Summary of a Cosmological-Teleological Hybrid Argument

Disclaimer: I use the word, "providence," broadly to refer to non-chance related explanations.  I realize this may be controversial, so if you prefer, feel free to choose another term.

1. Whatever exhibits regularity is the result of providence. (Premise)

2. Nature exhibits regularity. (Premise)

3. Therefore, nature is the result of providence.  (From 1 and 2)

4. Providence can be understood in terms of either necessity or design. (Definition)

5. If the providence of (3) is the result of design, then God exists. (Premise)

6. If the providence of (3) is the result of necessity, then that necessity is either mechanical or personal. (Premise)

7. Necessarily, a necessary mechanical providence will only produce necessary effects. (Premise)

8. The providence of (3) produces contingent effects. (Premise)

9. Hence, the necessary providence cannot be mechanical. (From 7 and 8)

10. Hence, the necessary providence is personal. (From 6 and 9)

11. Hence, the necessary providence is God. (Implied by 10)

12. Therefore, whichever providence is responsible for (3) is theistic. (From 5 and 11)

13. Therefore, God exists. (From 3 and 12)

De Ente et Essentia Revisited

De Ente et Essentia, or "On Being and Essence," contains what most Thomists consider to be the definitive proof of God's existence.  There have been numerous formulations of the argument, however, and I myself have treated it differently at times.  Instead of defending the more controversial being and essence distinction, we can also defend the metaphysical argument in terms of actuality and potentiality.  In this way the proof resembles the argument from motion, with the exception that Pure Act is the immediate conclusion, and not a further deduction.

1. No potentiality can actualize itself. (Premise)

2. If there is no Pure Act, then no potentiality can be actualized. (Implied by 1)

3. Potentialities are actualized. (Premise)

4. Therefore, Pure Act exists. (From 2 and 3)

The divine attributes are then inferred from the existence of Pure Act.  Premise (3) is obviously true.  Acorns do have their potentialities actualized during the process of becoming oak trees, and they can only do so by some existing actuality, in confirmation of (1).

(2) is implied by (1), since even if there were an infinite regress of potentialities presumably being actualized by other entities that exemplify both potentiality and actuality, there would simply be an infinite regress of non-actualized potentialities.  It would be as if a watch had infinitely-many gears, but no spring.  Without the spring, none of the infinitely-many gears would have their potentialities actualized.

The Obviousness of the Fifth Way

I just can't imagine why anyone would reject Thomas Aquinas's fifth way, a fairly benign teleological argument.

"Contrary and discordant things cannot, always or for the most part, be parts of one order except under someone’s government, which enables all and each to tend to a definite end. But in the world we find that things of diverse natures come together under one order, and this not rarely or by chance, but always or for the most part. There must therefore be some being by whose providence the world is governed. This we call God."  (Summa Contra Gentiles: Book One, ch. 13)




In summary:

1. Everything that exhibits regularity is the result of providence. (Premise)

2. Nature exhibits regularity. (Premise)

3. Therefore, the regularity of nature is the result of providence. (From 1 and 2)

4. Providence is what we call God. (Definition) 

5. Therefore, God exists. (From 3 and 4)

There are laws of nature, after all, e.g. gravity, electromagnetism, and the strong and weak atomic forces.  Since whatever happens over and over again (regularity) is not the result of chance alone, it follows that nature is the result of someone's or something's providence, e.g. God.

The Necessity of God and the Intelligibility of the World

I'm not sure this is a sound argument.  Rather, I just want to see what "sticks" and what doesn't.

1. Whatever is possible is necessarily possible. (Premise, S5)

2. Necessarily, the universe is intelligible. (Premise)

3. Possibly, the universe's intelligibility is known by a person. (Premise)

4. Necessarily, the universe's intelligibility is possibly known by a person. (From 1 and 3)

5. Whatever is necessarily possible is possible in all possible worlds. (Definition)

6. Necessarily, a person possibly exists in all possible worlds. (From 4 and 5)

7. No contingent person exists in all possible worlds. (Definition)

8. Therefore, a necessary person exists. (From 6 and 7)

I think the weakest premise of the argument is (6).  It is susceptible to the charge of equivocation, where "person" is used to describe any person in the preceding premises, but refers to a single person in (6).  Nevertheless, I think there's some promise with this argument.  It just needs some tuning up.

