I once asked my Ethical Theory professor (great class by the way): are virtue ethics and the categorical imperative really contradictory, or are they just different? He said they were, in fact, contradictory, but I remain skeptical.
A contradiction is not between A and B, but between A and ~A. Let's take an example of virtue ethics and see how a Kantian might respond. In virtue ethics, the golden mean between cowardice and rashness is bravery. Bravery is exhibited when the risk carries a consequence whose benefits outweigh the costs. For example, going into a burning house when there are people inside, and the house is not imminently at risk of collapsing. Cowardice would be standing by and doing nothing. Rashness would be going in even though there's no chance of the "hero" or anyone else escaping.
According to the categorical imperative (which is really just a fancy way of describing the Golden Rule: do unto others as you would have them do unto you), only those actions should be taken if they can be universalized. Is it not the case that the right thing to do according to the categorical imperative is the exact same action suggested by virtue ethics?
I'm not saying there are no incompatibilities between the two ethical theories. Nevertheless, I think the similarities greatly outnumber the incompatibilities.
Monday, January 28, 2013
Sunday, January 27, 2013
Order, Chaos and Taoism
As a devout Christian, I have to admit I see the appeal of Taoism. Taoism stresses opposites: male and female, hot and cold, good and evil, order and chaos. As a Christian, however, I don't agree that chaos is just as prevalent as order. After all, chaos is intelligible. Since intelligibility presupposes order, it follows that there is order behind allegedly chaotic events. It's not as if chaotic events are intelligible, and then suddenly unintelligible. Moreover, it's not as if "chaotic" events violate the laws of logic.
Order, therefore, appears more fundamental to reality than chaos. They're not equally eternal, so-to-speak, as Taoism teaches. Chaos is subordinate to order, which is just one reason I could never be a Taoist. As a Christian, I believe that the universe exhibits order because God created the universe, and the universe exhibits the order that God has imbued it with.
Order, therefore, appears more fundamental to reality than chaos. They're not equally eternal, so-to-speak, as Taoism teaches. Chaos is subordinate to order, which is just one reason I could never be a Taoist. As a Christian, I believe that the universe exhibits order because God created the universe, and the universe exhibits the order that God has imbued it with.
Some Inchoate Thoughts on the Fine-tuning Argument and Other Teleological Arguments
1. The fine-tuning of the universe's initial conditions is either the result of chance, necessity or design. (Premise)
2. It is not due to chance or necessity. (Premise)
3. Therefore, it is due to design. (From 1 and 2)
Surely this argument is rationally acceptable. Other philosophers, such as Robin Collins, maintain that this is a rationally compelling argument, but I won't get into the science of the argument. I'm simply not qualified as a philosopher and theologian to enter into a scientific debate. Nevertheless, neither premises (1) or (2) are obviously false. In fact, (1) is appears to be obviously true, barring any additional (and currently unknown) alternative.
I prefer the argument from order:
4. Whatever exhibits regularity is not the result of chance alone. (Premise)
5. The laws of nature exhibit regularity. (Premise)
6. Therefore, the laws of nature are not the result of chance alone. (From 4 and 5)
(6) leaves the possibility of nature's regularity being the result of necessity or design as an open question. I'm happy to leave this as an open question. In fact, the theist may use the argument from order as one part of a cumulative case for God's existence. One might combine the argument with the argument from reason, for example.
2. It is not due to chance or necessity. (Premise)
3. Therefore, it is due to design. (From 1 and 2)
Surely this argument is rationally acceptable. Other philosophers, such as Robin Collins, maintain that this is a rationally compelling argument, but I won't get into the science of the argument. I'm simply not qualified as a philosopher and theologian to enter into a scientific debate. Nevertheless, neither premises (1) or (2) are obviously false. In fact, (1) is appears to be obviously true, barring any additional (and currently unknown) alternative.
I prefer the argument from order:
4. Whatever exhibits regularity is not the result of chance alone. (Premise)
5. The laws of nature exhibit regularity. (Premise)
6. Therefore, the laws of nature are not the result of chance alone. (From 4 and 5)
(6) leaves the possibility of nature's regularity being the result of necessity or design as an open question. I'm happy to leave this as an open question. In fact, the theist may use the argument from order as one part of a cumulative case for God's existence. One might combine the argument with the argument from reason, for example.
Saturday, January 26, 2013
Common ground between theists and atheists?
In the past, I've defended arguments for the existence of an incorruptible and eternal entity. While not all atheists are averse to accepting this conclusion, I have to wonder why so many (not all, and not necessarily most) atheists find the conclusion unacceptable. Is it because the conclusion is too God-like? Here's the Modal Third Way (MTW) once again. Why would any atheist find the argument so unpalatable?
1. Something cannot come from nothing. (Premise)
2. Something presently exists. (Premise)
3. Hence, there was never a past time at which nothing existed. (From 1 and 2)
4. Either everything that exists is destructible, or else there exists at least one indestructible entity. (Premise)
5. Possibly, there was a past time at which nothing destructible existed. (Premise)
6. Therefore, at least one indestructible entity N exists. (Implied by 3, 4 and 5)
Reductio ad absurdum:
7. Nothing indestructible exists. (Assumption)
8. If nothing indestructible exists, then there was possibly a past time at which nothing existed. (From 5 and 7)
9. (8) contradicts (3).
