You're probably familiar with the small sect in Kansas led by Fred Phelps, Sr. It's the same group that protests the funerals of U.S. soldiers and openly declares that God hates homosexuals, and tops it off with a not-so-lovely pejorative term which I won't mention. My opinion is that this small group of individuals engage in their behavior for the attention it brings, and it alarms me that the responses to the Westboro Baptist church (WBC) have been mostly rhetorical, which plays right into their game. Instead of focusing solely on the "God is love" (true, but context is always needed) type of responses typical of the church's critics, I think it would be most beneficial to stop them in their tracks by addressing the passages they selectively cite.
The church claims that the misfortune of a child is the result of God's curse on the parent and child. I suppose the Westboro Baptist folks would have to say that Jacob, the recipient of God's eternal blessing, was also cursed, as evidenced by the rape of his daughter, Dinah (Gen. 34). The further notion that God has cursed those whose lives are ended abruptly is negated by the martyrdom of the disciples and the Biblical motif that, "we face death all day long; we are considered as sheep to be slaughtered" (Psalm 44:22). Is the murder of the righteous Uriah (2 Sam. 11) evidence of his condemnation? Hardly.
Most telling of all is that we are told that "the righteous perish" (Isaiah 57:1). The author of Ecclesiastes shares the experience of "the righteous perishing in their righteousness, and the wicked living long in their wickedness" (Eccl. 7:15). Sometimes good people die at a young age. That's the word of God speaking, and not what the Westboro people label as a lie.
The sect also cites Romans 9:13 in support of their claim that God hated Esau. What's striking about this is that Paul is clearly citing the OT prophet, Malachi, who provides the context of this passage. Let's first understand that Malachi begins by writing, "A prophecy: The word of the Lord to Israel through Malachi" (emphasis added). The nation of Israel is being addressed. Continuing, he prophesies, "'I have loved you, says the Lord.' But you ask, 'How have you loved us?' 'Was not Esau Jacob’s brother?' declares the Lord. 'Yet I have loved Jacob, but Esau I have hated, and I have turned his hill country into a wasteland and left his inheritance to the desert jackals'" (Mal. 1:1-4). The name of Esau is used to refer to the wicked acts of a nation, and not to Esau himself.
Let's also not forget the many blessings bestowed to Esau personally, despite his sin (Gen. 36). Moreover, the WBC seems to forget that the Semitic peoples (Israel included) often used hyperbole in their language. For every passage the WBC cites in support of their claim that God hates people, there are about a hundred that make it clear that God loves them, but merely disapproves of their behavior. After all, God does "not [will] for any to perish but for all to come to repentance" (2 Pet. 3:9) and "I take no pleasure in the death of anyone, declares the Sovereign Lord. Repent and live!" (Ezek. 18:32). This is made explicit by the Apostle Paul: "God demonstrates his own love for us in this: While we were still sinners, Christ died for us" (Rom. 5:8; emphasis added). John adds that Jesus "is the atoning sacrifice for our sins, and not only for ours but also for the sins of the whole world" (1 John 2:2).
The folks who comprise the WBC are under the impression that the antagonism they've been met with is evidence that they're doing God's work. They cite John 15:18-19, "If the world hates you, keep in mind that it hated me first. If you belonged to the world, it would love you as its own. As it is, you do not belong to the world, but I have chosen you out of the world. That is why the world hates you." The reasoning is demonstrably circular. The WBC claims they are right because the world hates them, but would they accept the notion that the Nazis were right because the world hated them? How many hated minority opinions are correct, despite the contradictions they pose one another?
It's been somewhat embarrassing for mainstream Christians, such as myself, to witness the lack of Biblical depth in most responses to the WBC. Instead of giving the sect what they want by getting angry and shouting profanities at these "funeral picketers," the calm demeanor of the Bible-believing Christian should direct us toward showing the WBC why they're so terribly mistaken on exegetical grounds.
