you can't back it up. There is no need to try and hide this by claiming I've committed the fallacy of affirming the consequent.
DeleteI asked you a question which, if your case really is as strong as you claim it is, should have been very simple to answer.
What claim? I never even touched upon the moral argument in the OP, yet that's what you want to focus on. If you think I've made a mistake in claiming you've committed the fallacy of affirming the consequent, it should be easy to explain where I went wrong. But, you can't, and so you just persist with the same tired objection.
DeleteI have already explained why I haven't committed the fallacy of affirming the consequent. I have never claimed that S and C are compabitble with moral perfection. That would be affirming the consequent. You on the other hand claim that "selfishness and cruelty are incompatible with moral perfection" and you cannot back this up. This may be a "tired objection" but as long as it hasn't been refuted, it stands.
DeleteI think you may need to look up what affirming the consequent is. You stated that on divine command theory (a view I don't even hold), "If God will selfishness and cruelty, then selfishness and cruelty are good." I've already agreed that this statement is true, but given the impossibility of the consequent, the conditional is also necessarily false. Let's be clear. You weren't asking me to defend the objectivity of selfishness and cruelty being incompatible with moral perfection without the additional agenda of attempting to use the Euthyphro dilemma. That was your entire point when you stated:
Delete"Satying they are not perfections does not suffice unless you can define moral perfections in an absolutely objective way, which BTW would destroy the moral argument for God."
So, not only did you commit the fallacy of affirming the consequent, but you were also attempting to change the subject surreptitiously. The OP says nothing about the moral argument, and it says nothing about moral epistemology or anything of the sort.
Given the impossibility of the consequent, the conditional is necessarily false. Of course, and that's why I have been asking you to show why the consequent is impossible.
DeleteAnd once again, you've failed to do so.
And whatever my "agenda" is, as long as you haven't answered the question, I have succeeded in whatever I was trying to achieve.
What you've been trying to achieve has no pertinence to the OP, which is why I have refused to explain why selfishness and cruelty are objectively wrong from an epistemological standpoint. Please learn to stay on topic.
DeleteYou know what, forget the moral argument entirely. It was my mistake to allow you to change the subject to begin with, which is why I'm now steering the discussion back to the OP. You and I both agree that selfishness and cruelty are objectively wrong. If I remember correctly, you come to this conclusion through a version of utilitarianism. I, on the other hand, come to the same conclusion through a hybrid of deontology and virtue ethics.
ReplyDeleteWith this in mind, it doesn't matter whether God is the ground of objective moral obligations. The two theistic arguments I mentioned were the argument from change and the modal ontological argument. If a man accepts these two arguments, he's not additionally required to accept the moral argument.
I don't agree that selfishness and cruelty are objectively wrong. They are wrong under my version of utilitarianism and they are wrong under your hybrid and probably also under lots of other methods, but none of these methods can lead to the conclusion that S and C are 100% objectively wrong. The kind of certainty required to make the absolute and objective claim that something is wrong can only be met by a form of Divine Command Theory, which in the matter we are discussing would come down to begging the question.
DeleteTo get back to your OP. A person who is convinced by the LPoE (or "suffering" if you wish)can remain a theist and even a Christian by adopting the view that maximal greatness also entails selfishness on the part of God, or that it entails a certain amount of cruelty. That man can even simply argue that, while selfishnes and cruelty are wrong for human beings, they are not wrong for God.
You don't need 100% certainty in order to state that something is objectively right or wrong. That's another example of conflating epistemology with ontology.
DeleteNow, as for your alternative to the OP in which a man states that selfishness and cruelty are not wrong for God, sure he could say that. Of course, he'd no longer be defending the Anselmian conception of God. Plus, the whole reason the man is having difficulty is because he doesn't believe that selfishness and cruelty are befitting of God, which is one of the potential outcomes of the logical argument from suffering. You see, the whole point I'm making in the OP is that one shouldn't just change one's ideologies at the first appearance of inconsistency. That's it, and that point should be uncontroversial.
Except that you claim that cruelty and selfishness cannot possibly be moral. To do this you need 100% certainty.
DeleteOf course the man doesn't believe the S and c are befitting of God, but since he is now convinced by the LPoE as well as by the argument from change and Plantinga's OA, the only logical thing for him to do is (of course after having thoroughly researched the arguments)"change his ideology".
In the OP, you are not talking about the first appearance of inconsistency but about someone who is "persuaded by the logical version of the argument from suffering."
King Henry VIII's existence is an objective historical fact. Do we have 100% certainty of this? Of course not. You're just redefining terms to suit your interests.
DeleteIf the man needs to change his ideology, it doesn't have to be about selfishness and cruelty. He could, for example, decide that there must be a sufficient refutation of the logical argument from suffering, even if he doesn't know what it is. This could be because he finds the weight of the other arguments much stronger. Now, I certainly am talking about the first appearance of inconsistency. Of course, I also mention what the man should do, which is continue to look into the arguments. The fact that he's persuaded by the logical argument from suffering could simply a type of initial persuasion, after which he realizes the argument is unsound.
This thread is now closed.
ReplyDelete