Summary of the Five Ways

First Way

1. Evident to the senses is motion. (Premise)

2. Everything in motion has its motion sustained by another. (Premise)

3. Either an Unmoved Mover exists, or else there is an infinite regress of sustaining movers. (Implied by 1 and 2)

4. There cannot be an infinite regress of sustaining movers. (Premise)

5. Therefore, an Unmoved Mover exists. (From 3 and 4)


Second Way

1. Dependent things exist. (Premise)

2. Every dependent thing has a sustaining cause. (Premise)

3. Either an independent first cause exists, or else there is an infinite regress of dependent sustaining causes. (Implied by 1 and 2)

4. There cannot be an infinite regress of dependent sustaining causes. (Premise)

5. Therefore, an independent first cause exists in the order of sustaining causes. (From 3 and 4)


Third Way

1. Everything that exists is either necessary or contingent. (Definition)

2. Something presently exists. (Premise)

3. Something cannot come from nothing. (Premise)

4. Hence, there was never a past time at which nothing existed. (Implied by 2 and 3)

5. The past is infinite. (Assumption)

6. Given infinite time, all potentialities will have been actualized. (Premise)

7. The concurrent nonexistence of all contingent entities is a potentiality.

8. Hence, there was a past time at which nothing contingent existed. (From 6 and 7)

9. Therefore, a necessary entity exists. (From 1, 4 and 8)


Fourth Way

1. There are degrees of truth and goodness that possess limitations. (Premise)

2. Limitations can be known only in reference to a standard of perfect truth and goodness. (Premise)

3. Hence, there is a standard of perfect truth and goodness. (From 1 and 2)

4. Necessarily, a standard perfect truth and goodness will be the supreme object of desire. (Premise)

5. A supreme object of desire can only have the effects of desirability if it exists. (Premise)

6. Therefore, a supreme object of desire exists. (From 3, 4 and 5)


Fifth Way

1. Whatever exhibits regularity is the result of some entity's providence. (Premise)

2. Nature exhibits regularity. (Premise)

3. Therefore, nature is the result of some entity's providence. (From 1 and 2)

The Other Argument Against an Infinite Regress of Sustaining Causes

Usually when I defend the argument from motion, I defend what's actually a secondary proof against the possibility of an infinite regress of sustaining causes.  That argument goes like this:

1. Whenever one begins counting, it is impossible to form an actual infinite by successive addition. (Premise)

2. In the order of sustaining causes, one must begin counting at each finite interval. (Premise)

3. Therefore, the regress of sustaining causes must be finite. (From 1 and 2)

In my estimation, this argument is bulletproof.  However, it's not even the primary argument Thomas Aquinas appeals to in support of the finitude of the regress of sustaining causes.  The first argument he defends may be summarized as follows:

4. No instrumental cause can sustain itself. (Premise)

5. If there is an infinite regress of instrumental causes, then the regress as a whole cannot sustain itself. (Premise)

6. Therefore, there cannot be an infinite regress of instrumental causes. (From 4 and 5)

Thomas offers the example of a hand moving a staff.  The staff is merely an instrumental cause, as is the hand.  Without a first cause of the staff's motion, we're left with an infinite regress of instrumental causes, in which case nothing would ever be in motion.  Since things are in motion, it follows that a first cause of motion exists.

The Goodness of the Unmoved Mover

The Unmoved Mover possesses certain attributes that can be deduced analytically: immutability, eternality, unicity, immateriality, and so forth.  However, what about the goodness of the Unmoved Mover?  Can we infer that God, the Unmoved Mover, is truly good?

