Disclaimer: I use the word, "providence," broadly to refer to non-chance related explanations. I realize this may be controversial, so if you prefer, feel free to choose another term.
1. Whatever exhibits regularity is the result of providence. (Premise)
2. Nature exhibits regularity. (Premise)
3. Therefore, nature is the result of providence. (From 1 and 2)
4. Providence can be understood in terms of either necessity or design. (Definition)
5. If the providence of (3) is the result of design, then God exists. (Premise)
6. If the providence of (3) is the result of necessity, then that necessity is either mechanical or personal. (Premise)
7. Necessarily, a necessary mechanical providence will only produce necessary effects. (Premise)
8. The providence of (3) produces contingent effects. (Premise)
9. Hence, the necessary providence cannot be mechanical. (From 7 and 8)
10. Hence, the necessary providence is personal. (From 6 and 9)
11. Hence, the necessary providence is God. (Implied by 10)
12. Therefore, whichever providence is responsible for (3) is theistic. (From 5 and 11)
13. Therefore, God exists. (From 3 and 12)
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Apart from tne fact that there is no rational support for (7) there is an even bigger problem with the assumption that necessary personal provndence can produce contingent effects.
ReplyDeleteOne personal cause can be distiguished from another personal cause by its properties. So, in order for a personal cause to produce contingent effects, this personal cause must have contingent properties.
But if that is the case, we can distinguish between God 1 in possible world w1 and God 2 in w2, in which case neither God 1 not God 2 is necessary.
In order to avoid this problem, the only reasonable assumption is that necessary causes can have contingent properties, but if we assume this, (7) loses every kind of support.
What the argument actually shows is that the providence cannot be entirely necessary, so this brings us back to a point I have made several times already, namely that whatver exhibits regularity is the result of a combination of necessity and chance. Even if (7)is true (and it most probably isn't), the contingent effects are accounted for by the 'chance' part.
Walter
The objection assumes that God's properties are the same as God's actions. I see no reason to accept that.
ReplyDeleteThe objection assumes no such thing. I don't expect you to agree with the objection, but erecting a strawman isn't going to help this discussion.
DeleteI agree that a strawman won't help. Good thing I didn't commit such a fallacy.
ReplyDeleteHere's what you say (with emphasis added):
ReplyDelete"One personal cause can be distiguished from another personal cause by its properties. So, in order for a personal cause to produce contingent effects, this personal cause must have contingent properties."
It's the contingency of the production you assume necessitates the contingency of the personal cause's properties that your argument needs to make any sense. Yet, a personal cause's properties aren't what constitute their effects.
Had Italy won the UEFA Euro Tournament of 2012 instead of Spain, the players would have been the same persons as they are in the actual world. Likewise, had N caused w2 instead of w1, N would still have been N.
Either necessary properties can produce contingent effects, or necessary properies can only produce necssary effects.
DeleteIf the former is the case, then your (7) is contradicted and if the latter is the case, whether the cause is personal does not help you in any way unless, as i said, you assume a necessary personal cause can have contingent properties.
As to Euro 2012, in order for your argument to have any meaning, it must be possible for a replay in exactly the same circumstances, involving the same players with exactly the same propeties to have a different result because of personal causes. So, Mario Balotello, having the exact same properties, the exeact same shape and thinking exactly the same as in June 2012, must somehow manage to open the score.
So, to answer your question: if Italy had won as a result of personal causes, then the players would not have had the same properties as they actually had. Euro 2012 was won by Spanish players as they were in June 2012, and nowadays, those players are not exactly the same anymore.
Walter: "Either necessary properties can produce contingent effects, or necessary properies can only produce necssary effects."
DeleteNo. You're ignoring the distinction between a cause that is personal and one that is purely mechanical. Unless you can properly distinguish the two, your objection will never accurately respond to the argument.
"If the former is the case, then your (7) is contradicted and if the latter is the case, whether the cause is personal does not help you in any way unless, as i said, you assume a necessary personal cause can have contingent properties."
