I remain convinced that deductive moral arguments, such as Norman Geisler's, are sound. Geisler summarizes his version of the proof as follows:
1. Every law has a lawgiver. (Premise)
2. There is an objective moral law. (Premise)
3. Therefore, there is an objective moral lawgiver. (From 1 and 2)
Geisler concludes that this objective moral lawgiver is part of what we mean by "God."
Robert Adams, on the other hand, argues like this:
1. Moral facts exist. (Premise)
2. Moral facts have the properties of being objective and non-natural. (Premise)
3. The best explanation of there being objective and non-natural moral facts is provided by theism. (Premise)
4. Therefore, the existence of moral facts provides good grounds for thinking theism is true. (From 1 - 3)
I doubt anyone will doubt premise (1) of Adams' argument. In fact, few
of us even doubt the objectivity of moral facts. Are rape, murder, or
torturing children for fun things we simply don't like, or are they
really (objectively) moral atrocities? For those persuaded that these
are objective moral atrocities, then this may provide a
person-relative-proof of God's existence.
The reason objective
laws, if they exist, are non-natural is because they are true immutably
and cannot be reduced to any of the physical sciences, e.g. physics,
chemistry, biology, etc. A scientist is able to show that torturing
children for fun is painful, but its being painful doesn't make it
morally wrong.
Thus, we are left with a supernatural
explanation for objective moral facts. Theism fits this description; so
at the very least, the reality of objective and non-natural moral facts
makes theism more plausible than in their absence. Let P = the
probability of some conjunction of facts, h = the hypothesis that God
exists, k = our background knowledge, and e = the evidence (in this case
the reality of objective and non-natural moral facts). With this in
mind, the following is true: P(h/e&k) > P(h/k).
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Doug,
ReplyDeleteFirst of all I do doubt that moral facts exist. Murder, rape and torturing children e.g. are not just things that we personally dislike, but things that, given the nature of what it means to be a human being, go against that nature. Had the nature of human beings been different, some of these things may not have been wrong at all. We cannot know that because we are human beings and judge things according to our nature.
Secondly, even if premise 1 is true, it is true regardless of any conscious being's opinion on it, including God's.
So, those things are not moral atrocities because God knows they are, but God knows they are moral atrocities because it is true that they are moral atrocities, the same way that 1 + 1 = 2 is not true because God knows it is, God knows it because it is true.
So,whether there is a God or not does not make any difference concerning the truth of moral facts.
Walter, I'm astounded that you would reject premise (1) of Adams's argument. However, I'd rather move onto your latter claims in which you implicitly allude the Euthyphro Dilemma. I deal with that objection elsewhere: http://dougbenscoter.blogspot.com/2011/10/euthyphro-dilemma.html
DeleteNeedless to say, I don't find your objection compelling. No offense; you're one of my favorite sparring partners, if you'll allow that term.
Doug
DeleteEvery untilitarian and virtually every consequentionalist doubt that moral facts , the way Adams define them, exist, so I don't know why my doubt about thier existence (not a denial but a doubt) should astound you.
Secondly, I have read your piece on the ED and needless to say, I don't find it compelling either. But I don't want to start an endless discussion on this, it's just that all of the premises you (or Adams) state as obvious are in fact highly controversial.
When did Adams or I state these premises are obvious? That there are moral facts is about the only premise I do consider obvious. What you're contesting to in referring to utilitarianism/consequentialism is the objectivity of moral facts stated in premise (2). Even an aesthetic subjectivist will agree that there are aesthetic facts. He or she will just insist that these facts are not objective. Likewise, a moral subjectivist (however ill-founded their subjectivism is) will still agree that there are moral facts, but only deny their objectivity.
DeleteDoug,
DeleteSure, if moral facts can mean subjective facts, then premise 1 is obviously true, but I considered premise 2 to be a clarification of premise 1.
That may have been a misunderstanding on my part, so in that case, I have serious doubts about premise 2, for the reasons I stated above, and so have lots of philosophers, both theists and atheists. It is, to say the least, a highly controversial premise.
So I don't think your observation that "few of us even doubt the objectivity of moral facts" is correct.
Concerning my implicit allusion to the ED, I would like ask you a simple question.
Let's consider two hypothetical worlds that are identical except that in w1 God exists and in w2 God doesn't exist. Does your position entail that in w1 rape is objectively wrong while in w2 rape isn't objectively wrong, even though the same creatures (except for God) with the very same properties exist in both worlds?
I think if you really want your objection to the ED to work you have the burden to argue why this is the case.
That few of us doubt the objectivity that rape is morally wrong is uncontroversial, even among philosophers. Take a look at the surveys if you don't believe me. In any case, we've established your reservation is with premise (2), and not with (1).
