1. Possibly, everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause. (Premise, W-PSR)
2. If the sum total of contingent entities C has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is a necessary cause. (Implied by 1)
3. C exists. (Premise)
4. Hence, C possibly has an explanation of its existence. (From 1 and 3)
5. Possibly, a necessary cause of C exists. (From 2 and 4)
6. Therefore, a necessary cause exists. (From 5 and S5)
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Is it possible for a contingent entity to have an explanation of its existence in the necessity of its own nature?
ReplyDeleteGood stuff. It strikes me that premiss 2, while defensible, would need to be either reworded or have some additional justification present, since it may be attacked as a fallacy of composition. I don't think it is, but I think that it may be over-simplified. But then, this is probably just a shorthand of the argument, and I may be being overly pedantic. :) I seem to recall Bill Vallicella successfully arguing from each element in a set being contingent to the set itself being contingent without assuming it as a matter of course.
ReplyDeleteOn a side note, have you ever thought of doing an analysis of some of Kenney's objections to the Five Ways?
FZ, I don't think so. If a contingent thing existed by a necessity of its own nature, then it would be non-contingent by definition. "Contingent" here isn't synonymous with "dependent," but refers to the possibility of existing and the possibility of not existing.
ReplyDeleteSyllabus, that's an important and longstanding objection, so I don't think it's pedantic. As William Rowe (an atheistic philosopher) points out, C is an instance in which the whole really is like its parts, just like a whole mountain must be made of rock if its parts are made of rock. After all, nothing contingent has to exist. If every part of a mountain failed to exist, then the mountain as a whole would fail to exist. I think the same is true of C.
ReplyDeleteI'd love to someday write a series of replies to Kenny. First I'd like to finish my response to Michael Martin! Haha
What about the virtual particle objection? For example, in the Casimir effect: Virtual particles come into being for a ridiculously short period of time, but just long enough to have a measureable effect. Though I don't think that the particles actually appear ex nihilo, it seems to observers that they appear uncaused. Wouldn't this be an example of a contingent "thing" coming into existence without a cause? (Of course, maybe we just haven't discovered the cause or explanation; to simply give up at this point would be to commit the taxicab fallacy.)
ReplyDeleteOne of the things I like about this argument is that it doesn't require every contingent thing to be actually caused. It merely postulates that every contingent thing is possibly caused.
ReplyDeleteHi Doug, quick question. Must a necessary concrete thing be immutable? Or can it change?
ReplyDeleteI'd argue that God is the only necessary concrete entity, and would further stipulate that God is immutable. However, I think your question has to do with whether necessity entails immutability. One could argue that it does, especially if one adopts the classical distinction between being and essence. A necessary entity N's being and essence are identical, since it is the kind of thing that exists because it has in its essence the impossibility of not-existing. (That's a very rough summary.)
ReplyDeleteThis, in turn, means that N is being itself subsisting. Now to change is to have a thing's essence changed. But, any change from being is non-being, which would imply that if N can change, then N possibly fails to exist. This is impossible, so N must be immutable.
That's just one way of approaching your very good question. :)
Thanks for the reply. I guess there may be a way to work out a counter-argument against those who claim that space, time and particles/energy are necessary concrete things. (As people sometimes do in response to arguments from contingency.) I'm not a physicist, but it seems obvious to me that particles can change (into energy)and that energy can change (into particles). Space can be said to "expand" such as the expansion of our universe. Occupying some volume X at time 1 and occupying some volume Y at time 2 seems like a change. And lastly (if my understanding is correct), time can be affected by external factors as well, like the effects of motion and gravity on time.
ReplyDeleteThey certainly could claim that the universe (or the most fundamental particles of the universe) are necessary entities. That would be consistent with the argument. However, if my suggestion is correct that there can be only one necessary entity, it's difficult to see how the universe could satisfy that criterion. Plus, as you mention, the most fundamental particles of the universe change in location and in essence.
ReplyDelete