Again, no. You're still assuming that what a thing does is the same as what it is.
"As to Euro 2012, in order for your argument to have any meaning, it must be possible for a replay in exactly the same circumstances, involving the same players with exactly the same propeties to have a different result because of personal causes."
Replay? Not at all. It need only be possible that the results could have been different. Come on, Walter. You're grasping at straws.
"So, to answer your question: if Italy had won as a result of personal causes, then the players would not have had the same properties as they actually had. Euro 2012 was won by Spanish players as they were in June 2012, and nowadays, those players are not exactly the same anymore."
Which means, implicitly by you, that it was necessary for Spain to have won Euro 2012. That's nonsense, unless you assume a very strong determinist view.
Now let's take a look at your own hypothesis: that regularity is the result of a combination of necessity and chance. You've never backed up this claim, and I suspect it's because there's no way to introduce chance as an explanation of any law-like behavior.
ReplyDeleteYou say that chance is responsible for the contingent effects which, as you state, in no way undermines (7). More importantly, you've basically reduced personal freedom to chance. If our decisions are made contingently, and chance is what causes contingent effects, then... well you get it.
Complete regularity is the result of necessity, but since the universe is not completely regular, it is not the result of necessity alone. And BTW, this does undermine (7)because mechanical causes,as well as personal ones, acompanied by some amount of chance can account for contingent effects.
DeleteAnd I have never claimed that all our decisions are made contingently, so, no, personal freedom cannot be reduced to chance alone. It is, as most things, a result of both chance and necessity.
So our decisions are the result of both chance and necessity? I have a feeling you haven't thought these matters out. What this means is that the conclusions we come to are the result of chance and necessity, and so they're no more rational than having a headache.
DeleteThe conclusions we come to are the result of a conscious process in our mind, based on necessity and chance and that is what we call a rational process. the regularity is this process is for the main part due to necessity, the irregularities, which make up the 'personal' part, are mainly due to chance (roughly speaking, it's much more complex than that) A headache is the result of a non-conscious process and hence we do not call it rational. But there probably is a rational explanation for why we have headaches. So, I have thought these matters through, Doug.
DeleteNo, you don't get the argument. Headaches and conclusions are both the result of either necessity or chance, on your hypothesis. There's nothing rational about chance. It just happens.
DeleteDoug "No. You're ignoring the distinction between a cause that is personal and one that is purely mechanical. Unless you can properly distinguish the two, your objection will never accurately respond to the argument."
ReplyDeleteThe point is, upon closer examination, there is no distinction between personal and mechanical causes.
You will have to make a case for how personal causes can produce contingent effects without invoking a random process of some sort.
"Again, no. You're still assuming that what a thing does is the same as what it is."
I am assuming that personal has some sort of meaning, and that what a person does is for an important part the result of what a person is. That is not the same as saying that what a person does is what a person is. You seem to just throw it in the word 'personal' without properly analysing it, which leads to to this kind of straw man.
"Replay? Not at all. It need only be possible that the results could have been different. Come on, Walter. You're grasping at straws."
Which is exactly the same. If the result could have been different that would be tyhe result of chance or, if it's due to personal causes, due to the fact that a person's porperties are not exactly the same in diffrent circumstances.
"Which means, implicitly by you, that it was necessary for Spain to have won Euro 2012. That's nonsense, unless you assume a very strong determinist view."
If the teams of Spain and Italy consisted of necessary players and everything about the circumstances were necessary, then of course it would have been necessary for Spain to win. But, AFAIK, the players are not necessary entities and strong determinism is most probably wrong. But I can account for indeterminism , while you cannot.
Walter: "The point is, upon closer examination, there is no distinction between personal and mechanical causes."
ReplyDeleteNot true. There's a huge difference between them, but I guess there's no convincing you.
"You will have to make a case for how personal causes can produce contingent effects without invoking a random process of some sort."
Again, no. Personal causes are in a distinct category from random "causes," and are most certainly distinct from mechanical causes.