DeleteYour question begs the question by assuming from the outset that God does not exist in w2. If objective morality is grounded in God's being, then God must exist in w2. Yes, of course I have a burden of proof, but this post isn't even addressing the deductive moral argument.
Consider the inverse. Hypothetically, let's say there is no objective morality. Does that make God's existence more plausible, less plausible, or does it make no difference whatsoever?
Doug
ReplyDeleteQuestions don't beg the question, arguments do.
I just want to establish whether premise 3 makes any sense at all.
As for your last question, my answer is that it makes no difference whatsoever.
A question can beg the question if there is a hidden assumption in the question. You've asked me: "Let's consider two hypothetical worlds that are identical except that in w1 God exists and in w2 God doesn't exist. Does your position entail that in w1 rape is objectively wrong while in w2 rape isn't objectively wrong, even though the same creatures (except for God) with the very same properties exist in both worlds?"
ReplyDeleteI don't accept the claim that there is a possible world in which w2 does not exist. You're assuming from the outset that God is logically contingent. That's textbook question-begging.
As for the last question, thank you for your honesty. Let's change the scenario a bit. Swinburne postulates that human knowledge of an objective moral law makes God's existence more plausible than in the absence of this fact. The following would still be true: P(h/e&k) > P(h/k). The only difference is that e = human knowledge of an objective moral law.
Notice how the Euthyphro Dilemma (even if correct, and it's not) has no affect on modified argument. It just seems more likely than not that God would create human beings to have knowledge of an objective moral law. At the very least, this makes God's existence more plausible than in its absence.
Would you agree to that?
To reiterate: "when did you stop beating your wife?" is both a question and a textbook case of question-begging. One needn't formulate a fallacious argument (question-begging) in the form of a question. This is elementary logic.
DeleteDoug
DeleteMy question tries to establish the validity and the soundness of your claim, so it doesn't beg the question. Your answer, on the other hand, does, because it states as a fact that w2 doesn't exist while that is precisely what your argument is trying to prove. That's textbook question-begging.
"When did you stop beating your wife?" is question-begging, but "In the hypothetical scenario in which you beat your wife, when did you stop doing it?" is not.
But I am not going to quarrel about this.Let's take your modified, Swinburnian version.
Now, suppose there really is such a thing as an objective moral law, then it may seem more likely than not that God would create human beings to have knowledge of such law, but it would also seem more likely than not that God would create all or at least most human beings to have PERFECT or at least very good knowledge of moral laws. However, it is not the case that God has created most human beings to have perfect ( or near perfect) knowledge of moral laws. So, things aren't always what it seems. In fact, the disagreement among human beings about lots of moral laws seems to indicate that whatever the source of knowledge about moral laws is, it is very unlikely that it is God, since God would have created a much better and widespread knowledge of these laws. In fact, the knowledge we find among human beings is precisely what we would expect on a naturalist source of this knowledge.
And that is IFF there is such a thing as objective moral law as you define it. And I see no reason to think that is even possible.
Well, I've already accepted a burden of proof in establishing the w2 is not possible. I'm not begging the question. I've only stated two deductive arguments and went out of my way to offer Swinburne's inductive argument instead. My point is that one cannot merely assume w2 is possible without dealing with the arguments for God's logical necessity. Further, Swinburne himself believes that God is only temporally necessary, and not logically necessary. However, I think you're right that we should let this go.
ReplyDeleteNow, I think you're exaggerating the difference of opinion among people with respect to morality. Does any society honor the man who abandons his fellow soldiers? Does any society approve of torturing children fun? No. In fact, the differences of opinion are largely tangential and are equally well explained by the Fall, so I don't think that increases the probability of (capital "N") Naturalism. Even if you could find a society that approves of those things, well, that society is wrong. Morality is really much simpler than some make it out to be. "How would you feel if someone did that to you?" is a good place to start, and we can rule out all kinds of immoral actions on that basis.
Doug
ReplyDeleteWell, since, "How would you feel if someone did that to you," is a good place to start, that kind of makes my point. Knowledge of the moral laws based on how we would feel about being treated wrongly does not at first gance depend on God.
My point is that there are several moral laws that are not generally agree upon. I don't agree e.g. that homosexual relations, premarital sex, euthanasia, contraception, are morally wrong, so obviously, God did not create me to have knowledge of those laws.
So it seems to me that the moral laws the knwoledge of which is easily explained on a naturalist account happen to be the ones that are virtually undisputed, while other laws the knwoledge of which may require some kind of divine revelation happen to be very controversial.
So some moral laws are (virtually) universally agreed upon? That's much different than what you were saying before. All we need for the argument to work are for some moral laws to be objective. The prohibition against homosexual acts, etc., aren't based on revelation but on natural law ethics. The claim has never been that one needs the Bible or any other religious text to know what's right and wrong. Rather, the claim is that knowing what's right and wrong makes God's existence more plausible than in the absence of such knowledge. What you call controversial isn't because God didn't create you to have knowledge that these acts are morally wrong, but it could be because you (albeit unintentionally) suppress that knowledge. In any case, I never brought up homosexual acts or euthanasia or any of these other controversial issues. I intentionally gave examples that are not controversial.