Thomas Aquinas provides several arguments that the Unmoved Mover is not only good, but is goodness itself.  For now, let's just consider one argument.  Thomas writes:

"Again, it was shown above that there is a certain first unmoved mover, namely, God.  This mover moves as a completely unmoved mover, which is as something desired.  Therefore, since God is the first unmoved mover, He is the first desired.  But something is desired in two ways, namely, either because it is good or because it appears to be good.  The first desired is what is good, since the apparent good does not move through itself but according as it has a certain appearance of the good, whereas the good moves through itself.  The first desired, therefore, God, is truly good." (Summa Contra Gentiles: Book One, ch. 37)

In order to properly understand this passage, we have to keep in mind that a thing can move another in one of two ways.  Either X moves Y insofar as X actualizes some potentiality within itself to cause a change in Y, or else X moves Y as an object of desire.  An example of the latter is when a person views a beautiful painting.  The person is said to be "moved" by the painting, even though the painting itself need not change.

With this in mind, the Unmoved Mover is immutable, and so it can only move things as an object of desire.  Yet, to be an object of desire is to be good.  Now, the Unmoved Mover is either good through itself or through another.  However, it cannot be good through another, since that would entail that the Unmoved Mover has a potentiality actualized by an external cause.  Given that the Unmoved Mover is pure actuality, and exemplifies no potentiality, it follows that not only is the Unmoved Mover good, but is goodness itself.

The Personhood of a Necessary Being

In one of his latest Reasonable Faith podcasts, "A Rabbi Looks at the Kalam Argument," William Lane Craig explains that he accepts the Aristotelian-Thomistic proof for the existence of a first cause in the order of efficient or sustaining causes.  At the end of the podcast, he enunciates an argument one of his students came up with for the personhood of the first cause, which has necessary existence.

1. The necessary being N is either personal or impersonal. (Definition)

2. If N is impersonal, then it cannot cause any contingent effects. (Premise)

3. N does cause contingent effects. (Premise)

4. Therefore, N must be personal. (From 1 - 3)

Craig explains that N cannot cause contingent effects if impersonal, in confirmation of (2), because an impersonal cause would be mechanical.  Such a cause could therefore only produce necessary effects, in violation of (3).  It's interesting to note that this argument very much resembles Craig's argument for a personal creator in his defense of the kalam cosmological argument.  The advantage here is that the connection between N and personhood is not dependent upon the universe's having had a beginning, unlike the kalam argument.

Kant, Thomas Aquinas, and the Cosmological Argument

Immanuel Kant makes a distinction between two categories: phenomena and noumena.  The phenomenal realm is what we perceive and, according to Kant's interpretation, is limited to the mind only.  By contrast, the noumenal realm is what a thing is in and of itself.  Noumena cannot be known by the mind, or the perceiver.  For Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, what can be known through phenomena corresponds to the noumena.  Kant denies this possibility.  (It should be noted that Aristotle and Thomas did not use these terms, but their acceptance of alethic, or truth-bearing, realism entails correspondence.)

As a result, Kant rejects the traditional arguments for God's existence, at least insofar as they have any bearing on the noumenal realm.  Nevertheless, traditional theistic proofs can be limited to the scope of the phenomenal realm, which is of significance.  Of course, one need only make such limitations if Kant's distinction is actual, and not in the mind only.  However, for the purposes of this post, Kantianism will be accepted for the sake of argument.  While he already accepts a moral argument for God's existence for pragmatic reasons in his Critique of Practical Reason, I want to argue that the historical proofs of theism are still salvageable on Kant's worldview.

Let's start from the basic premise that we perceive (phenomena) that dependent things exist, even if this cannot be established to hold true in the noumenal realm:

1. Dependent things exist. (Premise)

2. Every dependent thing has a sustaining cause. (Premise)

3. Either the regress of dependent and sustaining causes is infinite, or else there exists an independently existing first cause in the order of sustaining causes. (Implied by 1 and 2)

4. There cannot be an infinite regress of dependent and sustaining causes. (Premise)

5. Therefore, there exists an independent first cause in the order of sustaining causes. (From 3 and 4)

I take (2) to be true by definition insofar as X is understood to be causally sustained by Y if and only if X cannot exist apart from Y.  That's only a rough definition, but it will do for now.