Friday, January 4, 2013
Saturday, December 22, 2012
A Revised Version of the Third Way
Thanks to my friend, Walter, I've been able to alter the Third Way in such a manner that atheists might be more inclined to accept it. Here's the argument:
1. Something cannot come from nothing. (Premise)
2. Something presently exists. (Premise)
3. Hence, there was never a past time at which nothing existed. (From 1 and 2)
4. Either everything that exists is destructible, or else there exists at least one indestructible entity. (Premise)
5. The past is infinite. (Assumption)
6. Given infinite time, all potentialities will have been actualized. (Premise)
7. The concurrent non-existence of all destructible entities is a potentiality. (Premise)
8. Hence, there was a time in the past at which nothing destructible existed. (From 5 - 7)
9. Therefore, at least one indestructible entity exists. (From 3, 4 and 8)
1. Something cannot come from nothing. (Premise)
2. Something presently exists. (Premise)
3. Hence, there was never a past time at which nothing existed. (From 1 and 2)
4. Either everything that exists is destructible, or else there exists at least one indestructible entity. (Premise)
5. The past is infinite. (Assumption)
6. Given infinite time, all potentialities will have been actualized. (Premise)
7. The concurrent non-existence of all destructible entities is a potentiality. (Premise)
8. Hence, there was a time in the past at which nothing destructible existed. (From 5 - 7)
9. Therefore, at least one indestructible entity exists. (From 3, 4 and 8)
Thursday, December 20, 2012
Progress on the Book
As I've mentioned before, I'm currently writing a book entitled, Faith and Philosophy. I've revised to outline to look like this:
Section
One: Arguments in Support of God's Existence
Chapter One: The
Relationship Between Faith and Reason (five pages)
Chapter Two: The
Cosmological Argument (ten pages)
Chapter Three: The
Teleological Argument (ten pages)
Chapter Four: The
Conceptualist Argument (five pages)
Chapter Five: The
Ontological Argument (five pages)
Chapter Six: The Argument
from Desire (five pages)
Section
Two: Answering Atheism
Chapter Seven: Miscellaneous
Arguments (five pages)
Chapter Eight: The Argument
from Divine Hiddenness (five pages)
Chapter Nine: The Argument
from Suffering (ten pages)
Section
Three: Conclusion
Chapter Ten: A Cumulative
Case for God's Existence (five pages)
Total
pages: sixty-five
As I've said before, this is just an introductory text, which is why the chapters are so concise. With that being said, I feel I'm doing an adequate job presenting the arguments and defending them from the most common objections.
As of today, chapters two, three and four are complete. In the next two days, I'll be tackling the ontological argument and the argument from desire. Afterwards, I'll jump back to chapter one before critiquing the atheistic arguments. My hope is to write one chapter every day. Proof-reading and some polishing of the arguments will follow, but I hope to get this published relatively soon.
Sunday, December 16, 2012
Leibniz: With a Little Help From My Friends (Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas)
The Leibnizian cosmological argument (LCA) goes like this:
1. Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause. (Premise)
2. If the sum total of contingent entities C has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is a necessary, eternal and very powerful entity N. (Premise)
3. C exists. (Premise)
4. Hence, C has an explanation of its existence. (From 1 and 3)
5. Therefore, the explanation of C is N. (From 2 and 4)
Hume objects that once each member of a regress of causes is accounted for, then it is superfluous to ask for an explanation of the regress itself. Maybe there is an infinite regress of contingent entities, each causing the next. Thus, he rejects premise (2).*
Now, the traditional proponent of the LCA will point out, quite rightly I think, that the infinite regress (if one is even possible) itself is contingent. There didn't have to be any contingently existing entities, and so there did not have to be an infinite regress of contingent causes. Hume's proposed solution doesn't result in an explanation for the infinite regress.