"I am assuming that personal has some sort of meaning, and that what a person does is for an important part the result of what a person is. That is not the same as saying that what a person does is what a person is."
It has a meaning much different than mechanical or random, that's for sure.
"Which is exactly the same. If the result could have been different that would be tyhe result of chance or, if it's due to personal causes, due to the fact that a person's porperties are not exactly the same in diffrent circumstances."
Lol Walter, you're just repeating yourself here. They're not the same, and I've explained why.
"If the teams of Spain and Italy consisted of necessary players and everything about the circumstances were necessary, then of course it would have been necessary for Spain to win. But, AFAIK, the players are not necessary entities and strong determinism is most probably wrong. But I can account for indeterminism , while you cannot."
Then it's just chance. The game was won by nothing more than chance. So much for analyzing talent and good decision-making. You reduce both to mere chance. And, don't change the issue. The issue is not whether I can account for indeterminism. It's whether your assertions lead to the kind of de-humanizing philosophies that a mere chance hypothesis would garner, and I would say they do.
Doug
Delete"Not true. There's a huge difference between them, but I guess there's no convincing you."
I respect your beliefs, Doug, but just asserting something does not make it true. I would like to see an argument for this. I will never be convinced by an assertion.
"Then it's just chance. The game was won by nothing more than chance. So much for analyzing talent and good decision-making. You reduce both to mere chance."
I think this is a beautiful illustration of the fact that 'personal' the way you use it has no meaning whatsoever. What you are claiming is that the talent of a necessary person can vary. At one instant he can be more talented than at another.
Talent is a property, so if a necessary person's talent can vary, you agree that a necessary person has contingent properties and you actually make my case. The same holds for good decision making. Some players apparently are better equipped to make certain good decisions than others. Which is fine if they are contingent, but I am very curious to find out how a necessary person could at one instant be better equipped than at another instant. Do you really think a necessary Iker Casillas will at one time decide to jump in the direction of the ball and on another occasion jump to the other side?
That's what you have to account for, and it's not a question of changing the issue. The issue is that you make the positive claim that you can aacount for indeterminism So, please do, or if you can't , withdraw your claim until you can.
So the issue is not whether my argument leads to dehumanizing philosophies or not, it is whether your or my views lead to the truth, whether we like the trith or not does not chnage this.
Notice that you have yet to produce any explanation for the instantiation of chance. You say that regularity is the result of necessity. The problem is that these chance happenings or contingencies are the result of this necessity. If this were true, then N's effects would also be necessary, and not contingent, the latter of which is what you need. This brings us right back to premise (7), so you haven't explained anything.
ReplyDeleteJust read a good textbook on quantum mechanics and you will learn that N's effects are not necessary at all. You'll have to let go of the restriction of the Aristotelian notion of causility, though.
DeleteI am sure Aristotle would do the same if he were alive today.
Why are you talking about a necessary person's talent? That's not at all the right term to use, and I'm not going to jump through hoops to get your objections to bear any resemblance to the arguments I'm actually making.
ReplyDeleteAs far as QM is concerned, you're doing some philosophical dancing. If QM is supposed to be related to chance, then it's not describing N. You have to choose what your position is and stick to it. You're allowed to change your mind, of course, but don't do it surreptitiously. I'm also not interested in defending an Aristotelian account of causality here and now. Fortunately, I don't need to.
I am trying to find out what exactly you think can vary about a necessary person. It's not its talent, but what is it about a necssary person that can accout for variable decision making? So far you haven't made any sort of argument , you have merely asserted that a necessary person's decisions can vary. I could just object ' but if a neceesray perosn is supposed to be related to variable outcomes withiout any sort of explanation, then it's not decsribing N'.
ReplyDeleteSo, no offence, but until you have a real argument there is nothing more to discuss on this matter.
It's not a mere assertion. We actually perceive ourselves as persons with free will. Chance isn't freedom. Don't confuse indeterminism with freedom. If you don't understand something, then just say so. I've already explained that God's decisions can vary, since N is not identical to those decisions.
