The PSR is either necessarily true or necessarily false

From here.

Top Ten Episodes of The Simpsons

Every once in awhile I like to take a break from philosophy on this blog and do something more lighthearted.  I'm a big Simpsons fan, and I maintain that seasons 3 through 9 comprise the show's golden era.  It won't be any surprise, then, that my list of the top ten episodes will only include episodes during that time - 1991 to 1998.

1. Last Exit to Springfield (Season Four)

2. Marge vs. the Monorail (Season Four)

3. You Only Move Twice (Season Eight)

4. Rosebud (Season Five)

5. Treehouse of Horror V (Season Six)

6. Homer at the Bat (Season Three)

7. Cape Feare (Season Five)

8. Bart Sells His Soul (Season Seven)

9. El Viaje Misterioso de Nuestro Jomer (The Mysterious Voyage of Homer) (Season Eight)

10. Flaming Moe's (Season Three)

"The City of New York vs. Homer Simpson" (Season Nine) is an honorable mention.

An Argument Against Naturalism Based on the Laws of Logic

Let's define Naturalism as the view that only nature, e.g. physical space, time, matter and energy exists.  Not only does God not exist, but nothing like God exists, either.  I propose that a commitment to the positive ontological status of the laws of logic refutes Naturalism.

1. The laws of logic are immutable. (Premise)

2. Nature is dynamic. (Premise)

3. Therefore, the laws of logic cannot be part of nature. (Implied by 1 and 2)

The laws of logic, if they exist at all, include the laws of non-contradiction, identity, excluded middle, modus ponens, and so forth.  These are not to be confused with the laws of nature (gravity, electromagnetism, and the strong and weak atomic forces).  The laws of logic are immutable.  Square-circles cannot suddenly become possibilities.  It can never be the case that A is ~A.

Nature, on the other hand, is dynamic (mutable).  It is in a constant state of flux.  Acorns have their potentialities actualized into oak trees, for example.

What this implies, according to (3), is that the laws of logic cannot be part of nature.  After all, if the laws of logic were part of nature, then that would imply the laws of logic could change.  Since this is impossible, it follows that the laws of logic exist independently of nature.  Since Naturalism is the view that only nature exists, the existence of the laws of logic refutes Naturalism.  One is either left with Platonism or theism (as a result of conceptualism).

A Summary of the Modal Cosmological Argument

1. Possibly, everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause. (Premise, W-PSR)

2. If the sum total of contingent entities C has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is a necessary cause. (Implied by 1)

3. C exists. (Premise)

4. Hence, C possibly has an explanation of its existence. (From 1 and 3)

5. Possibly, a necessary cause of C exists. (From 2 and 4)

6. Therefore, a necessary cause exists. (From 5 and S5)

A Teleological Argument from Providence

The following argument is logically valid.

1. There are patterns of regularity found in the laws of nature. (Premise)

2. The laws of nature are either the result of chance, necessity or design. (Premise)

3. Patterns of regularity cannot be the result of chance alone. (Premise)

4. Therefore, the laws of nature are either the result of necessity or design. (From 1 - 3)

Whether the laws of nature are explained by necessity or design is inconsequential at this point of the argument.  After all, given that chance is a very poor explanation, the laws of nature must be the result of someone or something's providence.

That providence is what we believers call, "God."  If it's a "someone," then we have an argument for a personal designer.  If it's a "something," then we're left with some form of pantheism.

To be honest, I just don't get why atheists won't embrace pantheism.  I think there are a lot of problems with pantheism, but pantheism makes much more sense to me than atheism.  If the atheist will simply come to terms with pantheism being a more viable belief than atheism, then I think we can make some real progress.  The debate would no longer be about theism versus atheism, but rather theism versus pantheism.

A Practical Argument for God's Existence

Suppose you're resigned to an agnostic position: it is impossible to tip the scale in favor of theism or atheism by reason alone.  Can theism still be the preferred position?  Consider the following argument.

1. If there is no God, everyone has the same fate of eternal death. (Premise)

2. The fate of eternal death is depressing. (Premise)

3. Hence, if there is no God, then everyone has a compelling reason to be depressed. (From 1 and 2)

4. All things being equal, it is more rational to believe in something that leads to happiness than in something that leads to depression. (Premise)

5. Therefore, all things being equal, it is more rational to believe in God than not. (From 3 and 4)

The Argument from Suffering and an Ad Hominem Argument for the PSR

The more sophisticated argument from suffering against God's existence is surely its evidential form.  It goes something like this:

1. If God exists, then there will not be any gratuitous sufferings. (Premise)

2. There are gratuitous sufferings. (Premise)

3. Therefore, God does not exist. (From 1 and 2)

Lest we forget, it's important to note that even if this argument were successful, it would not demonstrate that there is no God whatsoever.  There very well may be a God qua creator and sustainer of all contingently existing entities, for example.  Nevertheless, the argument from suffering, if cogent, does demonstrate that a maximally excellent God (omnipotent, omniscient and morally perfect) does not exist.

As theists, we have often challenged both premises of the argument from suffering.  However, I want to tackle this at a different angle.  I want to argue that in order for any non-trivial argument from suffering to succeed, the skeptic must accept, perhaps unwittingly, some variant of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR).

The standard response to the logical version of the argument from suffering is that God may have morally sufficient reasons for permitting evil.  The skeptic who agrees that the existence of God and the reality of suffering are compatible appropriately retorts that while God may have morally sufficient reasons for permitting suffering, he does not have such sufficient reasons in light of the many gratuitous sufferings.

Let that sink in for a moment.  The proponent of the evidential argument from suffering agrees with the theist that God can and must have morally sufficient reasons for allowing suffering.  It's at this point that the skeptic presupposes the PSR.  If he weren't, then he wouldn't be requiring God to have any morally sufficient reasons at all.

I realize this is an ad hominem argument, but not all ad hominem arguments are fallacious or personal attacks.  What I've been seeking to do in this post is simply lead the skeptic to the logically inescapable conclusion that either the PSR is true, or else God needn't provide any morally sufficient reasons for permitting suffering of any kind.  The skeptic will simply have to pick his poison and either adopt some form of theism via the PSR, or else abandon the most promising argument against an omnipotent, omniscient and morally perfect being.