Nevertheless, there's an additional argument at the disposal of Leibniz, and I'm surprised I never see it brought up in defenses of the LCA. What I'm talking about is the one-to-one correspondence between potentialities and an infinite regress. Thomas Aquinas sums it up quite nicely in the Third Way:
6. Something cannot come from nothing. (Premise)
7. Something presently exists. (Premise)
8. Either everything that exists is contingent, or else there exists at least one necessary entity. (Premise)
9. The past is infinite. (Assumption)
10. Given infinite time, all potentialities will have been actualized. (Premise)
11. The concurrent non-existence of all contingent entities is a potentiality. (Premise)
12. Hence, there was a time in the past at which nothing contingent existed. (From 9 - 11)
13. Therefore, at least one necessary entity exists. (Implied by 6, 8 and 12)
In short, since there was a time in the past at which nothing contingent existed, it is either the case that something necessary existed at that time (and therefore must exist at all times) or that nothing at all existed. The problem with the latter is premise (6) of the argument. If there were ever a past time at which nothing existed, then nothing would exist even now, for being cannot arise from non-being. Given that something presently exists, it follows that at least one necessary entity exists.
As a result, Hume's objection is further weakened. There are good reasons to believe the infinite regress he speaks of is itself contingent, and secondly, even if it isn't contingent, there would still have been a past time at which nothing contingent existed. Either way, there's no escaping the conclusion that N exists.
*Hume sort of rejects (1) as well, but also accepts it as an indispensable element of human thought.
1. Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause. (Premise)
2. If the sum total of contingent entities C has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is a necessary, eternal and very powerful entity N. (Premise)
3. C exists. (Premise)
4. Hence, C has an explanation of its existence. (From 1 and 3)
5. Therefore, the explanation of C is N. (From 2 and 4)
Hume objects that once each member of a regress of causes is accounted for, then it is superfluous to ask for an explanation of the regress itself. Maybe there is an infinite regress of contingent entities, each causing the next. Thus, he rejects premise (2).*
Now, the traditional proponent of the LCA will point out, quite rightly I think, that the infinite regress (if one is even possible) itself is contingent. There didn't have to be any contingently existing entities, and so there did not have to be an infinite regress of contingent causes. Hume's proposed solution doesn't result in an explanation for the infinite regress.
Nevertheless, there's an additional argument at the disposal of Leibniz, and I'm surprised I never see it brought up in defenses of the LCA. What I'm talking about is the one-to-one correspondence between potentialities and an infinite regress. Thomas Aquinas sums it up quite nicely in the Third Way:
6. Something cannot come from nothing. (Premise)
7. Something presently exists. (Premise)
8. Either everything that exists is contingent, or else there exists at least one necessary entity. (Premise)
9. The past is infinite. (Assumption)
10. Given infinite time, all potentialities will have been actualized. (Premise)
11. The concurrent non-existence of all contingent entities is a potentiality. (Premise)
12. Hence, there was a time in the past at which nothing contingent existed. (From 9 - 11)
13. Therefore, at least one necessary entity exists. (Implied by 6, 8 and 12)
In short, since there was a time in the past at which nothing contingent existed, it is either the case that something necessary existed at that time (and therefore must exist at all times) or that nothing at all existed. The problem with the latter is premise (6) of the argument. If there were ever a past time at which nothing existed, then nothing would exist even now, for being cannot arise from non-being. Given that something presently exists, it follows that at least one necessary entity exists.
As a result, Hume's objection is further weakened. There are good reasons to believe the infinite regress he speaks of is itself contingent, and secondly, even if it isn't contingent, there would still have been a past time at which nothing contingent existed. Either way, there's no escaping the conclusion that N exists.
*Hume sort of rejects (1) as well, but also accepts it as an indispensable element of human thought.
Saturday, December 15, 2012
More on Ontological Nihilism
This argument occurred to me today as I was thinking about my previous post. A lot of us are familiar with the S5 axiom stated as, "if possibly necessarily p, then necessarily p." However, another aspect of S5 is this: "if possibly p, then necessarily possibly p."
Let's take w1, then, where purportedly nothing at all exists, not even possibility. Considering some other possible world w2, where at least one concrete object X exists, it follows that: if possibly X, then necessarily possibly X. Now, since whatever is necessary applies to all possible worlds, the possibility of X must obtain in w1. Taking this one step further, we can apply a rather benign causal principle to the argument: if possibly X in w1, then necessarily something concrete exists in w1. This is because nothing concrete can come into being apart from some other concrete being. If X doesn't come into being, then X exists by itself in w1. Thus the feasibility of ontological nihilism is defeated.
