Saturday, January 26, 2013

A New Take on the Modal Cosmological Argument

The modal cosmological argument (MCA) has numerous variations.  Here's one I'm currently working on, which makes use of a weakened Principle of Sufficient Reason (W-PSR).  First, it's important to understand some key terms:

contingent: x is contingent if and only if x possibly exists and x possibly does not-exist.
Examples: trees, mountains, animals

necessary: y is necessary if and only if y exists and cannot not-exist.
Examples: God, abstract objects

universe: sum total of all physical space, time, matter and energy.

1. Possibly, everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause. (Premise, W-PSR)

2. Possibly, the universe as a whole does not exist. (Premise)

3. Hence, the universe is contingent. (Implied by 1 and 2)

4. Possibly, the universe has an external cause. (From 1 and 3)

5. Necessarily, if the universe has an external cause, that cause is a timeless, changeless, immaterial and very powerful entity, e.g. God. (Premise)

6. Possibly, God exists. (From 4 and 5)

7. Hence, God possibly has an explanation. (From 1 and 6)

8. Necessarily, something timeless and changeless cannot have an external cause. (Premise)

9. Hence, God is explained by a necessity of his own nature. (From 1, 7 and 8)

10. Therefore, God exists. (Implied by 9)

32 comments:

  1. First of all, if someone does not accept the full PSR, then that same person cannot accept the W-PSR either.
    I have no idea e.g. whether premise 1 is true or false, so the argument already stops there for me.
    Secondly premise 5 is a non-sequitur. All that follows from your definition of the universe is that its alleged cause must be timeless and immaterial. "Changeless" and "very powerful" do not follow at all.
    8 does not follow either.
    And 9 should say "God is possibly explained by a necessity of his own nature."

    One piece of advice, Doug. Modal arguments cannot serve as proof for something their non-modal versions cannot prove. If you cannot prove something by non-modal means, then modality is quite useless, although it is often abused to make very weak argument seem much more impressive. That's what Plantinga does, e.g., and really if you want to find common grounds with atheists, you shouldn't go down that path. It really poisons the wells way too much.

    Walter

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  2. This version of the W-PSR does not entail the PSR. You have in mind the W-PSR of Gale and Pruss.

    Time is a measurement of change, so if something is timeless it must also be changeless. And, in order to cause something as vast as the universe, it must be very powerful. The universe as a whole is very powerful, after all.

    That God is possibly explained by a necessity of his own nature is sufficient enough, since whatever is possibly necessary is necessary.

    Your last comment is (to borrow a quote from Big Lebowski), "like, your opinion, man. ;)

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  3. In any case, the only intellectually honest answers I could give to premise 1 is, "I don"t know". If I say premsie one is true, I accept the PSR. If I say its not true, I claim something I cannot prove.
    Something that is timeless is also changeless, but you are using chnagless here to sneak in the immutability of God. If that's not your intention, you do not need changeless.

    As for the last comment being an opinion. That modality cannot be used to prove something non-modal arguments can"t is a fact, not an opinion. Modality is a way to clarify things and should be used that way. It should not be abused for apologetic purposes.

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  4. Why do you have to accept the PSR by accepting the W-PSR? I'm not sneaking anything in, by the way. That God is changeless necessarily follows from his transcending time. Call it immutability if you want. I use the terms interchangeably.

    I hardly see how your last comment is a fact. Modal arguments are used to accommodate those who are skeptical of traditional arguments. There's absolutely no abuse going on.

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  5. Because if i don't accept the PSR, I cannot accept (1). It's really as simple as that. And the terms 'changeless' and 'immutable' are not interchangeable, at least not without further argument, which you do not have here.

    And modal arguments cannot possibly satisfy those who are skeptical of traditonal arguments. Someone who is skeptical of traditional arguments should be equally skeptical of modal arguments. I am equally skeptical of this Modal cosmological argument as I am of every traditional cosmological argument, and I am not accepting the modal version, because I simply lack the knowledge to do so.
    As I said, the only I can say about (1) is that I do not know. Which also makes the conclusion unknowable.

    BTW I am not accusing you of abuse, but I am accusing Plantinga of abusing modal logic to give the false impression he has proved anything at all. He hasn't, and what's worse: he knows it. It's that kind of intellectual dishonesty that poisons the well and makes genuine discussions between atheists and theists impossible.

    Walter

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  6. I think you should read what Plantinga actually says about his modal ontological argument. From God, Freedom, and Evil: [W]e must be careful; we must ask ourselves whether this argument proves the existence of God. And the answer must be, I think, that it does not. An argument for God's existence may be sound, after all, without any useful sense in proving God's existence. . . . [N]o one who didn't already accept the conclusion, would accept the first premise. . . . What I claim for this argument, therefore, is that it establishes, not the truth of theism, but its rational acceptability."