ReplyDeleteI am leaving it at that. I have asked for an explanation becaue I am willing to concede that there might be something I am miissng here, but obviously you cannot answer my questions. No worries, I have asked thiks dozens of times to various theists and thd there is no anwer. You have not even begun to explain how God's decisions can vary, so, no offence, but I can't be bothered with psuedo-explanations.
ReplyDeleteIf you want the last word on this, you are of course welcome, But I won't be replying anymore.
I think the cosmological argument is often misrepresented in a less coherent fashion like Kreeft did last weeK : http://www.battleforthecoreoftheworld.com/2013/05/an-unfortunate-presentation-of-aquinas.html
ReplyDeleteWalter, you might want to read some of the relevant literature on free will. If you think theists and libertarians haven't answered your questions, you're just not looking hard enough.
ReplyDeleteI have read lots of texts on free will and I have never encountered any that actually answered my questions, but I keep an open mind on this, so there mùay be some that can.
DeleteSo, just name one relevant source that answers my objections, preferably one that I can read online.
So much for not replying anymore, huh? ;) No, that's okay. Craig offers a brief response, alluding to the lack of causal constraints, e.g. determinism. In answer to the writer's question, his most pertinent paragraph beings with, "Now as for your argument, I think two of its premisses are false."
Deletehttp://www.reasonablefaith.org/is-god-morally-praiseworthy
It was not an actual reply, I was just asking for some additional information. So thank you for the link you gave me, but in all fairness, this was one of the 'lots of texts' I had already read on free will which did not answer my question.
DeleteYou might want to lay out some of the questions you have. Or, you could just read Robert Kane's anthology, "Free Will."
DeleteI have read Robert Kane and I have laid out my questions to you, but neither you nor Robert Kane, nor William Lane Craig, nor Peter Van Inwagen... can answer my question.
DeleteThen what's the question? Are you just asking for a definition of "person"?
DeleteI made it perfectly clear what my question was, so if you have nothing more to add, I am out of this discussion.
DeleteThen why not indulge me and ask again? If you want to end the discussion, however, then that's your prerogative.
DeleteBecause you cannot answer my question, no matter how often I ask it. So this discussion is pointless.
DeleteLol you won't even say what the question is. You've asked plenty of questions in this thread alone. Am I supposed to just find the needle in the haystack?
DeleteIf you don't know which question I am referring to, why don't you just answer them all?
DeleteI guess you didn't read my latest reply. You've asked a lot of questions. It's unreasonable to expect me to guess which question you want answered the most. My patience here is growing very thin, and I've been very polite to you, Walter. Please just provide the question, or I'll be suspending you for a week.
DeleteI just kept replying because I thought it would be impolite not to, but I made it perfectly clear that I wanted to end this discussion unless you had something to add; so I am not going to repeat questions and keep this going for eternity.
DeleteIf you want to suspend me, then just do so. I am not going to lose any sleep over it.
Then have it your way. You won't be posting here again until this time next week.
DeleteIf you really want to discuss this further, I'll give you my question.
DeleteWhat can possibly account for the ability of a person to choose either A or ~A (or A or B if you prefer) given that there is neither anything internal to tbe person nor anything external that can vary in any way?
The question presupposes a causal constraint upon a person's freedom to choose, which is a contradiction in terms. Variation also has nothing to do with it. When a person freely chooses A or B, there is only the efficient cause, and no other explanation. I know it's weird, but so is consciousness.
DeleteWhat you are describing is not freedom to choose, but pure random chance. Which invalidates your argument.
DeleteI'm going to let you have the last word on this.
DeleteOK
DeleteWhat you are describing is not freedom to choose, but pure random chance. Which invalidates your argument.
Jon, I'm not familiar with Kreeft's latest presentation of the cosmological argument (CA). However, he's presented plenty of sound versions of the argument in the past. I'm more interested in the best articulations of the CA. Thanks for the link.
ReplyDelete