Thomas Nagel, author of the famous "What Is it Like to Be a Bat?" (1974), fits the description of an atheist who ardently rejects Naturalism (with a capital "N"). For Nagel, a philosopher of mind, the mind cannot be simply reduced to the brain or as a mere emergent property. In support of this, we are reminded that thoughts have a certain aboutness concerning them. Why is this so important?
Well, aboutness cannot be explained in terms of only physical processes. To think about something is to have an intentionality concerning what is thought about. However, where in the brain can aboutness or intentionality be found? Nowhere, at least according to Nagel, as well as many theistic philosophers.
If one were to explore the human brain, sure, there would be neurons firing away. However, neurons aren't about anything; they're simply physical parts of the brain. They might be used to express aboutness, but this is no different than a pianist using a piano to play some beautiful music. While Nagel does not use any modal argument in favor of mind-body dualism (or its cousin, hylomorphism), his argument does help to supplement such arguments:
1. Possibly, my mind exists apart from my body. (Premise)
2. Necessarily, whatever two objects do not possess the same attributes are not identical. (Premise, Leibniz's Law)
3. Therefore, my mind is distinct from my body. (From 1 and 2)
This isn't a theistic argument per se, although philosophers, such as J.P. Moreland, provide further arguments based on this in favor of theism. However, if this is a sound argument, then not only is Naturalism defeated, but the atheist can no longer claim that God's immaterial mind is something contradictory or incoherent.
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Unfortunately, the argument is not sound.
ReplyDeleteThe first premise, as, IIRC, I have already explained to you, only expresses epistemic possibility.
Either my mind exists apart from my body or it doesn't, but if it doesn't, there is no possible world in which it does, precisely because of Leibniz's Law. if my mind possesses the attribute of being material, then a mind that doesn't possess this attribute is, by Leibniz's law, not my mind.
I'm afraid I don't understand what you're saying. I get a whiff of the Bayesianism vs. Frequentism debate, but I can't really pattern-match it onto what you're saying. It seems to me that if ontology is epistemically inaccessible, we can say nothing about it—this is Kant's thing-in-itself. So, is the ontology epistemically accessible?
DeleteThe way I think about these things is to ask what the epistemic consequences are for the ontology being one way vs. the other. I explore this in more detail with my my difference between 'fact' and 'truth', albeit without a discussion of epistemic accessibility.
Given the above, might you be able to articulate your position, a bit more?
It's fairly obvious that premise (1) is the key to the argument, which is why I mentioned that Nagel's argument supplements the modal argument for mind-body dualism. One cannot simply assert that premise (1) is right or wrong.
ReplyDeleteThe point is that you haven't presented a sound modal argument here. If Nagel's argument merely shows that a mind separate from a body is not incoherent, then it is already a defeater for the claim that God's immaterial mind is contradictory, but more importantly, on that interpretation of premise 1, your conclusion does not follow.
DeleteYour conclsuion only follows if it is true that my (or your) mind exists apart from my (or your) body. It doesn't follow if it is possible.
The bottom line is that this modal version of yours does not add anything new to the discussion.
Well, it certainly doesn't add anything new to the discussion, but it's often beneficial to revisit arguments such as these.
DeleteNow, I have to ask: what do you find invalid about the argument? Granting that it's possible for the mind to exist from the body, then the mind possesses an attribute (possibly existing apart from the mind) that the body does not possess. By Leibniz's Law, that necessitates that the mind is distinct from the body.
Just out of curiosity, are you so committed to mind-body materialism that you feel mind-body dualism is a threat to your atheism? This is just a personal question, and it has nothing to do with the truth-value of the argument. It's just that Nagel himself is an atheist who holds to mind-body dualism.
If it is possible for a mind to exist apart from the body, then of course it is possible for a mind to exist apart from the body and such a mind would be of course be distinct from the body. My point is that you cannot reach the conclusion "my mind exists from my body" from an epistemic possibility that mind can exist apart from bodies. And epistemic possibility is all you have.
ReplyDeleteAs to your question: no, I am not committed to mind-body materialism. I don't see any reason so far to think mind-body materialism is not true, but if it were disproved, I would still be an atheist. My athiesm is not based on materialism. Apart from the fact that immaterialism is IMO an ill-defined concept, I have no real issues with it. The idea of a God, as defined by most religions, however I find completely incoherent.
Premise (1) is making an ontological claim, not an epistemic one. It is further supported as an ontological possibility by the examples already provided. Maybe you're not persuaded by those examples, but I'd like to hear your reasons for rejecting them. Where in the brain exactly can "aboutness" be found? That's just one question the mind-body materialist has to answer.