The key premise, as with so many cosmological arguments, is (4).  I've already argued at length that such an infinite regress cannot exist, even if the universe's past is conceivably eternal, which would imply an infinite regress of originating causes.  One of the reasons I affirm (4) is because it would take infinite time for an infinite regress of causes to be instantiated.  Given that there are finite periods of time even on the assumption that time is infinite, it follows that during any finite interval the regress of sustaining causes must also be finite.

Another way of thinking about it is that it is impossible to form an actual infinite by successive addition whenever one begins counting.  Since at each finite interval the regress of sustaining causes begins anew, we can deduce that during this interval there can only exist finite causal regresses.  At t1, the regress begins: 1, 2, 3, . . . n.  At t2, the regress begins again: 1, 2, 3, . . . n.  And so on.  Before t2 can arrive, t1 must reach infinity, which is impossible because there will always and indefinitely be another number to be traversed before arriving at infinity.

One objection is that between any two natural numbers - say, 1 and 2 - there are infinitely-many numbers (1.5, 1.25, . . . n).  The problem with using such examples is that the sum of these numbers is itself a finite number.  Moreover, the interval between 1 and 2 has a definite beginning (1) and end (2).  These two considerations show that the objection actually presupposes what it sets out to disprove, making the objection self-defeating.

The truth of (1) through (4), together with the argument's logical validity, necessitates the truth of (5): there exists an independent first cause in the order of sustaining causes.  It doesn't make any sense to ask what causes the first cause, since the first cause exists independently, and the causal premise of (2) is limited to what exists dependently.

There are a few more points to make.  First, one might be satisfied with this conclusion and seek no further implications.  The atheist is right to point out that the existence of a first cause does not automatically lead to theism.  If the theist wishes to make any connection between the first cause and God, additional metaphysical considerations will need to be taken into account.  However, that is beyond the purview of what I want to look at in this post.

As I said, one could go no further than concluding that a first cause exists, and one wouldn't even need to go beyond the phenomenal realm.  Nevertheless, I'm interested in ways to argue that the proof extends to the noumenal realm as well.  This will likely be the area of philosophy I most explore next.  For now, let's argue transcendentally, or from the impossibility of the contrary:

Prove A: Something independent exists in the noumenal realm.

Assume ~A: Nothing independent exists in the noumenal realm.

~A --> B: If nothing independent exists in the noumenal realm, then only dependent things exist in the noumenal realm.

~B: B is inscrutable.

Hence, ~~A: by modus tollens.

Therefore, A: by negation.

Q.E.D.

The noumenal realm does not escape the law of excluded middle.  Either X is dependent or independent, and there is no third alternative.  If A is denied on the grounds of inscrutability, then so is ~A.  For Kant, this demonstrates the collapse of human reason, but such a conclusion cannot be affirmed without making a claim about the noumena.  This also means that agnosticism about A and ~A is self-defeating, and so the only rational conclusion is that the phenomena maps onto the noumena.

If this argument is correct, and I'm only tentatively affirming it, one is compelled to reject the strong Kantian doctrine in favor of some form of metaphysical realism.

Resurrection of Jesus and the Scientific Method

In his debate with William Lane Craig on the historicity of Jesus's resurrection, Bart Ehrman argues that the resurrection cannot be considered historical because the field of history only contains events that are repeatable.  We shouldn't misinterpret Ehrman as saying that in order to conclude Julius Caesar crossed the Rubicon, he must be able to do so again.  Rather, what Ehrman means is that similar events must be possible.

The obvious problem with this criterion is that history, much like science, includes non-repeatable events.  In physics, one might look to the Big Bang.  The Big Bang occurred roughly fifteen billion years ago and is not something we can reproduce.  However, the Big Bang theory is also one of science's best attested hypotheses.  Craig reasons that the resurrection of Jesus is also very well-attested.  Since neither are repeatable, yet both are well-attested, I argue that something must be wrong with Ehrman's criterion.