Let's take w1, then, where purportedly nothing at all exists, not even possibility. Considering some other possible world w2, where at least one concrete object X exists, it follows that: if possibly X, then necessarily possibly X. Now, since whatever is necessary applies to all possible worlds, the possibility of X must obtain in w1. Taking this one step further, we can apply a rather benign causal principle to the argument: if possibly X in w1, then necessarily something concrete exists in w1. This is because nothing concrete can come into being apart from some other concrete being. If X doesn't come into being, then X exists by itself in w1. Thus the feasibility of ontological nihilism is defeated.
Wednesday, December 12, 2012
A Minimal Ontological Argument Without S5
1. Necessarily, everything that exists is either contingent or necessary. (Definition)
2. Necessarily, something exists. (Premise)
3. Possibly, nothing contingent exists. (Premise)
4. Therefore, something necessary exists. (From 1 - 3)
Reductio ad absurdum:
5. Nothing necessary does exists. (Assumption)
6. Necessarily, if nothing necessary exists, then it's possible for nothing to exist. (From 1 and 3)
7. (6) contradicts (2).
8. Therefore, (5) is false and something necessary exists.
Q.E.D.
The argument is logically airtight. If the premises are true, then there's no escaping the conclusion. Premises (1) and (3) are either true by definition or true on any realistic account of ontology. The key premise is (2). Is it necessarily the case that something exists? One could certainly defend cosmological arguments and the PSR, but I'd like to see another type of argument. Can it be shown that "possibly, nothing exists" (possibility of ontological nihilism) is contradictory or absurd?
2. Necessarily, something exists. (Premise)
3. Possibly, nothing contingent exists. (Premise)
4. Therefore, something necessary exists. (From 1 - 3)
Reductio ad absurdum:
5. Nothing necessary does exists. (Assumption)
6. Necessarily, if nothing necessary exists, then it's possible for nothing to exist. (From 1 and 3)
7. (6) contradicts (2).
8. Therefore, (5) is false and something necessary exists.
Q.E.D.
The argument is logically airtight. If the premises are true, then there's no escaping the conclusion. Premises (1) and (3) are either true by definition or true on any realistic account of ontology. The key premise is (2). Is it necessarily the case that something exists? One could certainly defend cosmological arguments and the PSR, but I'd like to see another type of argument. Can it be shown that "possibly, nothing exists" (possibility of ontological nihilism) is contradictory or absurd?
Sunday, December 2, 2012
The Argument from Gradation
As a self-described Aristotelian-Thomist, I admit that the argument from gradation (the "Fourth Way") gives me the most difficulty. I don't understand the manner in which Thomas derives his conclusion in the Summa Theologica. However, the Summa Contra Gentiles has made the proof much easier for me to understand, even though I still have questions about it. Here's how I would roughly summarize it:
3. Therefore, there exists a Supreme Truth. (From 1 and 2)
In support of (1), I'm reminded of C.S. Lewis's famous analogy: one cannot know a line is crooked without having some idea of what a straight line looks like.
3. Therefore, there exists a Supreme Truth. (From 1 and 2)
In support of (1), I'm reminded of C.S. Lewis's famous analogy: one cannot know a line is crooked without having some idea of what a straight line looks like.
Premise (2) should be obvious to anyone who doesn't claim omniscience. Based on these two premises, (3) necessarily follows. However, what's the significance of stating there exists a Supreme Truth? As far as I can tell, propositional truth is an abstract object, but no classical theist equates God with a mere abstraction.
One solution to this problem is to postulate that abstract objects, such as truth, exist as mental concepts, as opposed to mind-independent realities (the latter of which Plato held, whereas St. Augustine postulated the former). If conceptualism is true, then the Supreme Truth, which includes necessary and contingent truths, would have to be the concept of a necessary and omniscient mind, e.g. God.
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