10. Therefore, (7) is false and at least one indestructible entity N exists. (Implied by 9)
Obviously, more argumentation is needed in order to show that N is God, but why do so many atheists have strong reservations about affirming the argument? Each of the argument's premises appears to be compellingly true.
1. Something cannot come from nothing. (Premise)
2. Something presently exists. (Premise)
3. Hence, there was never a past time at which nothing existed. (From 1 and 2)
4. Either everything that exists is destructible, or else there exists at least one indestructible entity. (Premise)
5. Possibly, there was a past time at which nothing destructible existed. (Premise)
6. Therefore, at least one indestructible entity N exists. (Implied by 3, 4 and 5)
Reductio ad absurdum:
7. Nothing indestructible exists. (Assumption)
8. If nothing indestructible exists, then there was possibly a past time at which nothing existed. (From 5 and 7)
9. (8) contradicts (3).
10. Therefore, (7) is false and at least one indestructible entity N exists. (Implied by 9)
Obviously, more argumentation is needed in order to show that N is God, but why do so many atheists have strong reservations about affirming the argument? Each of the argument's premises appears to be compellingly true.
A New Take on the Modal Cosmological Argument
The modal cosmological argument (MCA) has numerous variations. Here's one I'm currently working on, which makes use of a weakened Principle of Sufficient Reason (W-PSR). First, it's important to understand some key terms:
contingent: x is contingent if and only if x possibly exists and x possibly does not-exist.
Examples: trees, mountains, animals
necessary: y is necessary if and only if y exists and cannot not-exist.
Examples: God, abstract objects
universe: sum total of all physical space, time, matter and energy.
1. Possibly, everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause. (Premise, W-PSR)
2. Possibly, the universe as a whole does not exist. (Premise)
3. Hence, the universe is contingent. (Implied by 1 and 2)
4. Possibly, the universe has an external cause. (From 1 and 3)
5. Necessarily, if the universe has an external cause, that cause is a timeless, changeless, immaterial and very powerful entity, e.g. God. (Premise)
6. Possibly, God exists. (From 4 and 5)
7. Hence, God possibly has an explanation. (From 1 and 6)
8. Necessarily, something timeless and changeless cannot have an external cause. (Premise)
9. Hence, God is explained by a necessity of his own nature. (From 1, 7 and 8)
10. Therefore, God exists. (Implied by 9)
contingent: x is contingent if and only if x possibly exists and x possibly does not-exist.
Examples: trees, mountains, animals
necessary: y is necessary if and only if y exists and cannot not-exist.
Examples: God, abstract objects
universe: sum total of all physical space, time, matter and energy.
1. Possibly, everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause. (Premise, W-PSR)
2. Possibly, the universe as a whole does not exist. (Premise)
3. Hence, the universe is contingent. (Implied by 1 and 2)
4. Possibly, the universe has an external cause. (From 1 and 3)
5. Necessarily, if the universe has an external cause, that cause is a timeless, changeless, immaterial and very powerful entity, e.g. God. (Premise)
6. Possibly, God exists. (From 4 and 5)
7. Hence, God possibly has an explanation. (From 1 and 6)
8. Necessarily, something timeless and changeless cannot have an external cause. (Premise)
9. Hence, God is explained by a necessity of his own nature. (From 1, 7 and 8)
10. Therefore, God exists. (Implied by 9)
Monday, January 14, 2013
Does God know what time it is?
Craig and Moreland offer this argument against divine timelessness:
1. God is timeless. (Assumption)
2. God is omniscient. (Premise)
3. If God is omniscient, he would know what time it is now. (Premise)
4. Necessarily, knowing what time it is now constitutes a change in God. (Premise)
5. Therefore, God is not timeless. (From 2 - 4)
To their credit, Craig and Moreland acknowledge that their argument presupposes an A-theory of time. If the theist adopts a B-theory, at which all moments of time - past, present and future - exist simultaneously, the theist can affirm both God's timelessness and his omniscience. Craig and Moreland go on to argue that an A-theory of time is preferable to a B-theory. However, they don't offer any proof that an A-theory is true, and as Craig admits in Time and Eternity, there are good reasons to accept a B-theory. He even concedes that, "the static [B-theory] understanding of time is accepted almost unquestioningly by many physicists and by a good many reflective philosophers as well." (William Lane Craig, Time and Eternity: Exploring God's Relationship to Time, Crossway Books, 2001, p. 167.)
Earlier Craig admits that at least one argument in favor of divine timelessness, "does have some force and so needs to be weighed against whatever arguments can be offered on behalf of divine temporality." (ibid, p. 74.)
My constructive criticism of Craig and Moreland does not in any way detract the admiration I have for both of them. After all, as a self-proclaimed Aristotelian-Thomist, there are philosophical matters in which I disagree with them, as well.