DeleteDoug
DeleteWere did I say that there are no moral laws that are virtually agreed upon? There is nothing much different than what I was saying before. That some moral facts that are virtually agreed upon does not make them objective in the way you want or your argument to work.
Yes, you can maintain that I (and the vast majority in my country, including most Catholics) suppress the knowledge that contraception is wrong. The problem is, in order for your argument to work, you have the burden to prove that this is the case. It doesn't suffice to say that it is possible that God created humans to have this knowledge. If God exists, then I admit this is possible. But you have a burden to show that God is a more plausible explanation then e.g. the fact that the consensus on some moral wrongs comes from how we would feel if someone did that to us. And so far, you haven't (and neither has Swinburne for that matter).
Finally, of course you prefer to only bring up a few cases that support your argument and ignore other cases, and that's exactly why I chose to bring them up.
"Were did I say that there are no moral laws that are virtually agreed upon?"
DeleteI got that from what you said earlier:
"In fact, the disagreement among human beings about lots of moral laws seems to indicate that whatever the source of knowledge about moral laws is . . ."
The fact is, most of our moral laws are in agreement. The disagreements are largely secondary, and I gave examples of how different societies agree upon a great deal of moral obligations. More importantly, though, moral opinion is not how we determine what is moral and what is not. If it did, then geocentrism would have been true prior to the Renaissance, which is ridiculous. Moral facts, like alethic facts, are independent of human opinion.
"That some moral facts that are virtually agreed upon does not make them objective in the way you want or your argument to work."
Again, that's not my claim. I'm not committing an ad populum fallacy. I was only responding to your claim about how controversial some moral issues are and how that allegedly undermines the objectivity of moral obligations. In point of fact, their objectivity can be established through virtue ethics, natural law ethics, or deontology. However, the point of the post wasn't to argue for moral objectivity, but to show how moral objectivity makes God's existence more plausible than in the absence of moral objectivity.
"Yes, you can maintain that I (and the vast majority in my country, including most Catholics) suppress the knowledge that contraception is wrong. The problem is, in order for your argument to work, you have the burden to prove that this is the case."
No, I don't. All I have to do is provide a philosophically sound argument that the actions you mention are morally and objectively wrong.
"But you have a burden to show that God is a more plausible explanation then e.g. the fact that the consensus on some moral wrongs comes from how we would feel if someone did that to us. And so far, you haven't (and neither has Swinburne for that matter)."
I don't think you understand what I meant by "how would you feel . . .?" That's just a primitive form of deontology and a way to explain to children that they should't behave in a certain way. Deontology, virtue ethics, and natural law ethics, have nothing to do with "feelings." You took that one word out of context and ran with it.
"Finally, of course you prefer to only bring up a few cases that support your argument and ignore other cases, and that's exactly why I chose to bring them up."
Great, and I can provide philosophically sound arguments in support of the notion that the cases you brought up are morally wrong. However, you're just changing the subject. The argument only requires that there be some objective moral obligations, and this was an assumption, not something I set out to argue for.
Doug
DeleteIf "In fact, the disagreement among human beings about LOTS of moral laws seems to indicate that whatever the source of knowledge about moral laws is" leads you to the conclusion that my claim was that there are NO moral laws that are virtually agreed upon, the I can only advise you to read what I said more carefully.
But that aside, you are now conflating two issues.
I was under the impression that we were discussion Swinburne's argument about human knowledge of moral law. I don't claim that the fact that some moral issues are controversial undermines the objectivity of moral obligations, I claim that the fact that lots of moral issues are controversial undermines the claim that KNOWLEDGE of moral facts is more likely under theism, because that knowledge isn't nearly as widespread as we would expect if this knowledge was handed to us by a morally perfect, omnipotent being. There are alternative explanations for that knwoledge, and, ironically enough, you provide them yourself, when you say that the knowledge about some of the laws that are agreed upon, could be the result of the way we would feel if someone did that to us ( a utilitarian or a consequentionalist apporach) or that we could discover them by natural law ethics etc.
Sure, our intelligence or our ability to use those methods could be more likely under the God hypothesis, but that's an entirely different argument altogether.
Anyway, I am not going to discuss this ad infinitum, so it's time for me to bow out.
Thank you for the interesting discussion.
Walter, I'll let you have the last word on this, since I agree we could go on and on. It's my position that it is God who makes it possible for us to have knowledge of moral objectivity, most especially through natural law ethics. That's been my argument from the beginning; I just didn't mention any specific ethical theory.
Delete