DeleteYour second paragraph simply reflects (in part) the view of Thomas Nagel. He's an atheist who accepts that the mind is something immaterial. I see no reason to address your belief that God, as defined by most religions, is incoherent. Sounds like shades of non-cognitivism to me.
I really see nothing but an argument from ignorance here. I don't know where in the brain "aboutness" can be found, but I don't know where "aboutness" could be found outside the brain either (and neither can you, for that matter). There are things we don't know (yet), but so what?
DeleteNowhere in my second paragraph do I accept that the mind is something immaterial. I accept that it could be something immaterial, but for now, I see no reason to think it is.
You don't have to address my "belief" because I haven't given you any arguments here. Materialism is not among those arguments, however.
You misunderstand the argument. It's not that we don't yet know how aboutness could be found in the brain; it's that aboutness is not the kind of thing to be found in the brain at all. Since I claim that aboutness is immaterial, it makes perfect sense to state that it can be found as a property of the immaterial mind.
DeleteI didn't say you accept mind-body immaterialism. I said that if you did and still maintained your atheism, then your view would comparable to Thomas Nagel's.
It seems to me that it's that you don't know how aboutness could be found in the brain and therefore jump to the conclusion that it's not the kind of thing to be found in the brain. Until I see some convincing evidence, I don't just accept the argument and neither do the majority of atheist philosophers.
DeleteNo, it has nothing to do with that. Dante's Divine Comedy is just a bunch of letters that forms words, and words that form sentences. Yet, these sentences are "about" something. Tell me how "aboutness" can be material and I'll reconsider. Also, I really don't care what the majority of atheistic philosophers think. We have at least one (Thomas Nagel) who agrees with me on this point. It's no wonder that so many atheistic philosophers deny that there really is any "aboutness."
DeleteYou seem to have answered your own question. Dante's Divine Comedy does not contain anything immaterial. I have a copy of it on my shelf. It's made of paper and ink and it is about something.
DeleteThe interpretation is immaterial. Otherwise, we just have ink on many (too many) pieces of paper. Words don't have meaning on their own; they must be assigned aboutness in order to be part of a language.
DeleteThe interpretation is done by a being capable of interpreting. To say that interpretation is immaterial is question-begging.
DeleteSaying that interpretation is done by being capable of interpreting is a truism. I haven't begged the question. What you need to show is how aboutness can be something material. Is there not a difference between ink on a page and what the words mean?
ReplyDeleteCan a computer transform a string of ones and zeros into a word? Yes. That is a form of interpretation, yet the computer is fully material. Aboutness in its most primitive form is a correspondence between an object and something external to that object. When a rock hits the water, there are wrinkles in the water. The wrinkles are "about" the rock.
ReplyDeleteAll that does is push the problem back a step. A computer's binary code is just another language translated into English, Spanish, etc. "Correspondence" is an interesting term you just used, given its rejection by materialists. Show me where "correspondence" is.
DeleteAnd no, the wrinkles are not "about" the rock; they are an effect of the rock hitting the water.
Correspondence is, on a materialistic account, nothing more than a reaction. Interpretation is also a reaction but more complex.
DeleteAnd an image of my mother, formed by electrical pattrens in my material mind,as a reaction to various encounters with her, is about my mother i the same way as wrinkles are about the rock, but of course much more complex.
The bottom line is that a materialist does not see "correspondence" or "aboutness" as something exceptionally special or spooky.
if you don't buy this, just read one of the countless books in which materialists account for intentionality. Dennett would be a good start.
Correspondence is nothing more than a reaction? As I mentioned, it's no wonder materialists reject the correspondence theory of truth in droves. A reaction is simply a response to stimuli. I don't see what that has to do with thinking, aboutness, or truth. By the way, I'm not spooked out by any immaterial account for these facts. Maybe that just tells us more about our psychological differences than anything else.
DeleteI'm familiar with Dennett and, like the other new atheists, I'd highly recommend reading folks like Graham Oppy and Quentin Smith instead, if not Thomas Nagel (in all fairness, Nagel holds to a view different than all of these atheistic philosophers).
I think this says it all: you don't see what that has to do with thinking, aboutness or truth and therefore it doesn't have anything to do with those things. Indeed this may tell us more about our psychological differences.
DeleteBTW, I am not a fan of Dennett's style, but he does know what he's talking about in the field of philosophy of the mind. Oppy and Smith seem much nicer.
You've already stated that objection, so it looks like we're once again at an impasse.
DeleteI'm not saying Dennett's an ignoramus or should be ignored. I just don't think his work even comes close to the atheists I've mentioned.