    Given that something is timeless, it cannot change (immutability), since time is a measurement of change. That's just analytically true. Finally, you haven't given any reason to suppose that my version of the W-PSR entails the PSR.

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  7. Plantinga almost literarilly syas what I have been saying all along: Planatinga knows his argument does not prove God. and yet he still uses it to make his case for God look more impressive. That's intellectual dishosety to me.

    As for your argument: since I do not accept the PSR, I do not accept premise 1. The only thing I would accept about premise 1 is that maybe everything has an explanatio and maybe not everything has an explanation. Without the PSR, that's the only possible conclusion I can draw from premise 1. But with this modified premsie, your argument does not work anymore.

    Walter

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  8. Just one thing. Given that something is timeless , it cannot change is not true, not analytically and not otherwise. If something chnages it enters time, but if it does not change, it remains timeless. That's the only thing that can be said about timelessness. Timeless is unchanging, but it does not mean unchangeable.

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  9. Plantinga's not being intellectual dishonest. He openly admits it's not a proof of God's existence. I can't imagine why you would persist in calling him intellectual dishonest. You haven't explained why my W-PSR entails the PSR, so I'm still waiting for an argument that it does.

    A thing's being timeless means that there is no measurement of change. Hence, it does entail immutability. Only if God is timeless sans creation, but enters into time at the moment of creation, does he become temporal.

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  10. I don't accept your premise one, and I am rationally justified not accepting it because I do not accept the PSR. So, is it possible that everything that exists has an explanation of its existence? The only way for it to be possible is if the PSR is true. Since I do not know that, I cannot answer the question with absolute certainty but I think it is extremely unlikey that premise one is true.

    As for Plantinga. Since he is not stupid, the only reason I can think of why he would present an argument that he himself knows does not work as an ontological argument for God is to deliberately give the false impression that he has something substantial to add to the debate. This kind of behaviour poisons the well, and as long as there are theists defending these tactics, there can be no true debate between atheists and theists.

    As for timelessness versus immutability, your last paragraph proves you are wrong. If God is timeless sans creation and can become temporal, he is timeless and NOT immutable. So timelessness does not entail immutability. You simply cannot just assert things here.

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  11. You've continued to say that the W-PSR entails the PSR, but have offered no justification for this.

    I'm really surprised to hear you say that about Plantinga. He makes his intentions very clear - namely, that he defends the ontological argument as rationally acceptable. That is most certainly an addition to the debate. There's no bad behavior going on.

    Lastly, even if God enters into time, that doesn't mean he can have an external cause. If God was timeless sans creation, the only explanation he could have had was his own necessity. Therefore, the argument works even granting that God became temporal.

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  12. If I do not think the PSR is true, what reason do I have to accept premise 1? None that I can think of. If can give me such a reason, your premise 1 stands, if not, it fails.

    As to Plantinga, if the traditional OA is rationally acceptable, then Plantinga's OA is also rationally acceptable. So, Plantinga's argument does not add anything at all to the debate. And if he claims it does, his intention is not honest. Plantinga is way too smart to make such mistakes. I personally do not mind, because I can see through his tactics. Unfortunately lots of people are fooled by Plantinga's argument, or by other modal arguments.

    I was claiming that your premise that the cause of the universe is immutable is a non-sequitur. And that clearly is true.. So, if you really value your argument, you should modify your 5th premise. The argument as it is now isn't valid. And the "e.g. God" is, to say the least, premature.
    So you are left with a timeless entity. Now why is it impossible for something timeless to have a external cause?

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  13. I'll reiterate once more that if X if timeless, then X must be changeless. Time is a measurement of change. You have yet to respond to that. Premise (5) doesn't entail immutability, even though I believe God is immutable for independent reasons. A timeless (and therefore changeless) entity cannot have an external cause because that would entail a time at which it didn't exist and then came into existence. That's a contradiction.

    Have you read Plantinga? I ask because your comments are inappropriate. His work on the ontological argument does constitute a significant addition to the argument's literature. Anselm wasn't aware of modal logic, so what Plantinga did was transform the argument to make it logically valid.

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  14. You claim that "given that something is timeless, it cannot change (immutability), ", so in premise 5, by "chnagless" tou mean immutable, and that's a non-sequitur.
    Moreover, that something having an external cause means there was a time at which it didn't exist is a very interesting idea that, if true, would mean that God cannot have caused anything. Fortunately for your sake, this idea hasn't been proven correct.