1. God is timeless. (Assumption)
2. God is omniscient. (Premise)
3. If God is omniscient, he would know what time it is now. (Premise)
4. Necessarily, knowing what time it is now constitutes a change in God. (Premise)
5. Therefore, God is not timeless. (From 2 - 4)
To their credit, Craig and Moreland acknowledge that their argument presupposes an A-theory of time. If the theist adopts a B-theory, at which all moments of time - past, present and future - exist simultaneously, the theist can affirm both God's timelessness and his omniscience. Craig and Moreland go on to argue that an A-theory of time is preferable to a B-theory. However, they don't offer any proof that an A-theory is true, and as Craig admits in Time and Eternity, there are good reasons to accept a B-theory. He even concedes that, "the static [B-theory] understanding of time is accepted almost unquestioningly by many physicists and by a good many reflective philosophers as well." (William Lane Craig, Time and Eternity: Exploring God's Relationship to Time, Crossway Books, 2001, p. 167.)
Earlier Craig admits that at least one argument in favor of divine timelessness, "does have some force and so needs to be weighed against whatever arguments can be offered on behalf of divine temporality." (ibid, p. 74.)
My constructive criticism of Craig and Moreland does not in any way detract the admiration I have for both of them. After all, as a self-proclaimed Aristotelian-Thomist, there are philosophical matters in which I disagree with them, as well.
Thursday, January 10, 2013
The Rational Acceptability of the Design Argument
The minimalist teleological argument I like to defend goes like this:
1. Whatever exhibits regularity is not the result of chance alone. (Premise)
2. The laws of nature exhibit regularity. (Premise)
3. Therefore, the laws of nature are not the result of chance alone. (From 1 and 2)
This is such a straightforward argument and its strength lies in its highly intuitively true premises. The observation that there are laws of nature is proof enough that they are the result of someone's or something's providence. Theists and pantheists alike call this someone or something, "God." Of course, as a theist, I hold that the laws of nature are the result of someone's providence, e.g. design.
Let's ask ourselves: is this belief at least rationally acceptable? In other words, is it positively irrational to believe that the laws of nature are the result of design? It's difficult to see how such a belief could be irrational. First, take the proposition, "it is necessarily the case that the laws of nature are not the result of design." Is there any forthcoming argument in support of this? If there's not, then it's at least possible for the laws of nature to have been designed. If this is so, then we have a potential cosmo-teleological argument for God's existence.
4. Possibly, everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause. (Premise; W-PSR)
5. If the laws of nature are designed, that designer must be timeless, changeless, immaterial, very powerful and very intelligent. (Premise)
6. Possibly, the laws of nature are designed. (Premise)
7. Possibly, a timeless, changeless, immaterial, very powerful and very intelligent designer exists. (From 5 and 6)
8. Necessarily, a possible designer will either exist by a necessity of its own nature or in an external cause. (Implied by 4)
9. Necessarily, a timeless and changeless designer cannot have an external cause. (Premise)
10. Therefore, a designer exists by a necessity of its own nature. (From 4, 7 and 9)
To be honest, I think this is a rationally compelling argument. However, I'm willing to grant for the sake of argument that not each of the argument's premises is rationally compelling. Hence, I'm arguing instead for the rational acceptability of the argument. That is indeed one of the primary objectives of natural theology, and I think the argument is successful in showing that theism proper is, at the bare minimal, rationally acceptable.
1. Whatever exhibits regularity is not the result of chance alone. (Premise)
2. The laws of nature exhibit regularity. (Premise)
3. Therefore, the laws of nature are not the result of chance alone. (From 1 and 2)
This is such a straightforward argument and its strength lies in its highly intuitively true premises. The observation that there are laws of nature is proof enough that they are the result of someone's or something's providence. Theists and pantheists alike call this someone or something, "God." Of course, as a theist, I hold that the laws of nature are the result of someone's providence, e.g. design.
Let's ask ourselves: is this belief at least rationally acceptable? In other words, is it positively irrational to believe that the laws of nature are the result of design? It's difficult to see how such a belief could be irrational. First, take the proposition, "it is necessarily the case that the laws of nature are not the result of design." Is there any forthcoming argument in support of this? If there's not, then it's at least possible for the laws of nature to have been designed. If this is so, then we have a potential cosmo-teleological argument for God's existence.
4. Possibly, everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause. (Premise; W-PSR)
5. If the laws of nature are designed, that designer must be timeless, changeless, immaterial, very powerful and very intelligent. (Premise)
6. Possibly, the laws of nature are designed. (Premise)
7. Possibly, a timeless, changeless, immaterial, very powerful and very intelligent designer exists. (From 5 and 6)
8. Necessarily, a possible designer will either exist by a necessity of its own nature or in an external cause. (Implied by 4)
9. Necessarily, a timeless and changeless designer cannot have an external cause. (Premise)
10. Therefore, a designer exists by a necessity of its own nature. (From 4, 7 and 9)
To be honest, I think this is a rationally compelling argument. However, I'm willing to grant for the sake of argument that not each of the argument's premises is rationally compelling. Hence, I'm arguing instead for the rational acceptability of the argument. That is indeed one of the primary objectives of natural theology, and I think the argument is successful in showing that theism proper is, at the bare minimal, rationally acceptable.
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