1. The universe is very complex. (Premise)
2. Whatever is very complex most likely has an external cause. (Premise)
3. Therefore, the universe most likely has an external cause. (From 1 and 2)
The beauty of this argument is its simplicity. It very much resembles the kalam argument, with the exception that the universe does not have to be finite in the past. Whether finite or infinite in the past, it's entirely conceivable that the universe didn't have to be so astronomically complex, or complex at all. Couldn't the universe exist with a single quark? I doubt anyone in their right mind will doubt premise (1), so the key premise is (2). Since this is an inductive argument, examples will suffice. A mountain, for example, is a very complex thing, and yet we know that it is externally caused by various geological processes. Or how about the complexity of an animal? The animal only exists because of the act of procreation. I could continue, but I think enough has been said already.
Now, since the universe is the sum total of all physical space, time, matter and energy, it follows that the external cause (which most likely exists) must be timeless, changeless (for time is a measurement of change), immaterial, and very powerful in order to cause something as complex and vast as the universe. I'll leave the personality of this external cause for another time.
It still strikes me as problematic. As I understand it, the content of experience is essential to an inductive argument. Whenever we say that something complex most likely has an external cause (which seems a relatively sane thing to accept) we're saying that our experience of the inside of the system tells us that complex things in the system have an external cause - but that cause is still internal to the system. I'm not sure, though, that we can make the same sort of leap when talking about the system as a whole. At least not inductively, because our experience ends where the universe does.
ReplyDeleteNone of this is to say that the termination of the argument is false - I think it's true. Since it hinges on our experience, though, it seems a little overzealous to extend the induction as far as it seems to me that (2) does.
Those are some well thought-out reservations, Syllabus. I would say that we use induction even in cases we do not have experience with. If we discovered some new complex entity, we would be rationally justified in concluding that it had some external cause, based on our previous experience that complex things are most plausibly externally caused.
ReplyDeleteAs for the universe as a whole, the same thing applies. While we don't have experience of the universe as a whole, apart from some compelling reason to make the universe an exception to the causal premise, one is susceptible to the charge of special pleading.
In any case, I think your reservations (although you ultimately accept the conclusion) are among the best. They sure beat the "who made God?" rhetorical question.
Dear Doug,
ReplyDeleteIf I may be so bold as to make a small suggestion to improve your argument. This slight improvement will save your argument from being attacked with one particular modern objection. And this improvement is just to change the following words in your argument:
1. The universe, which is a material thing, is very complex. (Premise)
2. Any material thing that is very complex most likely has an external cause. (Premise)
3. Therefore, the universe most likely has an external cause. (From 1 and 2)
The only reason that I suggest that this is an improvement is because it will save you from having to deal with the ridiculous but now often heard objection that “God is complex, so he must also have a cause.” In essence, by changing the word “Whatever” in Premise 2 to “Any material thing”, you can effectively neutralize this objection before it can even get off the ground.
Just a thought.
Take care,
RD Miksa
www.idontgiveadamnapologetics.blogspot.com
Thanks, RD! I'll be making that modification in the future. Of course, if God is immaterial, then He is remarkably simple anyway.
DeleteDear Doug,
DeleteYou are quite right. But my point is just that the slight reformulation of the argument will not diminish the argument in any way, but it will ensure that you can immediately avoid any of the more "village atheist" type objections--such as: "Well God is complex too, so that means he must have a cause!"-- that one hears so often today. Thus, the argument gets made slightly stronger without losing any of its original force. A win-win situation.
Take care,
RD Miksa
www.idontgiveadamnapologetics.blogspot.com
As for the universe as a whole, the same thing applies. While we don't have experience of the universe as a whole, apart from some compelling reason to make the universe an exception to the causal premise, one is susceptible to the charge of special pleading.
ReplyDeleteYeah, ultimately I agree. I think that since everything in the universe is susceptible to the causal principle, you can get to the necessity of a cause of the universe without a fallacy of composition. The main reservation I had was in the extension of the word "external" past the universe. It's doable, but, in my opinion, it would need a little more justification than initially given. Just my (admittedly non-professional) two cents.
Hey no problem, Syllabus. I post a lot of these arguments to get constructive feedback. Inductive arguments tend to be weaker than deductive arguments anyway, which is why I normally stick to Thomas's Five Ways. Still, I think arguments such as this inductive cosmological argument at the very least make God's existence more plausible than in the absence of the evidence.
Delete