    As for Plantinga, yes I have read him and he has several challenging arguments. That why I feel so strongly about his MOA, which indeed has made a contribution to the argument's literature, at the cost of thorough discussion about really important things.

    I also see you haven't answered my question yet.

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  15. The question I didn't answer was due to the fact that you never answered mine. Why do you believe the W-PSR entails the PSR?

    God's immutability is my own personal belief, but it's independent of the argument. I admit I didn't make that very clear. And, how exactly does God's being timeless mean that he couldn't have caused anything? You're offering a lot of assertions, but no arguments to back them up.

    So, you don't believe the ontological argument is important. Okay, that's fine, but it's also just your opinion.

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  16. I did anwer you question. I said "So, is it possible that everything that exists has an explanation of its existence? The only way for it to be possible is if the PSR is true. Since I do not know that, I cannot answer the question with absolute certainty but I think it is extremely unlikely that premise one is true. "
    I do not see any other reason than the PSR to conclude that it is possible that everythinjg that exists has an explanation. Now, maybe I am overlooking something, and that's why I ask you to give an answer that does not entail the PSR. That should be easy to do, but the fact that you haven't done so already, suggests I am right. If I am not, just show me.

    And God's being timeless does not mean he couldn't have caused anything. That would follow from your claim that "a timeless (and therefore changeless) entity cannot have an external cause because that would entail a time at which it didn't exist and then came into existence. That's a contradiction." That would mean that if the universe were caused (by God e.g;) there would have been a time at which the universe did not exist. But since you have defined the universe as sum total of all physical space, time, matter and energy, that would be a contradiction. So, contrary to what you claim, the fact that something has an external cause does not entail there was a time at which it didn't exist.
    Hence, you'll have to find another argument for why a timeless entity cannot have an external cause.

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  17. That's not an answer to the question. You're merely presupposes that the W-PSR entails the PSR, and I'm asking you to justify this claim. If you can't, just say so. The burden of proof is not on me to show that they're different, but on you to show they're the same. I'm still waiting for an answer.

    The fact that it's contradictory for there to be a time at which a timeless entity does not exist actually proves my point, as opposed to proving yours. I'm really surprised we're debating this point.

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  18. Sorry, Doug, if you can just assert premise 1, I can just assert premise 1 is false. But I don't. I am telling you! in all honesty that I cannot see how anyone can confirm premise 1 without believing the PSR. That's not an assertion. So, the burden is on you to explain why your premises are justified. If you fail to do so, you simply do not have an argument
    .So if you want to discuss this, first make sure you have a proper argument. Until you do, I am afraid there is nothing to discuss.

    Walter

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  19. I'll take that as a concession that you can't show how the W-PSR entails the PSR. Your personal feelings don't count as argumentation. It is just an assertion.

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  20. I'll take that as a concession that you cannot back up your first premise. Hence, you do not have an argument. Since I do not want to discuss assertions, there is nothing left to discuss here.

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  21. I asked you a question first. It's proper debate protocol to answer the question before asking one of your own. I'll be happy to answer your question once you answer mine.

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  22. I have answered your question to the best of my ability. I cannot think of any other reason than the PSR to think premise 1 is true. A sipple example would suffice to refute my claim.I wish you did the same.If you are not willing to back up your arguments, that's your choice. But don't expect anyone to take them seriously in that case.

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  23. You cannot think of any reason other than the PSR to think premise (1) is true. Okay, I respect that. However, that's a far cry from offering an argument that it really is the case that the W-PSR entails the PSR. Your objection here is that it does, so that's why I'm asking for some justification, and not just a feeling.

    Here's a simple example. A mountain is contingent, and as a result it requires an external cause, e.g. various geological processes. If one doesn't want to universalize this principle in the form of the PSR, he could simply maintain that it's possible for contingent things to have an external cause. Even a hypothetically inexplicable mountain would be possible caused. Can't you see how the W-PSR is more modest than the PSR?

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  24. That all contingent things possibly have external causes is only true if the PSR is true, because this claim entails that there are also non-contingent beings, which is what you are trying to get at. So, this definition begs the question. Contingent things exist in some possible worlds and not in others. Some contingent entities have explanations in other contingent entities, but that cannot apply to all contingent entities without ending up with an infinite regress.
    And I have no idea whether necessary beings are even possible.
    So, how can it , in that case, be possible for every contingent being to have an explanation?
    Point is, if necessary beings cannot exist, then it is impossible for all contingent entities to have an explanation.

