I'm not sure this is a sound argument. Rather, I just want to see what "sticks" and what doesn't.
1. Whatever is possible is necessarily possible. (Premise, S5)
2. Necessarily, the universe is intelligible. (Premise)
3. Possibly, the universe's intelligibility is known by a person. (Premise)
4. Necessarily, the universe's intelligibility is possibly known by a person. (From 1 and 3)
5. Whatever is necessarily possible is possible in all possible worlds. (Definition)
6. Necessarily, a person possibly exists in all possible worlds. (From 4 and 5)
7. No contingent person exists in all possible worlds. (Definition)
8. Therefore, a necessary person exists. (From 6 and 7)
I think the weakest premise of the argument is (6). It is susceptible to the charge of equivocation, where "person" is used to describe any person in the preceding premises, but refers to a single person in (6). Nevertheless, I think there's some promise with this argument. It just needs some tuning up.
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I don't want to nit-pick here, but I think there is a lot of work to do before theer is any promise in this argument.
ReplyDeleteI'll explain why
1. Whatever is possible is necessarily possible. (Premise, S5)
2. Doug Benscoter is possible (he obviously exists and impossible entities do not exist)
3. Doug Benscoter is necessarily possible (from 1 and 2)
4. Whatever is necessarily possible is possible in all possible worlds. (Definition)
5. Necessarily, Doug Benscoter possibly exists in all possible worlds.
6. No contingent person exists in all possible worlds
7. Therefore Doug Benscoter is a necssary person.
The problem is not so much in premise 6 of your argument, but in the fact that 7 has nothing to do with 6 and therefore 8 does not follow from 6 and 7 at all. in other words, it seems like your argument not only is unsound, but even invalid. And the basic mistake you are making ehre is that, while it is true that possibly necessary equals necessary, it is not the case that necessarily possible equal necessary. As my parody shows, that would lead to absurdities.
Walter
The reason (8) doesn't follow from (6) and (7) is because of the equivocation in (6). The parody you offer simply illustrates the criticism I make of my own argument. You're also quite right in saying that necessarily possible does not entail necessity. In any case, your criticism is spot on. It's one of the rare instances in which we agree. ;)
ReplyDeleteWhat I would need to do to is show that (6) involves a possibly necessary person. There are all kinds of approaches to that already, but I'm more interested in thinking of a new argument.
Have you read Meynell's book about The Intelligible Universe? http://www.amazon.com/Intelligible-Universe-Cosmological-Argument-Philosophy/dp/0333281020 Good stuff.
ReplyDeleteAlso, this argument reminds me of Finch's knowability paradox. Run this argument by Mike Liccione with a mention of Fitch's paradox and see what he says. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fitch%27s_paradox_of_knowability
I'll have to give it a read!
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