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  25. The claim does not entail that there are non-contingent entities, and neither does the PSR. What both principles state is that there are two ways a things can be explained. This doesn't mean that things really are explained in either of the two ways. Hence, it's not question-begging.

    So now you do reject the possibility of an infinite regress? I'm pleased to hear that. You seemed to be sitting on the fence on that issue last time we discussed it. In any case, one could object that even though there is no necessary entity, it's necessarily the case that some contingent entity or other must exist. This is seriously what the latest objection is, no joke. The fact that it's such a poor objection only illustrates the soundness of contingency arguments.

    By the way, it begs the question to state that a necessary entity cannot exist. I've pointed this out earlier posts. One version of the MCA goes like this:

    1. Possibly, everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause. (Premise, W-PSR)

    2. If the sum total of contingent entities C has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is a necessary cause N. (Premise)

    3. C exists. (Premise)

    4. Hence, C possibly has an explanation of its existence. (From 1 and 3)

    5. Hence, N possibly exists. (From 2 and 4)

    6. Therefore, N exists. (From 5 and S5)

    The counter-argument almost invariably goes like this:

    1*.

    2*.

    3*.

    4*.

    5*. Possibly, N does not exist.

    6*. Therefore, N does not exist. (From 5* and S5)

    Notice how (5) can be inferred from reasonable premises, whereas (5*) comes out of nowhere. In fact, in order to affirm (5*), one would have to reject the W-PSR, which you clearly recognize. The problem is I don't see any compelling reason you've given to think that the W-PSR is false or that it entails the PSR. Your objection is based on a profound misunderstanding of what the W-PSR is stating.

    Don't take my comments personally, Walter. I doubt that you do, anyway, but occasionally I feel I have to point out that my criticisms of common objections to theistic arguments are directed at the objections and not the objectors.

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  26. Doug

    I do not reject the possibility of an infinite regress. I do not like it, but there is no logical argument against it either.

    And sure it begs the question to state that a necessary entity cannot exist, but you are completely wrong in the example of the MCA.

    5* does not come out of nowhere, instead if follows logically from premise 1. Ignoring 5* as a possibility is in fact what makes this version question-begging.
    The correct way to go about this is investigating the two theoretical possibilities, namely that the 'possibly' in premise also entails 'possibly not'. Which of the two is actually possible cannot be established with any amount of certainty without begging the question. So, indeed, the conclusion from 6* 'God does not exist' is unjustified, but so is the conclusion in 6 that God exists. This depends on which side you prefer. And that' s why this argument, porperly understood, does not really add anything at all. It still remains a matter of preference.

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  27. Just a quick comment: the negation of "possible" is "impossible." It's not "possibly not."

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    1. I am not negating "possible". I am merely stating that in premsie 1,
      "possibly " entails "possibly not".

      So, let's replhrase your argument using my modifications

      1. Possibly, everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause. (Premise, W-PSR) and possibly, it is not the case that everything that exists has an explanation ...
      (both cannot be actually possible because that would lead to a contradiction, but, without begging the question we cannot be sure which is actually possible, so we must leave opne the two alternatives)

      2. If the sum total of contingent entities C has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is a necessary cause N, but it is also possible that C has no explanation (Premise)

      3. C exists. (Premise)

      4. Hence, C possibly has an explanation of its existence. (From 1 and 3) but possibly it does not have an explanation

      so there are two possibilities:

      5. Hence, N possibly exists. (From 2 and 4)

      6. Therefore, N exists. (From 5 and S5)

      or

      5* possibly N does not exist

      6* Therefore N does not exist.

      Now, of course, only one of those conclusions can be correct. But without further argument, it is impossible to tell with any amount of certainty which is correct and which isn't.

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  28. "Possibly" does not entail "possibly not." After all, a hypothetically necessary entity would also have to be possible. This is just simple modal logic. I'm only making this small correction because, like I said, I want to wrap up the discussion. Similarly, the notion that C possibly does not have an external cause does not entail that N possibly does not exist. N's existence is consistent with it's not causing C. So, (5*) still doesn't follow from your modified premises.

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  29. Here's an example. England did not build the Great Wall of China. From this it doesn't follow that England doesn't exist. This is because X's existence is not dependent on X's causing Y.

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  30. N's existence is not consistent with its not causing C. If C can exist uncaused then there is a possible world with only C. Hence N does not exist in all possible worlds.
    Comfriming the possibility of an uncaused contingent entity C means that a world with only C is not contradictory. Hence it is a possible world and it has no N. It's really as simple as that.

    But, let's wrap up this discussion

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  31. If that's what you really think, then fine. As always, nice talking with you.

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